FLSA Archives - Page 6 of 7

Supreme Court Ducks Mootness Question In Genesis

Does an unaccepted offer of judgment for full relief made prior to a motion to certify moot the plaintiff’s claim in an FLSA collective action? That was the question we hoped the Supreme Court would answer in Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk. Unfortunately, the majority in the 5-4 opinion issued April 16 refused to decide that question, finding that the issue was not properly before the Court because the plaintiff had conceded her claim was moot in the district court and Third Circuit, and had not contested the issue in her opposition to the petition for certiorari. While we now know from the dissent that Justices Kagan, Breyer, Sotomayor and Ginsburg would find that an unaccepted offer of judgment has no impact on the validity of the underlying claim, the majority opinion leaves unresolved a split among the Circuits. The Seventh Circuit accepts the argument that a claim must be dismissed as moot when an offer of judgment for full relief is made prior to a motion to certify, while the Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuits allow plaintiffs to circumvent mootness by immediately filing a motion to certify (the Second and Sixth Circuits accept mootness but reject the argument that the case should be dismissed, finding instead that judgment should be entered for the plaintiff in the amount offered by the defendant). Because the issue remains in doubt, Defendants in FLSA collective actions may prefer to pursue settlement with the individual plaintiff before a motion to certify has been filed to end the claim, rather than make an offer of judgment, in order to avoid endless litigation over the impact of the offer.

To read our client alert for this case click here.

Former Employee Fails To Convince Court Of Underpayment In First And Last Weeks Of Employment

Methodically navigating the arcane maze of regulations surrounding the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), the Court in Kirchoff v. Wipro, Inc., W.D. Wash., No. 2:11-cv-00568, 10/2/12, held that a technology consulting company (“Wipro”) did not violate the FLSA or Washington law by using the “Pay Period” – rather than the “Work Week” – method to calculate a fired senior manager’s salary for the first and last weeks of his employment.

Wipro provides consulting services to technology companies such as Microsoft Corp., Cisco Systems, Inc. and AT&T, Inc. Wipro employed Kirchoff as a Senior Manager at an annual salary of $140,000 from July 26, 2010 to January 27, 2011, when Wipro terminated his employment. Kirchoff then sued Wipro, claiming that he and other employees had been underpaid because Wipro used the “Pay Period” method to determine their pay for the first and last weeks of their employment.

An employer must generally pay an exempt employee his or her full salary for any workweek in which the employee works at all, regardless of the number of hours. However, Department of Labor (“DOL”) regulations provide that “[a]n employer is not required to pay the full salary in the initial or terminal week of employment. Rather an employer may pay a proportionate part of an employee’s full salary for the time actually worked in the first and last week of employment. In such weeks, the payment of an hourly or daily equivalent of the employee’s full salary for the time actually worked will meet the requirement.” 29 C.F.R. §541.602(b)(6). Additionally, “[w]hen calculating the amount of a deduction from pay allowed under paragraph (b) of this section, the employer may use the hourly or daily equivalent of the employee’s full weekly salary or any other amount proportional to the time actually missed by the employee.” 29 C.F.R. §541.602(c).

Under the “Pay Period” method of calculating an exempt employee’s pay for a partial first or last week of employment, the employer divides the employee’s annual salary into twenty-four semi-monthly pay periods to obtain a semi-monthly rate, which the employer then divides by the number of working days in the semi-monthly pay period to yield a daily rate for the pay period. The employer then multiplies the daily rate by the number of days actually worked by the employee to determine the final compensation for the first and last weeks of employment.

Under the “Work Week” method, the employer divides the employee’s annual salary by fifty-two to calculate the weekly rate and then divides that rate by five, the number of working days in a week, to determine the daily rate. The employer then determines the employee’s final pay by multiplying the daily rate by the number of days that the employee actually worked.

Kirchoff argued that 29 C.F.R. §778.113(b) requires employers to use the “Work Week” method. While acknowledging that the approach specified in this regulation “matches” the “Work Week” method, the Court rejected Kirchoff’s argument. According to the Court, Part 778, of which this regulation is a subpart, deals with Overtime Compensation, and Kirchoff’s dispute did not involve overtime, nor does the applicable regulation, 29 C.F.R. §541.602, incorporate or reference the overtime regulation. The Court further noted that Section 541.602(c) permits the employer to use “any amount proportional to the time actually missed by the employee.” The Court explained that Kirchoff’s interpretation that only the “Work Week” method is permitted would render the remaining language of the regulation meaningless, which runs counter to basic rules of statutory construction that presume that every word has some effect.

Focusing on Section 541.602(c), the Court found that Wipro’s method based on the percentage of days worked in the pay period was mathematically correct as a “proportionate part” of Kirchoff’s full salary. The Court granted summary judgment to Wipro on Kirchoff’s FLSA and state law claims.

Employers must be careful when addressing application of FLSA regulations and be aware that the FLSA provides employers with multiple options for calculating employees’ pay for the first and last weeks of work.

Federal Court Holds that FLSA’s “Fluctuating Workweek” Method Violates Pennsylvania Law

A recent decision out of the Western District of Pennsylvania, Foster v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., Civ. No. 09-453 (W.D.Pa. August 27, 2012), highlights the challenges employers face in simultaneously complying with both local and national wage and hour regulations. In Foster, the court held that the “fluctuating workweek” method of overtime compensation – which is expressly permitted by the FLSA – is not permitted under Pennsylvania law.

Under the fluctuating workweek method, an employer pays a nonexempt employee a fixed weekly salary, regardless of the number of non-overtime hours worked. This method is generally used in industries in which an employee’s hours change unpredictably from week to week based on factors such as customer demand or seasonal variation – e.g., lawn maintenance companies, golf courses, or the travel industry. In using this method, the employer benefits from significant cost savings over traditional methods of overtime calculation and the employee benefits from the stability of a fixed weekly salary.

There are five requirements for using the fluctuating workweek method. The employee’s hours must fluctuate from week to week; the employee must receive a fixed salary that does not vary with the number of hours worked (excluding overtime); the salary must be high enough that the employee’s regular rate of pay is at least the minimum wage; the employer and employee must have a clear mutual understanding that the salary is fixed; and the employee must receive overtime compensation equal to at least one-half the regular rate for all hours worked over forty.

In Foster, the court’s analysis focused on this last requirement. The court held that “the payment of overtime under the FWW method, at any rate less than one and one-half times the ‘regular’ or ‘basic’ rate,” is impermissible under the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Law. We’ll be watching this decision (if appealed) and subsequent cases closely, because if this interpretation of the Minimum Wage Act is upheld, the primary advantage to the employer in utilizing the fluctuating workweek method is eliminated. In the meantime, Pennsylvania employers who use this method to compensate nonexempt employees should reconsider their policies, given that it may no longer result in cost savings. Moreover, this case should serve as a reminder that, although many local wage and hour regulations are modeled after (and in some respects identical to) the FLSA, compliance with the FLSA does not guarantee compliance with local statutes.

Federal Judge Rules for Nurses in Multi-Million Dollar Class Action for Unpaid Overtime

A federal judge in Pennsylvania has signed off on a multi-million dollar settlement of a class action lawsuit for unpaid overtime brought by registered nurses against a number of hospitals affiliated with the Lehigh Valley Hospital and Health Network. The nurses claimed in their lawsuit, which was filed in January 2010, that the Hospitals violated the FLSA and Pennsylvania wage law by paying them on a per-shift basis, failing to compensate them for reporting early or remaining on duty after their shifts ended, and also failing to pay for work performed during lunch periods or while attending training. The $4.5 million settlement provides more than $2.5 million to the more than 2,000 nurses who joined in the lawsuit. This is a significant development for hospitals and other health care providers who pay nurses on a per-shift basis. While Pennsylvania and New Jersey have enacted statutes which prohibit mandatory overtime for nurses, the laws allow nurses to volunteer for extra hours and to work overtime in emergencies or unforeseen circumstances. Nurses are entitled to overtime pay in such circumstances whenever they work more than 40 hours in a week.

U.S. Supreme Court to Hear Arguments in Case that Could Have Significant Impact on Strategies Available to Defend FLSA Collective Actions

The United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari of a decision by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Symczyk v. Genesis HealthCare Corp., 656 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2011), a case that could have a significant impact on employers’ litigation strategy in putative FLSA collective actions. The Third Circuit in Symczyk held that a collective action brought under the FLSA is not rendered moot when the defendant makes a Rule 68 offer of compromise in full satisfaction of the individual claim to a putative representative before the class representative moves for “conditional certification” and before any other plaintiff opts into the action.

Under the FLSA, an employee may file a “collective action” against an employer on behalf of himself and other similarly situated employees. Unlike traditional class actions, however, the FLSA requires that the “similarly situated” employees affirmatively decide to join or opt into the collective action. In Symczyk, the plaintiff filed a putative FLSA collective action, alleging that her employer, Genesis, automatically deducted her pay for meal breaks regardless of whether she performed any compensable work during the break. After answering the Complaint, Genesis served the plaintiff with an offer of judgment for the full amount of her claims, including costs and attorneys’ fees, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. Genesis then moved to dismiss the Complaint, arguing that the offer to pay her claims in full mooted the claims, depriving the plaintiff of any ongoing personal stake or legally cognizable interest in the litigation, and divesting the court of any jurisdiction over the case.

The district court granted Genesis’ motion, holding that an offer in full satisfaction of a plaintiff’s claims moots those claims. At this point, no other employees had opted into the suit because the plaintiff had not yet sought conditional certification of the collective action. Thus, the case was dismissed. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that “conventional mootness principles do not fit neatly within the representative action paradigm.” Id. at 195. The court compared FLSA collective actions to class actions, in which it is settled law that a defendant cannot moot a putative class action by making an offer of judgment to the named plaintiff before the class is certified and held that there was no rationale for treating the two types of actions differently. Id. at 197-201.

Accordingly, the Third Circuit reversed, holding that “[w]hen Rule 68 morphs into a tool for the strategic curtailment of representative actions, it facilitates an outcome antithetical to the purposes behind [the FLSA].” Id. at 200. The Third Circuit remanded to the district court in order to allow the plaintiff to file a motion for conditional certification, which would then be deemed to “relate back” to the filing of the original complaint and thus preserve the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 201 The Third Circuit noted that if the mootness inquiry were based solely on whether another employee had opted in at the same moment a plaintiff receives a Rule 68 offer of judgment, employers would encounter little or no difficulty in “preventing FLSA plaintiffs from attaining the “representative” status necessary to render an action justiciable.” Id. at 199.

The Third Circuit’s decision in Symczyk cited with approval the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Sandoz v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 553 F.3d 913, 922 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that, although a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment could theoretically moot a FLSA collective action, the “relation back principle applies to ensure that defendants cannot unilaterally “pick off” collective action representatives and thwart availability of collective actions under the FLSA.”)

However, both the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have held, to the contrary, that an offer of judgment for the full amount of the named plaintiff’s claims prior to the certification of a class does moot a collective action. See Smith v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 570 F.3d 1119, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 2009); Cameron-Grant v. Maxim Healthcare Serv., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2003).

The Supreme Court granted Genesis’ petition for certiorari on June 25, 2012 and stated the question presented as “Whether a case becomes moot, and thus beyond the judicial power of Article III, when the lone plaintiff receives an offer from the defendants to satisfy all of the plaintiff’s claims.” The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will likely have a significant impact on the strategies available to employers to defend against FLSA collective actions and will also resolve a circuit split on this issue.

The Court will hear the case in the term beginning October 2012, and a ruling is expected by the end of the term in June 2013.

Who’s The Boss: Third Circuit Announces Joint Employer Test for FLSA Cases, Opening the Door to Broader Exposure to Wage and Hour Liability

On June 29, 2012 the Third Circuit responded for the first time to a question pondered by many employers and courts within its judicial districts: what constitutes a “joint employer” under the FLSA? In a case captioned In re: Enterprise Rent-a-Car Wage & Hour Employment Practices Litigation, the Third Circuit announced a four part, multi-factor test as an answer to this question.

In the Enterprise case, the joint employer question was raised as a result of the filing of a collective action by assistant branch managers at subsidiaries of Enterprise Holdings, Inc., seeking overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). While these assistant managers were employees of Enterprise Holdings’ subsidiaries, they nevertheless sought relief from Enterprise Holdings on the theory that it was a joint employer.

In answering whether Enterprise Holdings falls within the category of “joint employer,” the Third Circuit noted that the definition of “employer” under the FLSA is “the broadest definition that has ever been included in any one act.” Emphasizing that the definition of employer focuses on “control,” the Third Circuit concluded that ultimate control over employees is not necessarily required and even “indirect” control may be sufficient

To determine whether a party is a “joint employer,” and thereby subject to FLSA liability, the Third Circuit adopted the following analysis:

Does the alleged employer have:

Authority to hire and fire employees;
Authority to promulgate work rules and assignments, and set conditions of employment, including compensation, benefits, hours and work schedules, including the rate and method of payment;
Day-to-day supervision, including employee discipline; and
Control of employee records, including payroll, insurance, taxes, and the like.

The Third Circuit emphasized that the factors identified do not constitute an exhaustive list and should not be “blindly applied.” Rather, under the Third Circuit’s guidance, courts are to look to the “total employment situation” and “economic realities of the work relationship.”

How did Enterprise Holdings, the sole stockholder of thirty-eight domestic subsidiaries, avoid the label of “joint employer”? Even despite finding that a three-member board of directors for each subsidiary consisted of the same people who sat on Enterprise Holding’s three-member board, the Third Circuit focused on other key facts in support of its decision: (i) Enterprise Holdings had no authority to hire or fire assistant managers; (ii) Enterprise Holdings had no authority to promulgate work rules or assignments; (iii) Enterprise Holdings had no authority to set compensation benefits, schedules, or rates or methods of payment; (iv) Enterprise Holdings was not involved in employee supervision or employee discipline; and (v) Enterprise Holdings did not exercise or maintain any control over employee records. Among these factors, the Third Circuit emphasized that Enterprise Holdings only “suggested” various Human Resources and salary policies and that the adoption of such suggestions was not mandatory, rendering the parent company more akin to a third-party consultant.

In light of this decision, employers and, in particular, parent corporations, should be aware of the fact that courts within the Third Circuit (Delaware, New Jersey and Pennsylvania) will apply the “Enterprise” test going forward. Notwithstanding, while the test has been articulated, the analysis remains highly fact intensive and courts are by no means limited to consideration of the factors identified in the Enterprise decision. Employers unsure of their FLSA joint employer status should contact their labor and employment counsel.