Laborsphere

Three Steps to Prepare for the Labor Department’s Proposed Rule on Paid Sick Leave

The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) released a proposed rule that requires federal contractors and subcontractors to provide workers with seven days of paid sick leave on an annual basis. The proposed rule, released on Feb. 25, was created in response to President Barack Obama’s Executive Order 13706, which directed the DOL to issue and finalize regulations this year.

The proposed rule is projected to extend paid sick leave to more than 800,000 employees, 400,000 of which don’t currently receive any paid sick leave, within a five-year period, according to DOL estimates.

Although the DOL has extended the comments period on the proposed rule through April 12, employers and human resources professionals should start preparing for implementation. Here are three things companies can do to prepare:

1. Review and revise policies

HR professionals should compare their employer’s existing policies with the proposed rule to see where revisions are needed. Employers may find that the changes are not as drastic as expected, and they can plan for changes in existing policies to comply with the proposed rule.

For example, the proposed federal rule explains that existing sick leave policies can be used to satisfy the new requirements if they provide at least as much paid time off (i.e., 56 hours a year), and allow the employee to use the existing time off for the reasons covered by the new rule. Many employers likely already have similar policies in place, especially if they have employees in states and municipalities that currently require paid time off for attending to family illnesses, or if the employee has been a victim of domestic violence, including California, Connecticut, Philadelphia, New York City and Seattle, among others.

2. Track and evaluate employee reasons

Employers should also confirm that they are tracking the reasons why employees are taking time off from work. This is already important in terms of compliance with the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and corresponding state laws, and will make it easier to comply with the record keeping obligations under the new law. We often find that records may inaccurately report that the employee took vacation when the time was actually taken due to an employee’s illness or to care for a sick family member.

3. Document and verify

The proposed rule allows employers to require certification from an employee’s health care provider attesting to the need for leave if the employee is/was absent for three or more consecutive full work days, as is done in the context of FMLA leave or when providing time off as a reasonable accommodation under disability laws. That will help to prevent any possible misuse of the benefit.

Existing leave laws and the proposed rule also require employees to give as much advance notice as practicable regarding the need for paid time off. Employers should require compliance with reasonable “call-out” policies to minimize the disruption caused by absences covered by applicable leave laws.

The future of paid sick leave

While it is possible that this proposed rule may not come to fruition following the presidential election in November, it is indicative of a larger national push for paid sick leave. We are seeing a trend towards allowing employees to use sick time for reasons covered by this proposed new rule, such as care of family members. We are also seeing a trend in employers adopting general ‘PTO’ or paid time off policies that combine days off for personal time, such as attending a child’s school function or a routine doctor appointment, with vacation time and sick time.

With many state and local governments already leaning towards adding paid sick leave benefits, it would be wise for federal contractors and subcontractors to review their policies and make sure they are in compliance with this proposed rule.

Have a Seat: The California Supreme Court Clarifies the Wage Orders’ Suitable Seating Rules

On April 4, 2016, the California Supreme Court issued an opinion concerning the Industrial Welfare Commission’s (IWC) Wage Orders’ suitable seating rules. According to the California Supreme Court, whether an employer must provide seating while employees are actively engaged in duties depends on employees’ tasks performed at given work locations. The Court determined that if the tasks being performed at any given location reasonably permit sitting, and provision of a seat would not interfere with performance of any other tasks that may require standing, an employer must provide a seat. The Court held that the determination of whether work “reasonably permits” sitting is a question to be resolved objectively, based on the totality of the circumstances. While an employer’s business judgment and the physical layout of the workplace are relevant factors, they are not dispositive. However, an employer’s preference that employees stand and/or individual employees’ physical characteristics are not to be considered. Finally, the Court held that the burden of establishing that no suitable seating is available falls on the employer.

The Wage Orders’ Seating Provisions

Over a century ago, the California Legislature established the IWC to investigate various industries and to promulgate Wage Orders establishing minimum wages, maximum work hours, and conditions of labor. The majority of Wage Orders currently in effect contain a section devoted to the provision of seating to employees—Section 14. Section 14(A) of the Wage Orders in question provides that “employees shall be provided with suitable seats when the nature of the work reasonably permits the use of seats.” Section 14(B) provides that “when employees are not engaged in the active duties of their employment and the nature of the work requires standing, an adequate number of suitable seats shall be placed in reasonable proximity to the work area, and employees shall be permitted to use such seats when it does not interfere with the performance of their duties.”

The Issues from Kilby and Henderson

The certified questions before the California Supreme Court arose from two related federal appeals, Kilby v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. and Henderson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA. The cases involved application of identical seating provisions contained in Wage Orders 7 (Mercantile Industry) and 4 (Professional, Technical, Clerical, Mechanical and Similar Occupations), respectively.

In Kilby, the plaintiff, a CVS Pharmacy, Inc. (CVS), customer service representative, sought to represent other CVS retail employees who, like her, were denied seats while performing their jobs. The plaintiff’s duties in Kilby included operating a cash register, straightening and stocking shelves, organizing products in front of and behind the sales counter, cleaning the register, vacuuming, gathering shopping baskets, and removing trash. The district court concluded that Sections 14(A) and 14(B) of the applicable Wage Order were mutually exclusive. It reasoned that section 14(A) applied when an employee was actually engaged in work, while section 14(B) applied when an employee was not actively working. In evaluating the “nature of the work” under Section 14(A), the district court held that an employee’s entire range of assigned duties had to be considered together. Because it was undisputed that some of the performed duties required the employee to stand, the district court ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to seating during her work time and granted summary judgment for CVS. The plaintiff appealed.

Henderson was a putative class action brought by three bank tellers at JPMorgan Chase Bank NA (Chase). Chase tellers had duties associated with their teller stations, including accepting deposits, cashing checks, and handling withdrawals. They also had duties away from their stations, such as escorting customers to safety deposit boxes, working at the drive-up teller window, and making sure that automatic teller machines were working properly. These duties varied, depending on the shift or branch location and on whether the employee was a lead or regular teller. On the basis of these differences, the district court denied class certification, and the plaintiffs appealed.

Faced with Kilby and Henderson, the Ninth Circuit certified three questions for the California Supreme Court to answer:

Does the phrase “nature of the work” (used in Section 14 of most Wage Orders) refer to individual tasks that are performed throughout the workday, or to the entire range of an employee’s duties that are performed during a given day or shift?
When determining whether the nature of the work “reasonably permits” use of a seat, what factors should courts consider? Specifically, are an employer’s business judgment, the physical layout of the workplace, and the characteristics of a specific employee relevant factors?
If an employer has not provided any seat, must a plaintiff prove that a suitable seat is available in order to show that the employer has violated the seating provision?

A Location-Driven “Nature of the Work” Standard

As to the first certified question, the defendants argued that examining when the “nature of the work reasonably permits the use of seats” requires consideration of an employee’s job as a whole, i.e., a “holistic” consideration of all of an employee’s tasks and duties throughout a shift. In the defendants’ eyes, if the majority of an employee’s duties favored standing, no seat would be required. By contrast, the plaintiffs argued that whether the “nature of the work reasonably permits the use of seats” turns on a task-by-task evaluation of whether any single task may feasibly be performed seated. In their eyes, if any individual task could be done sitting down, a seat had to be provided.

The California Supreme Court, however, took a middle-of-the-road approach instead. The Court held that, when evaluating whether the “nature of the work reasonably permits the use of seats,” courts must examine subsets of an employee’s total tasks and duties by location, such as those performed at a cash register or a teller window, and must consider whether it is feasible for an employee to perform each set of location-specific tasks while seated. According to the Court, the focus should be on the actual tasks performed by employees (or those reasonably expected to be performed), as opposed to abstract characterizations, job titles, or job descriptions. In the Court’s view, tasks that are performed with more frequency or for a longer duration are more germane to the seating inquiry than tasks performed briefly or infrequently.

The Court also clarified that Section 14(A) and 14(B) of the Wage Orders are not mutually exclusive, although they do not apply at the same time. If an employee’s actual tasks at a discrete location make seated work feasible, he or she is entitled to a seat under Section 14(A) while working there. However, if other job duties take the employee to a different location where he or she must perform tasks while standing, the employee would be entitled to a seat under Section 14(B) during “lulls in operation.”

The Multifactor “Reasonably Permits” Analysis

According to the California Supreme Court, whether an employee is entitled to a seat under Section 14(A) depends on the totality of the circumstances. The analysis starts with an examination of the relevant tasks, grouped by location, and whether the tasks can be performed while seated or require standing. In undertaking this analysis, consideration must be given to the feasibility of providing seats. Feasibility considerations may include, for example, an assessment of whether providing a seat would unduly interfere with other standing tasks, whether the frequency of transition from sitting to standing may interfere with the work, or whether seated work would impact the quality and effectiveness of overall job performance. The analysis is to be qualitative in nature—not a rigid counting of tasks or amount of time spent performing them.

The Court held that an employer’s business judgment about the nature of work could be considered. However, the Court rejected the notion that an employer’s mere preference for standing—as opposed to sitting—could be part of the analysis.

As to work location, the Court held that the physical characteristics of the area where the work is performed should be part of the assessment. On the other hand, just as an employer’s preference for standing could not constitute a relevant “business judgment,” the Court held that employers are not permitted to deliberately design workspaces to further a preference for standing or to deny a seat that might otherwise be reasonably suited for the contemplated tasks.

Finally, the Court held that the analysis should focus on the nature of the tasks at issue and should take into account the location where they are to be performed, as opposed to specific employees’ experiences and abilities in performing tasks. Thus, whether a seat is required depends on the work, as opposed to the physical characteristics of any employees.

Showing That Seating Is Not Feasible Is an Employer’s Burden

The California Supreme Court also held that an employer that seeks to be excused from Section 14(A) bears the burden of showing that compliance is infeasible because no suitable seating exists. There is no obligation on plaintiffs to demonstrate that they requested a seat or that it would be feasible to provide seating for any position.

Takeaways

While the California Supreme Court’s opinion clarifies the Wage Orders’ seating requirements, it may require many California employers to dramatically alter their work environments by providing employees with seats. The decision has particularly significant implications for employers in customer-facing environments where seating may be less common and more difficult to implement, including in the retail and hospitality industries.

In light of this new guidance, employers who do not currently provide seats at all times should examine the nature of their employees’ job duties and work environments to determine whether certain types of work (and work locations) are amenable to seated employees. In addition, employers should ensure that they have suitable seats for employees when they are not actively engaged in their duties. For assistance with ensuring compliance, employers should seek advice from qualified California employment counsel.

Tyson Foods Ruling Opens the Door for Use of Statistical Averaging in Wage and Hour Class Actions

Last week, in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo et al., No. 14-1146, the United States Supreme Court ruled that class certification was appropriate in a wage and hour class and collective action, despite the lack of individualized evidence for the amount of uncompensated time worked by each class member. The Court instead allowed the employees to use a statistical expert who conducted representative time studies to determine the average number of minutes that the employees spent on pre-shift and post-shift activities. The Court rejected Tyson’s arguments against the use of representative sample averaging, including Tyson’s reliance on Wal-Mart Stores. Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), which denied certification in a nationwide Title VII class because liability and damages would require individualized proof.

Plaintiff employees in Tyson worked at Tyson Foods, Inc.’s (“Tyson”) pork-processing facility in Storm Lake, Iowa, in the “kill,” “cut,” and “retrim” departments. In the course of their duties, they were required to wear protective gear, the composition of which varied with the tasks that each worker performed on any given day. During the applicable class period, Tyson paid some employees for donning and doffing activities, but did not compensate others at all. Tyson did not record the amount of time that each employee spent donning and doffing.

Arguing that the time that they spent donning and doffing protective gear was an integral part of their hazardous work, Tyson employees filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa (“District Court”). In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that Tyson’s failure to compensate them for donning and doffing resulted in the denial of overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 207(a), and the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law, Iowa Code § 91A.3. Plaintiffs sought certification of their Iowa wage claims as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 23”), and of their FLSA claim as a “collective action” under 29 U.S.C. § 216.

To certify a class action under FRCP Rule 23, the trial court must find that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over questions affecting individual members.” The most significant issue in Tyson was whether the time spent donning and doffing protective gear was compensable work under the FLSA; a question common to the entire class. However, in order to recover damages, a second important question was whether each employee could prove the amount of time spent donning and doffing their equipment and whether that time constituted overtime work in any work week.

In opposition to plaintiffs’ class certification motion, Tyson contended that, because of the variance in protective gear that each employee wore, the employees’ claims were not sufficiently similar to be resolved on a class-wide basis. The District Court rejected that position and concluded that there were common questions susceptible to class-wide resolution, including (1) whether the donning and doffing of protective gear could be considered work under the FLSA; (2) whether such work was integral and indispensable to the plaintiff employees’ work; and (3) if compensable, whether such work was de minimis. The District Court accordingly certified a Rule 23 class of 3,344 employees with respect to plaintiffs’ claims under Iowa law, and a class of 444 opt-ins under the FLSA.

At trial, to establish Tyson’s liability for overtime, each employee was required to show that he or she worked more than 40 hours each week, inclusive of time spent donning and doffing. Because no records of time spent donning and doffing existed, however, plaintiffs relied on a study performed by an industrial relations expert, who conducted 744 videotaped observations, recorded the amount of time that various donning and doffing activities took, and calculated an average for each department. The data from this statistical sampling yielded an average of 18 minutes a day for the cut and retrim departments and 21.25 minutes for the kill department.

Relying on this data, plaintiffs furnished another expert who estimated the amount of uncompensated time worked by each employee by adding the average donning and doffing time to the compensable/recorded time reflected in plaintiffs’ existing time records. Using this methodology, plaintiffs’ expert estimated that 212 employees did not meet the 40-hour threshold and could not recover damages for unpaid overtime; the remaining class members, however, had potentially been uncompensated to some degree.

Crucially, Tyson failed to challenge the validity of the statistical sampling and analyses prepared by plaintiffs’ experts in a hearing under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and made no effort to rebut the evidence with an expert of its own. Instead, echoing its arguments in opposition to class certification, Tyson argued to the jury that the variable amount of time that it took employees to don and doff different varieties of protective equipment made the lawsuit “too speculative for class-wide recovery.” Ultimately, although the calculations of plaintiffs’ experts supported an aggregate award of $6.7 million dollars, the jury returned a verdict of only $2.9 million in damages for unpaid wages. A subsequent ruling on liquidated damages upped the total award to $5.8 million.

Relying on Wal-Mart v. Dukes and other authority, on appeal, Tyson strenuously argued that the amount of time spent donning and doffing protective gear varied from person to person and required individualized inquiries, thus rendering class treatment improper. Rejecting this argument, the Court ruled that Wal-Mart did not stand for the broad proposition that a representative sample is an impermissible means of establishing class-wide liability. Wal-Mart involved, in part, a claim that supervisors misused their discretion in hiring and promoting female employees. The employees could not point to a common policy and instead proposed using a “sample set of selected class members” to determine both liability and damages for the entire class. The Court rejected the Wal-Mart plaintiffs’ proposed methodology as “trial by formula.”

By contrast, the Tyson Court noted there was a common policy with respect to liability, and the time study could be introduced in each individual claim to determine that employee’s overall hours for the week. The Court further noted that, unlike Wal-Mart, the Tyson employees all worked in the same facility, did similar work, and were paid under the same policy. The Court also was influenced by the principle that Tyson’s failure to keep records should not be used against the employees. In this respect, the Court relied heavily on its opinion in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686-688 (1946), to hold that so long as “each class member could have relied on the sample to establish liability if he or she had brought an individual class action, . . . that sample [could serve] as a permissible means of establishing the employees’ hours” on a class-wide basis. Tyson, slip op. at 11.

Takeaways

Tyson does not necessarily erode the holding of Wal-Mart because, as the Court was careful to note, the two cases are so factually and legally different. However, in Title VII employment discrimination class actions, the courts may be open to smaller class actions involving employees who work in the same facility, perform similar tasks, or are supervised by common management.

Tyson’s ramifications for wage and hour class actions are far greater. The Tyson method of proving damages could be applied to other “off the clock” wage and hour class actions, such as pre-shift and post-shift administrative or maintenance work, missed lunch and meal breaks, security checks, or travel between job sites.

Finally, the Court assumed, without deciding, that the standards for certifying an FLSA collective action and a Rule 23 class action are the same. This may be significant because the relative sizes of the classes are different, with the FLSA collective action usually being much smaller. Several federal circuit courts of appeal have held that the standards for certifying an FLSA collective action and a Rule 23 class action are not the same. The Court may be forecasting that it will have to decide this issue in the future.

For further information about this alert, please contact the authors above or any member of our Labor and Employment Practice Group.

Get the Most Out of Your Employee Payroll Audit

Employee payroll audits, which have long been recommended as a best practice for corporations that want to stay on the right side of the law, have become even more critical with the current proliferation of labor and employment laws at the state level. Among other things, the California Fair Pay Act, which went into effect on January 1, 2016, places new demands on California employers that in many cases can only be effectively satisfied by means that include a payroll audit.

Earlier this month, we held a webinar to discuss the CA Fair Pay Act requirements and what employees should do to comply. Below you will find some of the key takeaways.

What is the California Fair Pay Act?

The new law goes further and imposes more obligations on employers than longstanding federal and state equal-pay and employment-discrimination laws. More than simply requiring employers to pay men and women equal pay for the same work, the California statute prohibits employers from paying members of one sex less than the rates paid to employees of the opposite sex “for substantially similar work, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility, and performed under similar working conditions.” And the employees of opposite sexes whose jobs and pay are being compared need not work together in the same establishment. There are several important defenses to liability under the law, such as the employer’s use of a bona fide factor that is not sex-related.

How can a payroll audit help?

Determining what types of work are “substantially similar” in terms of skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions is no easy task. That’s where a payroll audit can help.

On a step-by-step basis, a properly conducted audit will identify potential problems under the California Fair Pay Act by identifying positions that have “substantially similar work,” analyzing the pay of these workers by gender, finding any disparities in pay, and determining whether any defenses apply. For example, does the company have a bona fide seniority system or merit system, or is there a business necessity for the disparities in pay?

In addition to these complex Fair Pay Act questions, employee payroll audits remain desirable or necessary for other purposes, such as ensuring that employees are treated fairly under the company’s employee benefit plan and that certain employees or groups of employees are not excluded from the plan.

What steps should be taken?

When conducting a payroll audit, it should be done with review and consultation of attorney with the end goal of identifying and quickly addressing disparities that cannot be explained adequately or need to be corrected. It is important to note that the audit is subject to attorney/client privilege and/or work product protection. The following are key steps in the audit process:

Consider all job titles/descriptions across all geographic regions
Consider how to identify or sort based on disparate geographical locations
Compare the positions that have “substantially similar work”
Determine if the statutory exemptions apply
Identify explanations for disparities
Address disparities that can’t be explained
Determine what action needs to be taken

Ongoing Compliance

From a compliance perspective, the number one benefit to conducting employee payroll audits is the ability to determine what action needs to be taken to address and correct disparities if they exist. Failure to address disparities that can’t be explained within the requirements of the California Fair Pay Act or the Federal Pay Act can result in penalties, sanctions and, in some cases, litigation with the DOL and/or IRS. Ongoing compliance should include regular review of the following:

Handbooks and policies to remove outdated references to “equal” work
Policies that prevent employees from discussing or asking about other employees’ compensation
How compensation decisions are made and adjust if necessary
Job descriptions – update and describe as comprehensive as possible
Record keeping – records must be kept for three years
Training of HR personnel, senior management on the new law and how it should be applied in setting compensation at hiring

Click here to watch the full presentation.

Click here to view a PDF of the presentation.

California Employers: New Poster to be Posted April 1, 2016

Did you recently update your workplace posters? Time to do it again.

In California, all employers have obligations to satisfy workplace posting, such as posting information related to wages, hours and working conditions. The workplace posters must be placed in an area frequented by employees where these posters may be easily read during the workday.

As a result of new amended regulations pertaining to the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) going into effect on April 1, 2016, certain covered employers must post a new poster on April 1, 2016. Employers with 5 or more employees (full-time or part-time) are covered by the FEHA and must post a specific notice, which replaces Pregnancy Disability Leave (“PDL”) Notice A. This new poster, titled “Your Rights and Obligations as a Pregnant Employee,” provides clarifications of the PDL, including, but not limited to, the following:

Eligible employees are entitled up to four months of leave per pregnancy, and not per year;
The four months means the working days the employee would normally work in one-third of a year or 17 1/3 weeks; and
PDL does not need to be taken all at once, but can be taken on an as-needed basis as required by the employee’s health care provider.

For a copy of this poster, click here.

Under the California Code of Regulations, “[a]ny FEHA-covered employer whose work force at any facility or establishment is comprised of 10% or more persons whose spoken language is not English shall translate the notice into every language that is spoken by at least 10 percent of the workforce.” The Spanish version of the foregoing notice should be available soon at http://www.dfeh.ca.gov/Publications_Publications.htm.

Any time employers are required to update their posters and/or new (or amended) regulations are issued, employers should take the opportunity to ensure their workplace posters and their employee handbooks and policies are up to date and compliant.

For further information, please contact the author or any member of our Labor and Employment Practice Group.

Courts in New Jersey Continue to Endorse “Awkward Theory” of Individual Liability in NJLAD Cases

Referred to by some courts as an “awkward theory” of liability, employers and supervisors should be aware that courts in New Jersey continue to recognize the viability of individual liability claims under the “aiding and abetting” provision of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. §10:5-12(e).

Personal Liability for Supervisors: Title VII vs. NJLAD

Unlike Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act, which does not provide for individual employee liability, New Jersey courts have held that in addition to “employers” being liable under NJLAD, supervisors can be personally liable for their illegal conduct under an “aiding and abetting” theory. The New Jersey Supreme Court recently clarified the expansive definition of “supervisor” for purposes of the NJLAD as an employee who is (1) authorized to undertake tangible employment decisions affecting the plaintiff, or (2) authorized by the employer to direct the plaintiff’s day-to-day work activities. Aguas v. New Jersey, 220 N.J. 494, 529 (2015).

To hold a supervisor liable as an “aider and abetter” under the NJLAD, a plaintiff must show that the individual (1) performed a wrongful act that caused an injury; (2) was generally aware of his or her role as part of an overall illegal activity at the time that he or she provided the assistance; and (3) knowingly and substantially assisted in the principal violation. Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 70, 83084 (2004). Aiding and abetting requires “active and purposeful conduct.” Cicchetti v. Morris County Sheriff’s Office, 194 N.J. 563, 595 (2008).

What Makes this Aiding and Abetting Theory so “Awkward”?

Courts applying New Jersey law have yet to follow a uniform rule in situations where the plaintiff alleges that a supervisor aided and abetted the “employer” in violating the NJLAD based on the supervisor’s own conduct (i.e., as the sole actor engaged in the wrongful conduct). In other words, what happens when the supervisor is the only person alleged to have engaged in the wrongful conduct? Two distinct lines of cases have developed in this area of the law – one finding supervisory employees can be personally liable for aiding and abetting their own/the employer’s wrongful conduct (e.g., Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 1999), and another refusing to impose individual liability (e.g., Newsome v. Admin. Office of the Courts of N.J., 103 F. Supp. 2d 807 (D.N.J. 2000). See Aiding and Abetting Your Own Conduct, New Jersey Law Journal, Volume 209 (July 16, 2012), Employment Counselor, Number 241 (Sept. 2010).

A string of recent decisions by New Jersey state and federal courts suggest that this “awkward” theory is here to stay. For example, in Yobe v. Renaissance Electric, Inc., 2016 WL 614425 (D.N.J. Feb. 16, 2016), the court denied a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s NJLAD disability retaliation claims against his former supervisor, who was the only person alleged to have engaged in the retaliatory conduct. The defendant argued that the plaintiff’s claim failed as a matter of law because a supervisor cannot “aid and abet” his own conduct. Citing to the Third Circuit’s “prediction” in Hurley that the New Jersey Supreme Court would hold a supervisor personally liable under NJLAD, and an unpublished, non-precedential decision by the New Jersey Appellate Division in Rowan v. Hartford Plaza Ltd., 2013 WL 1350095 (App. Div. April. 5, 2013), the court in Yobe concluded that “[w]hile it is concededly an ‘awkward theory’ to hold an individual liable for aiding and abetting his own conduct, it would thwart the NJLAD’s broad and remedial purpose, and make little sense, to construe it as permitting ‘individual liability for a supervisor who encourages or facilitates another employee’s harassing conduct, while precluding individual liability for the supervisor based on his or her own discriminatory or harassing conduct.’”

Impact on Employers and Individual Supervisors

In discrimination, hostile work environment and retaliation cases brought under the NJLAD, it is common for a plaintiff to name his or her former supervisor as an individual defendant, particularly if the supervisor is the person who made the decision to take an adverse employment action against the plaintiff. Naming the supervisor, particularly a high-level manager, might be viewed by the plaintiff as a tactical move to encourage an early settlement by driving a wedge between the employer’s interest in defending its business decision and the supervisor’s reputational or financial impact concerns. Absent a showing of fraudulent joinder, a plaintiff’s naming of his or her supervisor as a defendant might prevent the employer from removing the action to federal court based on complete diversity of citizenship. In addition, legal fees could increase if separate legal representation for the employer and the supervisor is required. These important issues should be considered and discussed with counsel at the outset of the case. Because the NJLAD does not provide for individual liability for aiding and abetting if the employer is not found liable, the best defense is a unified one between the employer and the individual supervisor.