Starkey v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis has been appealed. We expect the Seventh Circuit will soon have the opportunity, post-Bostock, to weigh in on the intersection of Title VII’s sexual orientation and gender identity protections and its religious organization exception, related to a religious organization’s employment decisions. This could foreshadow future disputes and court rulings in this developing area of the law.
For the full alert, visit the Faegre Drinker website.
This week, three female associates at Morrison & Foerster (“MoFo”) filed a nine-count gender, pregnancy, and maternity (“sex-plus”) discrimination class and collective action against their employer in the Northern District of California. The putative class includes all female attorneys at MoFo and other national and California subclasses of female attorneys who have been or will be employed by MoFo and who have been or will be pregnant, have children, and/or take maternity leave.
Continue reading “Big Law Hit With A Gender, Pregnancy, And Maternity Discrimination Class Action”
On June 15, 2017, J.P. Morgan Chase employee Derek Rotondo filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging that the company’s parental leave policy discriminates against males by relying on a sex-based stereotype that mothers are the primary caretakers of children, thereby denying fathers paid parental leave on the same terms as mothers. The EEOC charge, filed on a class-wide basis, seeks relief on behalf of himself and all fathers who were or will be subject to J.P. Morgan’s parental leave policy.
Continue reading “Is Your Parental Leave Policy Really Gender Neutral?”
On August 1, Massachusetts added significant teeth to the state’s current equal pay law. The new law, “An Act to Establish Pay Equity,” not only targets compensation decisions, it also affects hiring practices. As of July 1, 2018, when the new law takes effect, employers cannot ask an applicant to provide his or her prior salary history until after the candidate has successfully negotiated a job offer and compensation package. This measure is intended to stop the perpetuation of gender pay disparities from one employer to the next. In addition, employers cannot use an employee’s prior salary history as a legitimate basis to pay a man more than a woman for comparable work.
The definition of comparable work is broad: “work that is substantially similar in that it requires substantially similar skill, effort and responsibility and is performed under similar working conditions: provided, however, that a job title or job description alone shall not determine comparability.”
Continue reading “Massachusetts Joins California and New York with Aggressive Equal Pay Law”
Governor Chris Christie signed Assembly Bill 2647 (the “Gender Equity Notice and Posting Law,” N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.12) into law, effective November 21, 2012 requiring New Jersey employers with 50 or more employees to conspicuously post a notice, where it would be accessible to all workers in each of the employer’s workplaces, informing employees of their “right to be free of gender inequity or bias in pay, compensation, benefits, or other terms or conditions of employment” under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, other New Jersey State law, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the federal Equal Pay Act of 1963. (http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2012/Bills/PL12/57_.PDF)
Under the Gender Equity Notice and Posting Law, employers have 30 days from December 9, 2013, the date the New Jersey Division of Labor and Workforce Development (“NJDLWD”) issued the “notice” to comply. The gender equity notice is now available for download from the NJDLWD at: http://lwd.state.nj.us/labor/forms_pdfs/EmployerPosterPacket/genderequityposter.pdf
Here is what “covered” employers (those employers with 50 or more employees, whether they work inside or outside of New Jersey) must do:
Covered employers may distribute the gender equity notice as follows:
Covered employers must ensure that the gender equity notice contains an acknowledgment, indicating that the worker has received the notification and has read and understands its terms. The acknowledgment must be signed by the employee, in writing or electronically verified form, and returned to the employer within 30 days of receipt. The notice must be posted in English, Spanish, and any other language the employer reasonably believes is the first language of a significant number of workers in the covered employer’s workforce, provided that the NJDLWD has issued a form notice in that language.
New Jersey employers (with 10 employees or more) are reminded of the similar, annual posting and distribution requirements of the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”) and of the new posting requirement of the New Jersey SAFE Act, which provides unpaid leave for victims of domestic violence. As the end of 2013 rapidly approaches, New Jersey employers are encouraged to take time out to make sure that all postings are current for the new year, that all distribution requirements are or will be satisfied, and that handbooks are updated to reflect these new laws.
In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, decided June 24, 2013, the United States Supreme Court held that a plaintiff can no longer establish a retaliation claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), merely by demonstrating that retaliation was a “motivating factor” in the employer’s decision to fire, demote or otherwise take adverse action. Instead, plaintiffs must demonstrate that retaliation was the “but for” reason for the employer’s adverse action. In other words, plaintiffs must show that the adverse employment action would not have happened absent the employer’s unlawful retaliatory motive. This holding makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail on Title VII retaliation claims.
Defendant University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center (the “University”) and Parkland Memorial Hospital (the “Hospital”) entered into an “affiliation agreement” requiring all Hospital staff physicians to be employed by the University. Plaintiff Naiel Nassar, a medical doctor, worked as a faculty member for the University and a staff physician for the Hospital. Dr. Beth Levine was a supervisor. During his employment, Nassar complained to Levine’s supervisor, Dr. Gregory Fitz, that Levine discriminated against Nassar on the basis of his ethnic heritage and religion.
Nassar ultimately resigned from the University and, in a letter to Fitz and others, accused Levine of harassing him because he was Arab and Muslim. Although the Hospital had offered to continue employing him as a staff physician, it withdrew the offer when Fitz – unhappy about Nassar’s accusations against Levine – objected that employing a physician who was not employed by the University was inconsistent with the affiliation agreement.
Nassar filed a lawsuit in federal court in Texas asserting Title VII claims for race and religious discrimination, and retaliation. After Nassar received a jury verdict in his favor on both counts, the University appealed. With regard to the retaliation claim, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit held that Nassar had established that retaliation was a “motivating factor” in Fitz’s objection to the Hospital hiring Nassar.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the “motivating factor” standard. According to the Court, “proof that the defendant’s conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff’s injury … is a standard requirement of any tort claim.” Referring to this concept as a “default” rule, the Court explained that the rule applies “absent an indication to the contrary” in a statute.
Against this backdrop, the Court observed that Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of two different categories: (1) “personal characteristics,” which are race, color, religion, sex and national origin; and (2) “protected employee conduct,” which is opposing or complaining about workplace discrimination. Title VII addresses these two different categories in two separate statutory sections, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (personal characteristics) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (protected employee conduct).
According to the Court, in the personal characteristics section of Title VII, Congress clearly indicated that the motivating factor standard applies. Indeed, the statute includes the phrase “motivating factor” and states that discrimination is prohibited “even though other factors also motivated the practice.” Thus, the Court explained, Congress plainly indicated its intent that the motivating factor analysis applies to claims under this section.
In contrast, in the protected employee conduct section of Title VII, Congress did not use this language. Instead, the section prohibits an employer from retaliating “because of” protected employee activity – language that the Court, when analyzing other statutes, has interpreted as meaning that the “but for” standard applies.
In reaching its decision, the Court declined to give deference to the guidance manual published by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which reflected the agency’s view that the “lessened causation standard” applies to Title VII retaliation claims. According to the Court, the EEOC’s reasoning “lack[ed] … persuasive force” and was “circular.”
The Court concluded that a plaintiff asserting a claim for retaliation under Title VII must present “proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.” The Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
For employers, the Nassar decision is good news. As the Court noted, “claims of retaliation are being made with ever-increasing frequency” and applying the “motivating factor” standard advocated by Nassar could have “contribute[d] to the filing of frivolous claims.” However, this decision only applies to retaliation claims under Title VII. The decision does not alter the standard of proof for retaliation claims under other statutes – particularly state statutes – and employers should continue to exercise caution when taking action against an employer who has engaged in protected activity.