LaborSphere, Author at Laborsphere

The New National Labor Relations Board: Will It Be More of the Same — Or Worse?

For the first time in more than ten years, the National Labor Relations Board will have five Senate-confirmed board members and no battles over recess appointments. However, the new Board will continue to be dominated by pro-union members selected by President Obama. The three Democratic members are: current Chairman Mark Pearce; Nancy Schiffer, associate general counsel for AFL-CIO; and Kent Hirozawa, chief counsel to Pearce. The two Republican members are seasoned management-side labor lawyers Philip Miscimarra and Harry Johnson III.

The confirmation of these Board members ends, at least moving forward, the uncertainty caused by the President’s recess appointments which were ruled invalid by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. For employers, this new Board is not likely to behave much differently than the Board has since the President was elected. In fact, employers can expect this Board to continue to issue decisions that favor unions and employees. In addition, the Board may well exercise its rulemaking power with greater vigor than before.

Here is what employers may see from this new Board:

1. The Resurrection of the “Quickie/Ambush” Election Rule

In December 2011, the Board adopted a final rule that made numerous and substantial changes in how union election would be handled. The rule was not implemented because a federal court decided that the Board’s vote to adopt the rule was improper. Significantly, the court did not object to the substance of the rule and its changes. The new Board could reconsider the rule and take another vote and employers can expect the 3-2 Democratic majority to approve it. It is also conceivable that this Board could propose a rule that calls for additional changes to the election procedures that would assist unions in winning elections, such as making voting by mail the preferred method of casting ballots; Chairman Pearce has previously indicated his interest in taking a fresh look at the rule.

2. Take a Hard Look at Bush-Era Board Decisions

As the Board composition changes with each change in the Presidency, it is common for Boards to re-examine decisions issued under a prior Administration of the other political party. The Board under George W. Bush was accused of wholesale reversal of rulings under the Clinton Administration. This new Obama Board can be expected to continue its reversal of Bush-era Board decisions. By way of example:

Many have expected the Board to overrule a 2007 decision in Register-Guard, in which the Bush-era Board held that an employer can maintain a policy that prohibits employees from using its email system for non-job related solicitation including union organizing. Current Board law gives unionized employees the right to a union representative at an investigatory interview the employee reasonably believes may lead to discipline. During the Clinton administration, the Board extended this right to representation to non-union employees. That extension was reversed by the Board during the Bush administration, by a 3-2 vote. It would not be a surprise for the new Obama Board to extend representation rights to non-union employees again.

3. Continued Focus on Non-Union Employers’ Policies

Under the Obama administration, the Board has aggressively focused on policies and practices of employers who have no unionized employees. The Board has examined at-will statements, social media policies, confidentiality clauses, dress code policies, premises access policies and disciplinary action based on these policies and practices. Employers should expect the Board to continue its examination of any policy or practice that could interfere with employees’ ability to engage in union organizing or other activity protected by the National Labor Relations Act.

4. Micro Bargaining Units

In August 2011, the Board ruled in Specialty Healthcare that the Board will approve the bargaining unit requested by a union unless the employer can prove the unit improperly excludes employees who share “an overwhelming community of interest” with the employees in the proposed unit. Under Specialty Healthcare, the Board has issued numerous decisions finding that small units are appropriate; those units would not have been approved before Specialty Healthcare became law. Employers can expect the Board to continue to abide by its decision and can hope the Board will provide greater guidance and clarity on how this new standard will be used.

Will the new Board be the same as the old Board? Time will tell. It is unlikely the new Board will be more employer-friendly and it is distinctly possible it will be even more aggressive in issuing decisions and rules to enhance unions’ ability to organize employees.

This Conversation May Be Recorded

Editors Note: Frequent LaborSphere contributor Jerrold J. Wohlgemuth recently wrote a post for our friends at LifeSciencesNow. While directed at the pharmaceutical industry, the message is one that all employers can and should ake to heart. Below is the text of the post. The original may be viewed here.

As the pharmaceutical industry changes, it must take note of the impact such change has on employee relations and the potential for lawsuits. Big Pharma has shed thousands of jobs in the past few years, with reports showing that the industry has lost more than 6,000 jobs from January –May 2013, up from the approximately 5000 lost in the first 5 months of 2012. And there will be more to come as the industry continues to react to lab failures, pressure to cut costs and lower prices due to lower profits, and increased competition from generics.

The result is employee disruption felt not only by those displaced, but also by the remaining workforce which often finds itself under stress from having to maintain productivity with fewer numbers, and who may feel threatened by the culture of layoffs. Either way, employee relations becomes strained and confrontational.

A significant development in the technology age is the finding in claims filed with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and state agencies that employees have been using smart phones or other mobile devices to surreptitiously record conversations with supervisors, managers and human resources representatives in lay-off meetings, performance reviews and disciplinary actions. And it should be no surprise that female employees are using smart phones to record male supervisors making inappropriate sexual comments and advancements. While most recordings reflect that management is engaged in proper communications with employees, the recordings are nevertheless being carefully evaluated by investigators to help determine whether or not to file a claim against the employer. Some recordings become smoking gun evidence of harassment or discrimination.

Employers should assume that employees are and will continue to record conversations with management, and should therefore take appropriate steps to protect themselves:

- Do not say anything you would not want a jury or government investigator to hear;

- Be on the alert for a set-up where the employee tries to get a supervisor or manager to repeat something said at another time;

- Bring a witness to meetings with employees;

- Ask the employee if he/she is recording the conversation, advise that it is not permitted, and get verbal assurance from employee that he/she is not recording;

- Have employee sign a statement that he/she did not record the conversation;

- Draft policies prohibiting unauthorized recordings in the workplace;

- Train supervisors and managers to be on the lookout for employees using mobile devices to record conversations.

Remember, every conversation may be evidence in a government investigation or lawsuit.

New Jersey Safe Act Provides Unpaid Leave For Victims Of Domestic Violence

On July 13, 2013, Governor Chris Christie signed the New Jersey Security and Financial Empowerment Act (New Jersey SAFE Act) into law. Effective on October 1, 2013, the New Jersey SAFE Act, covering public and private employers with 25 or more employees, provides up to 20 days of unpaid leave in one 12-month period when an employee or their child, parent, spouse, domestic or civil union partner has been the victim of a domestic violence incident or a sexually violent offense and the employee has been employed by the employer for at least 12 months and 1,000 base hours during the 12-month period immediately preceding the leave.

Under the New Jersey SAFE Act, each incident of domestic violence or any sexually violent offense constitutes a separate offense for which the eligible employee may take leave, so long as the employee has not already exhausted the allotted 20 days for the 12-month period. The unpaid leave may be taken intermittently in intervals of no less than one day, as needed for the employee or the employee’s family or household member to handle issues arising from the incident such as:

Seeking medical attention for, or recovering from the injures caused by the domestic or sexual violence;

Obtaining services from a victim services organization;

Obtaining psychological or other counseling;

Participating in safety planning, relocation or other activities to increase the safety of the employee or the
employee’s family or household member and to ensure economic security;

Seeking legal assistance to ensure the health and safety of the employee or the employee’s family or household member; or

Attending, participating in, or preparing for a court proceeding related to the incident of which the employee or the
employee’s family or household member was the victim.

An eligible employee may elect, or the employer may require, the employee to use any or all accrued paid time off during any part of the 20-day leave provided under the New Jersey SAFE Act. If the employee’s request for leave under the New Jersey SAFE Act is also covered by the New Jersey Family Leave Act or the federal Family and Medical Leave Act, the leave must count simultaneously against the employee’s entitlement under each law.

Before taking leave under the New Jersey SAFE Act, the employee must give the employer written notice, if the necessity for the leave is foreseeable, as far in advance as reasonable and practical under the circumstances. An employer may also require the employee to substantiate the domestic violence or sexually violent offense which is the basis for the leave. If the employee provides one or more of the types of documentation listed in the Act such as a restraining order or a letter from the prosecutor, it will be deemed sufficient.

All documentation regarding the leave must be retained by the employer in strictest confidence unless the employee voluntarily authorizes disclosure or it is required by federal or State law, rule or regulation.

The employer must conspicuously display notice of employees’ rights and obligations under the New Jersey SAFE Act in a manner to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Labor and Workforce Development, and must use “other appropriate means to keep its employees so informed.” Neither the posting, nor guidance regarding what other appropriate means must be used has been issued.

The New Jersey SAFE Act prohibits discrimination, harassment and retaliation against employees who have exercised their rights under the Act. Aggrieved individuals have a private right of action within one year of the alleged violation to bring suit in Superior Court for recovery of the fully array of damages available to a prevailing plaintiff in common law tort actions, including reinstatement, compensation for lost wages and benefits, an injunction to restrain continued violations and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. In addition, the employer may be assessed a civil fine of $1,000 or up to $2,000 for a first violation, and up to $5,000 for any subsequent violations.

Updates regarding employers’ notice requirements and means to keep employees informed will follow when issued.

NJ Supreme Court Expands The Scope Of Retaliation Claims Under The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination

Under the guise of promoting the “broad remedial purposes” of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”), the New Jersey Supreme Court recently decided that employees may be protected from retaliation under the LAD even when they complain about offensive sexual comments by a supervisor which would not violate the law because they were not heard by any female employee. In Battaglia v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the plaintiff objected to his supervisor’s repeated use of crude sexual language during discussions with other men about women in the workplace, and made a vague reference to that language in an anonymous letter of complaint to management. The employer investigated the complaints raised in that letter, but did not pursue the issue of offensive sexual comments because the letter was too vague to understand that the reference to “language you wouldn’t use [in] your worst nightmare” was about crude sexual comments. Management – including the supervisor in question – figured out that plaintiff wrote the letter. It subsequently conducted a separate investigation concerning certain inappropriate conduct by plaintiff and demoted him from his position as a manager. Plaintiff then sued for retaliation under the LAD, and included a separate cause of action for retaliation under the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”) based on other complaints he had raised concerning alleged fraudulent use of corporate credit cards.

Following a jury verdict for plaintiff, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the jury’s verdict for plaintiff under CEPA but reversed with respect to the cause of action for retaliation under the LAD. That court observed that the LAD only protects employees who reasonably believe that the employer is engaged in conduct which would be unlawful under the LAD, and that plaintiff had not engaged in protected activity because there was no discrimination or hostile work environment where the comments by the supervisor were not direct to, or heard by, any female employee.

The Supreme Court reinstated the LAD verdict, but vacated the verdict under CEPA because, among other things, the plaintiff admitted he did not believe the credit card use had been fraudulent. With respect to the LAD cause of action for retaliation, the Court rejected the appellate court’s “narrow interpretation” that the Act only protects employees who complain about “demonstrable acts of discrimination.” Instead, once again invoking the broad remedial purposes of the Act, the Court found that the jury had sufficient evidence to find that the plaintiff had a “good faith belief” that the supervisor’s crude sexual references to women in the workplace was unlawful under the LAD. In this regard, the Court observed: “when an employee voices a complaint about behavior or activities in the workplace that he or she thinks are discriminatory, we do not demand that he or she accurately understand the nuances of the LAD or that he or she be able to prove that there was an identifiable discriminatory impact upon someone of the requisite protected class.”

It has long been clear that an employee may pursue a cause of action for retaliation under the LAD even where the underlying complaint of discrimination has no merit. What is not clear is how an employee could have a reasonable belief that he was complaining about unlawful conduct where that conduct – offensive comments about women made to a group of men – could not possibly be unlawful. That is compounded in this case by the fact that management could hardly be expected to understand that the plaintiff was complaining about unlawful conduct from the vague reference in his letter. The opinion reflects the Court’s determination to continue to read the LAD expansively to protect employees from retaliation. Indeed, the driving factor in this case may be reflected in the Court’s observation that the jury had evidence to support a finding that management not only gave short shrift to the complaints, but responded by imposing discipline against the complainer.

WHO IS A SUPERVISOR UNDER TITLE VII?

In its 1998 opinions in Faragher v. Boca Raton and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, the Supreme Court held that harassment by a supervisor can result in liability against an employer, but that an employer would only be liable for harassment by a non-supervisory employee if it knew or should have known of the harassment and was negligent in failing to correct it. It has remained unclear, however, exactly who is a supervisor for purposes of vicarious harassment liability under Title VII. The First, Seventh and Eighth Circuits have held that an individual is a supervisor for purposes of harassment liability only if he/she has been given the authority to take tangible employment actions – to hire, fire, demote, transfer or discipline – against the victim of harassment. The Second, Fourth and Ninth Circuits have adopted the definition set forth by the EEOC in its Enforcement Guidance where it defines supervisory status by the ability to exercise significant direction of an employee’s work activities irrespective of the power to take substantial or tangible employment actions. The Supreme Court’s opinion this week in Vance v. Ball State University resolves that split by making clear that Title VII imposes vicarious liability on the employer only for the harassment by a member of management who has been given the power by the employer to significantly impact the employment of a subordinate victim.

In Vance, Plaintiff Maetta Vance complained on a number of occasions to the University that she had been subjected to racial harassment by Saundra Davis, who she claimed was her supervisor, as well as by a number of co-workers and other supervisors. The University investigated each complaint and imposed discipline when it found the complaint had merit. Nevertheless, Vance filed charges with the EEOC and ultimately initiated a Title VII action for race harassment and hostile environment discrimination in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The district court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment based on its finding that the University was not strictly liable for the alleged harassment by Davis because Davis was not Vance’s supervisor, and that the University was not liable under a negligence theory because it acted promptly to investigate and resolve the complaints filed by Vance.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Appeals Court determined that summary judgment was warranted in part because Vance had failed to establish a basis to impose liability against the employer. In this respect, the court found that Davis was not a supervisor under Title VII because she did not have the power to take tangible employment actions, i.e., Davis had no authority to hire, fire, promote, demote or discipline Vance. The court rejected the argument by Vance that Davis was a supervisor merely because she told Vance what to do and refused to adopt the definition of supervisor advanced by the EEOC that it was sufficient under Title VII if the supervisor directed the day-to-day activities of an employee even without authority to take significant or tangible employment actions.

In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Samuel Alito, the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court resolved the split among the circuits by refusing to defer to the expertise of the EEOC, and by rejecting the Agency’s vague and “nebulous” definition of supervisor in favor of a bright line standard which could easily be applied by the parties and courts to establish the status of an alleged harasser. The majority determined that it was appropriate to focus on the framework established in Faragher and Ellerth – that employers will be vicariously and strictly liable for harassment by a supervisor which results in a tangible adverse action such as a significant change in the victim’s employment status – in order to understand and determine the proper definition of a supervisor in the context of a claim for harassment under Title VII. Applying the Faragher and Ellerth analysis, the Court found that the defining characteristic of a supervisor in such a case is the power to cause “direct economic harm” by virtue of “the authority to effect a tangible change in a victim’s terms and conditions of employment.” Accordingly, the Court held that to be a supervisor for purposes of imposing vicarious liability in a Title VII harassment case, a person must have the power to make a “significant change” in the working status of the alleged victim, such as the ability to hire, fire, promote, demote, discipline or impose “significantly different responsibilities” on the employee.

The dissent, written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, argued that the majority opinion ignores the workplace reality where the power to control work assignments – no less than the power to fire or discipline – is used as an intimidating factor to aid in the harassment of a subordinate. Justice Ginsburg would have deferred to the informed expertise of the EEOC, and suggested that the majority opinion will allow employers to escape liability for the harassment of their employees and undermine the effort “to stamp out discrimination in the workplace.”

The Vance opinion will not only have a significant impact on how harassment cases are approached in litigation, but will also promote the use of internal complaint procedures by forcing employees to report incidents of harassment by co-workers, and by encouraging employers to investigate and resolve such complaints in order to avoid liability in court. Not surprisingly, the opinion has been lauded by defense counsel for bringing clarity to a significant issue of importance and as a victory for employers. The General Counsel of the EEOC, however, has expressed his disappointment in the ruling and in the Court’s failure to defer to the Agency’s long standing interpretation of the law, and employee organizations have parroted the concern expressed in the dissenting opinion that the standard adopted by the Court will make it harder for victims to hold their employers accountable for harassment in the workplace. However, as noted by Justice Alito, there has been no indication from any of the 14 states which comprise the First, Seventh and Eighth Circuits – which have long applied the test adopted by the Court – to support that fear.

Unpaid Interns Deemed Employees Under the FLSA

A federal district court in New York ruled last week that unpaid interns who worked on the production of films for Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc. and Fox Entertainment Group, Inc. were actually employees who should have been paid in accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and New York Labor Law (“NYLL”). Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., Case No. 11-CV-06784 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). This decision comes just weeks after another Southern District of New York judge issued a favorable defense ruling by denying class certification for unpaid interns at various Hearst-owned magazines. See Wang v. The Hearst Corporation, Case No. 12-CV-00793 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

In Glatt, the court applied the six-factor test set used by the Department of Labor (“DOL”) and determined that two unpaid interns who worked on production of Black Swan were improperly classified and did not come within the “trainee” exception to the FLSA’s coverage. Instead, the interns should have been classified as employees subject to the FLSA and NYLL. Specifically, in applying the DOL test, the court found that:

The internship was not similar to training in an educational environment because the interns did not receive any formal training or education, or acquire any new skills aside from those specific to the Black Swan back office during the internship;
The internship had only incidental benefit to the interns – resume value and references– which were not the result of the structure of the internship, and that Fox also benefitted from the unpaid work;
The interns displaced regular employees and performed tasks that would have otherwise been performed by regular employees, such as obtaining documents for personnel files, picking up paychecks for coworkers, tracking and reconciling purchase orders, making copies, and running errands, among other low-level tasks;
Fox received immediate advantages from the activities of the interns, and there is no evidence that the interns impeded work;
The interns were not entitled to a job at the conclusion of the internship; and
The parties understood that the interns were not entitled to wages for time spent in the internship, although the court noted that this factor was not determinative.

While the plaintiffs to whom the court’s ruling applied did not seek class certification, the court granted another plaintiff’s motion for class certification of her NYLL claims and conditional certification of the FLSA claims. In doing so, the court found that: (1) the class was sufficiently numerous because it included at least 40 plaintiffs whose information was not easily identifiable by plaintiffs; (2) there are common questions or law and fact relating to the DOL’s six-factor test; (3) the plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class because she participated in the same internship program administered by the same set of recruiters as all class members and was classified as an unpaid intern like all class members; (4) plaintiff’s interest are not antagonistic to those of the class; (5) common issues of liability predominate over any individual damages claims; and (6) class action is a more efficient mechanism than individual claims because of the relatively small recoveries available.

The court’s reference to the evidence presented in the case provides a good lesson for employers. The court noted an internal memo in which Fox stated that, in light of the DOL test, Fox would only provide paid internships unless a manager could comply with the six criteria provided by the DOL. The outcome in Glatt demonstrates employers must remain vigilant not only in maintaining proper policies on internships, but also in training and oversight of managers, to ensure compliance with the DOL’s six-factor test and the FLSA.