Counseling & Compliance Training - Page 77 of 90

Supreme Court Applies Tougher “But For” Standard to Title VII Retaliation Claims

In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, decided June 24, 2013, the United States Supreme Court held that a plaintiff can no longer establish a retaliation claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), merely by demonstrating that retaliation was a “motivating factor” in the employer’s decision to fire, demote or otherwise take adverse action. Instead, plaintiffs must demonstrate that retaliation was the “but for” reason for the employer’s adverse action. In other words, plaintiffs must show that the adverse employment action would not have happened absent the employer’s unlawful retaliatory motive. This holding makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail on Title VII retaliation claims.

Defendant University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center (the “University”) and Parkland Memorial Hospital (the “Hospital”) entered into an “affiliation agreement” requiring all Hospital staff physicians to be employed by the University. Plaintiff Naiel Nassar, a medical doctor, worked as a faculty member for the University and a staff physician for the Hospital. Dr. Beth Levine was a supervisor. During his employment, Nassar complained to Levine’s supervisor, Dr. Gregory Fitz, that Levine discriminated against Nassar on the basis of his ethnic heritage and religion.

Nassar ultimately resigned from the University and, in a letter to Fitz and others, accused Levine of harassing him because he was Arab and Muslim. Although the Hospital had offered to continue employing him as a staff physician, it withdrew the offer when Fitz – unhappy about Nassar’s accusations against Levine – objected that employing a physician who was not employed by the University was inconsistent with the affiliation agreement.

Nassar filed a lawsuit in federal court in Texas asserting Title VII claims for race and religious discrimination, and retaliation. After Nassar received a jury verdict in his favor on both counts, the University appealed. With regard to the retaliation claim, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit held that Nassar had established that retaliation was a “motivating factor” in Fitz’s objection to the Hospital hiring Nassar.

In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the “motivating factor” standard. According to the Court, “proof that the defendant’s conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff’s injury … is a standard requirement of any tort claim.” Referring to this concept as a “default” rule, the Court explained that the rule applies “absent an indication to the contrary” in a statute.

Against this backdrop, the Court observed that Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of two different categories: (1) “personal characteristics,” which are race, color, religion, sex and national origin; and (2) “protected employee conduct,” which is opposing or complaining about workplace discrimination. Title VII addresses these two different categories in two separate statutory sections, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (personal characteristics) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (protected employee conduct).

According to the Court, in the personal characteristics section of Title VII, Congress clearly indicated that the motivating factor standard applies. Indeed, the statute includes the phrase “motivating factor” and states that discrimination is prohibited “even though other factors also motivated the practice.” Thus, the Court explained, Congress plainly indicated its intent that the motivating factor analysis applies to claims under this section.

In contrast, in the protected employee conduct section of Title VII, Congress did not use this language. Instead, the section prohibits an employer from retaliating “because of” protected employee activity – language that the Court, when analyzing other statutes, has interpreted as meaning that the “but for” standard applies.

In reaching its decision, the Court declined to give deference to the guidance manual published by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which reflected the agency’s view that the “lessened causation standard” applies to Title VII retaliation claims. According to the Court, the EEOC’s reasoning “lack[ed] … persuasive force” and was “circular.”

The Court concluded that a plaintiff asserting a claim for retaliation under Title VII must present “proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.” The Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

For employers, the Nassar decision is good news. As the Court noted, “claims of retaliation are being made with ever-increasing frequency” and applying the “motivating factor” standard advocated by Nassar could have “contribute[d] to the filing of frivolous claims.” However, this decision only applies to retaliation claims under Title VII. The decision does not alter the standard of proof for retaliation claims under other statutes – particularly state statutes – and employers should continue to exercise caution when taking action against an employer who has engaged in protected activity.

WHO IS A SUPERVISOR UNDER TITLE VII?

In its 1998 opinions in Faragher v. Boca Raton and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, the Supreme Court held that harassment by a supervisor can result in liability against an employer, but that an employer would only be liable for harassment by a non-supervisory employee if it knew or should have known of the harassment and was negligent in failing to correct it. It has remained unclear, however, exactly who is a supervisor for purposes of vicarious harassment liability under Title VII. The First, Seventh and Eighth Circuits have held that an individual is a supervisor for purposes of harassment liability only if he/she has been given the authority to take tangible employment actions – to hire, fire, demote, transfer or discipline – against the victim of harassment. The Second, Fourth and Ninth Circuits have adopted the definition set forth by the EEOC in its Enforcement Guidance where it defines supervisory status by the ability to exercise significant direction of an employee’s work activities irrespective of the power to take substantial or tangible employment actions. The Supreme Court’s opinion this week in Vance v. Ball State University resolves that split by making clear that Title VII imposes vicarious liability on the employer only for the harassment by a member of management who has been given the power by the employer to significantly impact the employment of a subordinate victim.

In Vance, Plaintiff Maetta Vance complained on a number of occasions to the University that she had been subjected to racial harassment by Saundra Davis, who she claimed was her supervisor, as well as by a number of co-workers and other supervisors. The University investigated each complaint and imposed discipline when it found the complaint had merit. Nevertheless, Vance filed charges with the EEOC and ultimately initiated a Title VII action for race harassment and hostile environment discrimination in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The district court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment based on its finding that the University was not strictly liable for the alleged harassment by Davis because Davis was not Vance’s supervisor, and that the University was not liable under a negligence theory because it acted promptly to investigate and resolve the complaints filed by Vance.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Appeals Court determined that summary judgment was warranted in part because Vance had failed to establish a basis to impose liability against the employer. In this respect, the court found that Davis was not a supervisor under Title VII because she did not have the power to take tangible employment actions, i.e., Davis had no authority to hire, fire, promote, demote or discipline Vance. The court rejected the argument by Vance that Davis was a supervisor merely because she told Vance what to do and refused to adopt the definition of supervisor advanced by the EEOC that it was sufficient under Title VII if the supervisor directed the day-to-day activities of an employee even without authority to take significant or tangible employment actions.

In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Samuel Alito, the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court resolved the split among the circuits by refusing to defer to the expertise of the EEOC, and by rejecting the Agency’s vague and “nebulous” definition of supervisor in favor of a bright line standard which could easily be applied by the parties and courts to establish the status of an alleged harasser. The majority determined that it was appropriate to focus on the framework established in Faragher and Ellerth – that employers will be vicariously and strictly liable for harassment by a supervisor which results in a tangible adverse action such as a significant change in the victim’s employment status – in order to understand and determine the proper definition of a supervisor in the context of a claim for harassment under Title VII. Applying the Faragher and Ellerth analysis, the Court found that the defining characteristic of a supervisor in such a case is the power to cause “direct economic harm” by virtue of “the authority to effect a tangible change in a victim’s terms and conditions of employment.” Accordingly, the Court held that to be a supervisor for purposes of imposing vicarious liability in a Title VII harassment case, a person must have the power to make a “significant change” in the working status of the alleged victim, such as the ability to hire, fire, promote, demote, discipline or impose “significantly different responsibilities” on the employee.

The dissent, written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, argued that the majority opinion ignores the workplace reality where the power to control work assignments – no less than the power to fire or discipline – is used as an intimidating factor to aid in the harassment of a subordinate. Justice Ginsburg would have deferred to the informed expertise of the EEOC, and suggested that the majority opinion will allow employers to escape liability for the harassment of their employees and undermine the effort “to stamp out discrimination in the workplace.”

The Vance opinion will not only have a significant impact on how harassment cases are approached in litigation, but will also promote the use of internal complaint procedures by forcing employees to report incidents of harassment by co-workers, and by encouraging employers to investigate and resolve such complaints in order to avoid liability in court. Not surprisingly, the opinion has been lauded by defense counsel for bringing clarity to a significant issue of importance and as a victory for employers. The General Counsel of the EEOC, however, has expressed his disappointment in the ruling and in the Court’s failure to defer to the Agency’s long standing interpretation of the law, and employee organizations have parroted the concern expressed in the dissenting opinion that the standard adopted by the Court will make it harder for victims to hold their employers accountable for harassment in the workplace. However, as noted by Justice Alito, there has been no indication from any of the 14 states which comprise the First, Seventh and Eighth Circuits – which have long applied the test adopted by the Court – to support that fear.

Unpaid Interns Deemed Employees Under the FLSA

A federal district court in New York ruled last week that unpaid interns who worked on the production of films for Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc. and Fox Entertainment Group, Inc. were actually employees who should have been paid in accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and New York Labor Law (“NYLL”). Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., Case No. 11-CV-06784 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). This decision comes just weeks after another Southern District of New York judge issued a favorable defense ruling by denying class certification for unpaid interns at various Hearst-owned magazines. See Wang v. The Hearst Corporation, Case No. 12-CV-00793 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

In Glatt, the court applied the six-factor test set used by the Department of Labor (“DOL”) and determined that two unpaid interns who worked on production of Black Swan were improperly classified and did not come within the “trainee” exception to the FLSA’s coverage. Instead, the interns should have been classified as employees subject to the FLSA and NYLL. Specifically, in applying the DOL test, the court found that:

The internship was not similar to training in an educational environment because the interns did not receive any formal training or education, or acquire any new skills aside from those specific to the Black Swan back office during the internship;
The internship had only incidental benefit to the interns – resume value and references– which were not the result of the structure of the internship, and that Fox also benefitted from the unpaid work;
The interns displaced regular employees and performed tasks that would have otherwise been performed by regular employees, such as obtaining documents for personnel files, picking up paychecks for coworkers, tracking and reconciling purchase orders, making copies, and running errands, among other low-level tasks;
Fox received immediate advantages from the activities of the interns, and there is no evidence that the interns impeded work;
The interns were not entitled to a job at the conclusion of the internship; and
The parties understood that the interns were not entitled to wages for time spent in the internship, although the court noted that this factor was not determinative.

While the plaintiffs to whom the court’s ruling applied did not seek class certification, the court granted another plaintiff’s motion for class certification of her NYLL claims and conditional certification of the FLSA claims. In doing so, the court found that: (1) the class was sufficiently numerous because it included at least 40 plaintiffs whose information was not easily identifiable by plaintiffs; (2) there are common questions or law and fact relating to the DOL’s six-factor test; (3) the plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class because she participated in the same internship program administered by the same set of recruiters as all class members and was classified as an unpaid intern like all class members; (4) plaintiff’s interest are not antagonistic to those of the class; (5) common issues of liability predominate over any individual damages claims; and (6) class action is a more efficient mechanism than individual claims because of the relatively small recoveries available.

The court’s reference to the evidence presented in the case provides a good lesson for employers. The court noted an internal memo in which Fox stated that, in light of the DOL test, Fox would only provide paid internships unless a manager could comply with the six criteria provided by the DOL. The outcome in Glatt demonstrates employers must remain vigilant not only in maintaining proper policies on internships, but also in training and oversight of managers, to ensure compliance with the DOL’s six-factor test and the FLSA.

Drinker Biddle Labor & Employment Lawyers Ranked in Chambers USA 2013

Congratulations to the Labor & Employement group lawyers and practices who were recognized as leaders in their field in Chambers USA 2013. Those lawyers who were recognized include Labor & Employment group co-chair Tom Barton (Band 3) and Florham Park partners John Ridley (Band 1) and Lynne Anderson (Band 3).

Sources said about the New Jersey practice (Band 2), “They were eloquent and responsive to a tee. Everyone has been extremely helpful”. When asked about John Ridley, one client commented “He is a seasoned litigator and has been doing employment law for so long that he is a real asset”. Another interviewee praised Lynne Anderson for her ability to “remain calm amid the nastiness of litigation.”

When asked about Tom Barton, one client commented “Smart, creative and practical” and “tries to find a solution for his clients.” And when commenting on the Pennsylvania practice (Band 4), a client noted ” They’ve been great – their approach to litigation has been very reasonable and measured. They’re not overly aggressive – they’re very logical and pragmatic.”

The lawyers of the Labor & Employment group help make up the more than 60 lawyers from many of Drinker Biddle & Reath’s 16 practice groups that were recognized in the Chambers USA 2013 edition.

Whistleblowing May Not Be Limited to Claims About Employer Wrongdoing in New Jersey

The New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”) was designed to protect whistleblowing employees who have the courage to stand up to illegal or wrongful conduct by their employer. As the courts have consistently held, the initial focus in a typical CEPA case is on the whistleblower’s prima facie case burden to establish that he/she had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that the employer did something wrong by either violating a law or engaging in conduct incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy.

In an unreported opinion issued in March 2013, however, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey found that CEPA can be implicated even where there is no claim or contention that the employer did anything wrong. In Stapleton v. DSW, Inc. (2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38502), the plaintiff employee believed that a store customer was mistreating her young child by, among other things, not changing her dirty diaper, and decided to “blow the whistle” on the customer by turning her in to the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the “Division”) out of concern for the child’s health and wellbeing. The plaintiff employee gave the customer’s name and address to the Division after obtaining that information from the customer’s transaction with the store. In doing so, the plaintiff violated the company’s perfectly lawful policy prohibiting the unauthorized disclosure of confidential customer information. When the employer learned of what had happened, it discharged the plaintiff for violating its non-disclosure policy, and she filed suit under CEPA.

Not surprisingly, the company moved to dismiss the lawsuit on the grounds that the plaintiff was not a protected “whistleblower” because she did not allege that the company had done anything wrong or illegal. Indeed, the plaintiff had blown the whistle on the customer, not the company. This is where it gets interesting. In denying the company’s motion, the District Court noted that CEPA not only protects employees who object to illegal activity, but also those who refuse to follow a policy or practice which they reasonably believe is incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy. Unlike most CEPA cases, the court in Stapleton focused on the conduct of the employee – not the employer – and concluded that she was protected under CEPA by virtue of the fact that she acted pursuant to the public policy that encourages individuals to report child abuse. In this circumstance, the court determined that the company’s policy prohibiting the disclosure of the customer’s identity was incompatible with the State’s clear mandate to protect the health and welfare of children, and that the plaintiff was therefore engaged in protected “whistleblowing” under CEPA when she refused to “participate in” or follow that policy in order to help the Division identify the customer.

While the court’s CEPA analysis is subject to debate – there was no allegation that the employer had engaged in wrongful or illegal conduct – the plaintiff would appear to have a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy where the New Jersey Child Protection Law provides immunity to employees reporting child abuse, and the New Jersey courts have held that employer policies on confidentiality must yield to matters of child safety. Nevertheless, this opinion should serve as a caution to employers and counsel alike that the courts often take an expansive view of the protections provided under CEPA.

Unpaid Internships – Training Programs or a Lesson in Class Actions?

Summer is quickly approaching, and eager students are lining up for internship opportunities, some of which may be unpaid. The whole topic has caused a firestorm of news stories lately – including an NYU students’ petition to remove unpaid internship postings from the campus career center, and an auction by an on-line charity website for a six week unpaid internship at the UN NGO Committee on Human Rights (the current bid is $26,000). Do unpaid internships run afoul of federal and state minimum wage laws? The answer potentially is yes, but given recent successful challenges to class certification, employers now have useful guidance in developing defense strategies against such claims.

Last week, in Wang v. The Hearst Corporation, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 12-CV-00793, the court denied class certification in a case brought by interns at various Hearst-owned magazines. The interns challenged Hearst’s practice of classifying them as unpaid interns, allegedly to avoid minimum wage and overtime laws under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and New York state law. The court found that the plaintiffs could not satisfy the commonality requirement for class certification. While plaintiffs could demonstrate a corporate-wide policy of classifying proposed class members as unpaid interns, the nature of the internships varied greatly from magazine to magazine. The court noted there was no evidence of a uniform policy among the magazines regarding the interns’ specific duties, training, or supervision.

Days later, attorneys for the defendant in Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 11-CV-06784, made a similar argument to defeat class certification in a case in which Fox interns challenged their unpaid status under federal and New York state minimum wage and overtime laws. In that case, the interns worked on the sets of different films or were based out of corporate offices, and weren’t governed by a centralized policy or procedure. The defendant in Glatt argued that class certification should be denied because of the lack of a uniform policy. While the court in Glatt has not yet ruled, these two cases suggest that, although claims by unpaid interns may persist, plaintiffs may find it increasingly difficult to sustain them as class actions.

In light of these cases, now is a good time to review the rules for internships. According to the Department of Labor, internships in the for-profit private sector will be viewed as employment relationships for which the FLSA minimum wage and overtime rules will apply, unless the intern is truly receiving training which meets six criteria: (1) the internship is similar to training that would be given in an educational environment; (2) the internship experience is for the benefit of the intern; (3) the intern is not replacing employees and works under close supervision; (4) the sponsor of the intern does not derive immediate benefit from intern’s activities and at times, its operations may actually be impeded; (5) the intern is not entitled to a job at the conclusion of the internship; and (6) the sponsor and the intern understand the intern is not entitled to wages for the time spent in the internship. As of 2010, the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (“DLSE”) relaxed the multi-factor test it previously applied and now uses the same criteria as the DOL.

While the Hearst ruling is good news for employers, the case did not address the merits of the interns’ claims and does not mean employers can relax their compliance efforts. If an employer improperly classifies an internship as “unpaid,” the employer could be liable for failure to pay minimum wage and overtime, penalties for failure to provide meal and rest breaks, as well as potential liability for violations of anti-discrimination and anti-harassment laws that apply to employees. The bottom line is that employers should apply the DOL/DLSE six-factor test and if their internships do not meet the criteria, the interns should be paid at least minimum wage.

Editors note: Be sure to check out Kate’s guest blog post for thewrap.com on the use of interns by entertainment and media companies.