The New Jersey District Court in St. Cyr v. Brandywine Senior Living LLC, recently granted summary judgment to the employer dismissing the plaintiff’s causes of action for handicap and race discrimination, but allowed the plaintiff to go to trial on her claim that she was unlawfully discharged in violation of the FMLA in retaliation for asking for a medical leave of absence because she was fired only two days before the leave of absence was to begin. In granting summary judgment on the claim of handicap discrimination, the court determined that the plaintiff, who suffered from arthritis, was not “handicapped” under the NJLAD because the condition, which was alleviated with medication, did not interfere with her ability to perform her job, and because she never asked for an accommodation for the condition. The court rejected her claim of race discrimination based on her admission that the only evidence implicating racial animus was the fact that she was fired for watching the BET Network on television during working hours. The court noted that the plaintiff, who had previously been placed on probation for poor performance and was on final warning, was replaced by an African American employee and had failed to show the legitimate reason given for her discharge was pretextual. Despite that finding, however, and despite the fact that the employer had granted the plaintiff’s request for a medical leave of absence, the court denied summary judgment on the claim of retaliatory discharge under the FMLA based only on the determination that the timing of the discharge – only two days before her FMLA leave was to begin – was “unusually suggestive” of retaliatory motivation. The court did not explain how the timing could be suspect if that was when the plaintiff was found watching television instead of doing her job, and if there was no evidence that the proffered reason was pretextual.
Category: Counseling & Compliance Training
New Jersey District Court Denies Employer’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Cause of Action After Employee’s Supervisor Gains Unauthorized Access to Employee’s Facebook Account
In Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hospital Service Corp., the District Court in New Jersey recently denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s cause of action for invasion of privacy in connection with a supervisor having gained unauthorized access to her private Facebook account. The plaintiff nurse, who was also the union president at the hospital, had posted comments on her Facebook wall about the news story out of Washington, D.C. in 2009 concerning the killing of a security guard at the Holocaust Museum by a white supremacist in which she expressed her opinion or rant that the paramedics in D.C. should have let the shooter die rather than help him after he was shot during the incident: “He survived [and] I blame the DC paramedics. I want to say 2 things to the DC medics. 1. WHAT WERE YOU THINKING? and 2. This was your opportunity to really make a difference! WTF!!!! And to the other guards…. go to target practice.” The supervisor apparently wanted access to plaintiff’s Facebook comments because of her leadership role with the union, and convinced a co-worker to give him access to her private account so he could copy her postings. When he saw the comments about the D.C. incident he sent a copy to the State Board of Nursing suggesting that it represented an improper disregard for patient safety.
On the employer’s motion to dismiss the invasion of privacy claim on the grounds that there can be no expectation of privacy with respect to Facebook postings, the court decided that the question whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy was for a jury to decide based on the circumstances, including the number of “friends” who had access to her Facebook wall where the plaintiff claimed that she had restricted access to her friends but did not provide access to any supervisors or members of management. The court did not address the separate question whether a rant expressing an opinion about a news report could be considered an expression of one’s “private affairs” subject to protection under invasion of privacy law, and did not address the fact that Facebook specifically includes in its Privacy Policy a disclaimer to the effect that there is no guarantee of privacy and that users make postings at their own risk inasmuch as anyone with access can copy or share comments with anyone they choose.
Who’s The Boss: Third Circuit Announces Joint Employer Test for FLSA Cases, Opening the Door to Broader Exposure to Wage and Hour Liability
On June 29, 2012 the Third Circuit responded for the first time to a question pondered by many employers and courts within its judicial districts: what constitutes a “joint employer” under the FLSA? In a case captioned In re: Enterprise Rent-a-Car Wage & Hour Employment Practices Litigation, the Third Circuit announced a four part, multi-factor test as an answer to this question.
In the Enterprise case, the joint employer question was raised as a result of the filing of a collective action by assistant branch managers at subsidiaries of Enterprise Holdings, Inc., seeking overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). While these assistant managers were employees of Enterprise Holdings’ subsidiaries, they nevertheless sought relief from Enterprise Holdings on the theory that it was a joint employer.
In answering whether Enterprise Holdings falls within the category of “joint employer,” the Third Circuit noted that the definition of “employer” under the FLSA is “the broadest definition that has ever been included in any one act.” Emphasizing that the definition of employer focuses on “control,” the Third Circuit concluded that ultimate control over employees is not necessarily required and even “indirect” control may be sufficient
To determine whether a party is a “joint employer,” and thereby subject to FLSA liability, the Third Circuit adopted the following analysis:
Does the alleged employer have:
- Authority to hire and fire employees;
- Authority to promulgate work rules and assignments, and set conditions of employment, including compensation, benefits, hours and work schedules, including the rate and method of payment;
- Day-to-day supervision, including employee discipline; and
- Control of employee records, including payroll, insurance, taxes, and the like.
The Third Circuit emphasized that the factors identified do not constitute an exhaustive list and should not be “blindly applied.” Rather, under the Third Circuit’s guidance, courts are to look to the “total employment situation” and “economic realities of the work relationship.”
How did Enterprise Holdings, the sole stockholder of thirty-eight domestic subsidiaries, avoid the label of “joint employer”? Even despite finding that a three-member board of directors for each subsidiary consisted of the same people who sat on Enterprise Holding’s three-member board, the Third Circuit focused on other key facts in support of its decision: (i) Enterprise Holdings had no authority to hire or fire assistant managers; (ii) Enterprise Holdings had no authority to promulgate work rules or assignments; (iii) Enterprise Holdings had no authority to set compensation benefits, schedules, or rates or methods of payment; (iv) Enterprise Holdings was not involved in employee supervision or employee discipline; and (v) Enterprise Holdings did not exercise or maintain any control over employee records. Among these factors, the Third Circuit emphasized that Enterprise Holdings only “suggested” various Human Resources and salary policies and that the adoption of such suggestions was not mandatory, rendering the parent company more akin to a third-party consultant.
In light of this decision, employers and, in particular, parent corporations, should be aware of the fact that courts within the Third Circuit (Delaware, New Jersey and Pennsylvania) will apply the “Enterprise” test going forward. Notwithstanding, while the test has been articulated, the analysis remains highly fact intensive and courts are by no means limited to consideration of the factors identified in the Enterprise decision. Employers unsure of their FLSA joint employer status should contact their labor and employment counsel.
New Jersey Court Affirms Sanction Against Law Firm For Losing Emails
The New Jersey Appellate Division has affirmed an order imposing sanctions against defense counsel for losing attorney-client emails that were relevant to the question whether a settlement had been reached between the parties and that had been identified on defendants’ privilege log. When the judge directed that the emails be submitted for in camera inspection, defense counsel replied that they were not available because they had been in the file of the defendants’ prior counsel and could no longer be located.
Plaintiffs’ counsel then retained a forensic expert and incurred over $10,000 in costs and attorneys’ fees to recover the emails from backup tapes on the hard drive of the original defense counsel’s firm. The judge then determined after in camera inspection that the emails were admissible, and ordered the defendants and the law firm representing them to jointly reimburse plaintiffs for that expense. The emails ultimately formed the foundation for the trial court’s ruling in plaintiffs’ favor at trial.
On appeal, the defense firm argued that the sanction was improper because it had not violated any Court Rule in connection with its handling of the emails, and because there was no evidence of intentional spoliation. The Appellate Division disagreed.
In its opinion in Goldmark v. Brach Eichler LLC, the Court observed that the trial judge had inherent power to impose discovery sanctions, and held that the sanctions were proper even in the absence of intentional spoliation because counsel had an obligation to preserve the documents identified on its privilege log and produce them as required for in camera inspection. The Court concluded that “[i]t would make a mockery of our discovery rules to allow a party or
its counsel – after identifying privileged information – to destroy or carelessly lose or misplace the materials in question.”
Courts consistently hold that litigants and in-house counsel must preserve documents that bear a relationship to issues in litigation. Consistent with that, the Goldmark opinion reminds counsel of record to preserve all potentially relevant emails – including privileged client communications – during litigation.
EEOC’s Guidance on the Use of Criminal History Records Under Title VII Comes as New News to Many Small Businesses
In our post on April 30, 2012, we highlighted the EEOC’s recent guidance on the use of criminal history records to discriminate against job applicants. To read our original post click here. As businesses large and small now look to make sense of the new guidance, and to tailor appropriate policies, many are discovering that they may have been unknowingly violating the law. For some interesting thoughts on the EEOC’s Guidance on the use of criminal history records under Title VII from the perspective of small businesses, check out this well-sourced post by New York Times reporter Robb Mandelbaum and his related article.