Employer Liability Archives - Page 12 of 12

Firing Employees Who Don’t Get Flu Shots: What Risks Do Hospitals Face?

As hospitals continue to see an onslaught of flu patients, they also face challenges to flu vaccination policies designed to reduce the spread of flu to patients and fellow employees. Hospitals are understandably concerned with protecting patients, visitors and employees from contracting the flu and the potentially serious consequences to the health of elderly and infant patients. However, protecting patients against flu can create legal liability when employees are disciplined, discharged or suffer other adverse action because they do not get a flu shot.

Employment Considerations for Flu Vaccination Policies—The National Labor Relations Act

What limitations exist on a hospital’s ability to create and implement a flu/other vaccination policy? Under the National Labor Relations Act, a flu vaccination policy is a mandatory subject of bargaining. This means that unionized hospitals cannot unilaterally implement such a policy without first giving the union notice of the intended policy and bargain over the policy if the union requests to do so.

A hospital does not have to bargain if the union has “clearly and unmistakably” waived its right to bargain over the issue. A waiver is typically found in the “Management Rights” clause, which was the case in a recent National Labor Relations Board (NLRB; the Board) decision, Virginia Mason Medical Center, 358 NLRB No. 64 (2012), where the Board found a clear and unmistakable waiver in the Management Rights clause. That clause stated, in relevant part, that the Medical Center has the right to “operate and manage the Hospital, including but not limited to the right to require standards of performance and…to direct the nurses…to determine the materials and equipment to be used; to implement improved operational methods and procedures…to discipline, demote or discharge nurses for just cause…and to promulgate rules, regulations and personnel policies….”

The Union representing the Medical Center’s registered nurses filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board and a hearing was held before an NLRB Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ ruled, and the Board agreed, that the Management Rights clause did not specifically mention wearing facemasks (which the flu policy required in certain areas for non-immunized nurses), but it did “specifically allow the Hospital to unilaterally ‘direct the nurses’ and ‘determine the materials and equipment to be used’ [as well as] implement improved operational methods and procedure.’” The ALJ noted that the Hospital had several infection control policies that required nurses to wear masks under various circumstances, and found that requiring non-immunized nurses to wear masks was within the Hospital’s authority to “determine the materials and equipment to be used [and] implement improved operational methods and procedures.”

With properly crafted language in a Management Rights clause or elsewhere in a collective bargaining agreement, a unionized hospital has the right to unilaterally implement a new flu vaccination policy or modify an existing policy.

Employment Considerations for Flu Vaccination Policies—Disability and Religious Discrimination

Hospitals, of course, have reached different decisions on how to balance the interests of patients and employees. As such, policies vary in the flexibility given to employees regarding non-vaccination and the resulting consequences:

Vaccination encouraged but not mandated
Vaccination mandated with exemptions for medical contraindication, religious beliefs (discipline/other adverse consequences for non-exempted employees)
Vaccination mandated and masking required for medical contraindication, religious beliefs (discipline/other adverse consequences for failure to be vaccinated or wear mask, as applicable)
Vaccination required (discipline/other adverse consequences for non-compliance)

Flu vaccination policies also differ regarding applicability. Some policies apply only to employees who come into direct contact with patients. At the other end of the continuum, the policy applies to all employees, independent contractors, students, interns, vendors and others who provide services inside the hospital.

Union and non-union hospitals should consider the potential for discrimination claims based on a flu vaccination policy that requires any group of employees to get a flu shot or face adverse consequences (such as discharge) if they fail to do so for any reason. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) would likely find such a policy to be unlawful. The EEOC has taken the position in its “Pandemic Preparedness in the Workplace and the Americans with Disabilities Act” guidance that

“[a]n employee may be entitled to an exemption from a mandatory vaccination requirement based on an ADA disability that prevents him from taking the influenza vaccine. This would be a reasonable accommodation barring undue hardship (significant difficulty or expense). Similarly, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, once an employer receives notice that an employee’s sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance prevents him from taking the influenza vaccine, the employer must provide a reasonable accommodation unless it would pose an undue hardship as defined by Title VII (“more than de minimis cost” to the operation of the employer’s business, which is a lower standard than under the ADA).”

www.eeoc.gov/facts/pandemic_flu.html – 48k – 2009-10-21

Recently, a federal district court in Ohio refused to dismiss a complaint by a registered nurse alleging religious discrimination because she was fired for refusing to comply with the hospital’s mandatory flu vaccination policy. Chenzira v. Cincinnati Children’s Medical Center, S.D. Ohio, No. 1:11-cv-00917 (12/27/12). The employee’s refusal was based on her “religious beliefs” in veganism. The court rejected the hospital’s argument that her veganism was merely a “social philosophy or dietary preference.” According to the court, it was plausible the employee could show that she held her belief in veganism with the same sincerity as traditional religious beliefs. However, this case is far from over. The court noted that its ruling on the motion to dismiss “in no way addresses what it anticipates as the hospital’s justification for its termination of the employee — the safety of patients at Children’s Hospital.”

Not all refusals to get a flu shot are based on medical or religious reasons. A hospital in northern Indiana fired seven employees who refused to get flu shots. One oncology nurse who was fired said it was “a personal thing.” The nurse said she gets other vaccinations but it should be her choice whether she gets the flu vaccine. She said she opposes “the injustice of being forced to put something in [her] body.” Absent a violation of applicable state law, it is doubtful this employee would have a claim against the hospital for her termination.

Considerations in Creating a Flu Vaccination Policy

Current CDC guidelines do not require hospitals to mandate flu vaccination in any form; the CDC recommends active encouragement of employees to get a flu shot. However, some hospitals believe it is appropriate to do more to try to protect vulnerable patients from catching the flu in the hospital and then suffering severe health consequences. These hospitals mandate that at least some groups of employees must be vaccinated. ”

Terminating or taking other adverse action against an employee who cannot get the vaccine because of a disability (as defined in the Americans with Disabilities Act and/or applicable state law) exposes a hospital to meaningful risk of a discrimination lawsuit. The same is true for employees who raise a “religious objection.”

Hospitals should evaluate such refusals on a case-by-case basis and explore possible reasonable accommodations of the employees’ refusal to get vaccinated, and the policy should so inform employees. Possible reasonable accommodations could be exempting the employee from the policy entirely, transferring the employee to another position temporarily (until the flu threat ends as determined by local health officials) or permitting the employee to wear a mask when in proximity to patients and coworkers. From my perspective as a former hospital board chairman, this approach presents a balancing of the hospital’s interest in protecting patients from flu exposure while protecting the legal rights of certain employees who decline to get vaccinated. In the final analysis, many hospitals believe that risk of harm to patients may trump an individual’s right to refuse when flu epidemics are declared.

Extreme Weather, Natural Disasters and Personnel Issues

What happens when a business is temporarily closed due to extreme weather? What about overtime as employees try to catch up on work? These are questions that employers on the East coast find themselves asking in the wake of Hurricane Sandy. William Horwitz, counsel in the Florham Park office, has authored a client alert to answer these and other questions that employers are now faced with.

Read the full alert.

New FCRA Background Check Forms Required January 1, 2013

Effective January 1, 2013, employers must revise Summary of Rights forms they provide to prospective and current employees as required under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”).

The FCRA is a federal law which applies whenever a covered employer seeks information from a “consumer reporting agency” regarding an individual’s credit, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living. A “consumer reporting agency” is defined quite broadly under the FCRA, resulting in an employer being subject to the FCRA simply by using a third-party vendor to conduct background checks on any of its applicants/employees.

Pursuant to the FCRA, an employer is required to provide a disclosure and obtain written authorization from any applicant/employee prior to conducting a background check. Should the employer seek to take an “adverse action” against the applicant/employee based on the background check — which, for purposes of the FCRA is defined as a denial of employment or any other decision that adversely impacts the applicant/employee (i.e., failure to hire, transfer, termination) — the employer must first provide the applicant/employee a copy of the background check and a Summary of Your Rights under the FCRA (“Summary of Rights”) form under the FCRA. It is this Summary of Rights form that employers must revise prior to January 1, 2013.

With President Obama’s signing of the Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (signed into law on July 21, 2010) enforcement powers over the FCRA were transferred from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to a newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). The CFPB has since issued regulations requiring employers to revise their Summary of Rights forms effective January 1. 2013 to reflect that information about consumers rights under the FCRA can now be obtained from the CFPB instead of the FTC.

Other notice provisions under the FCRA remain the same. After taking adverse action against an applicant/employee based on a background check, the employer must provide the applicant/employee with notice of the adverse action, as well as the name, address and toll-free telephone number of the third-party vendor that conducted the background check, and a written statement that the third-party vendor did not make the decision to take the adverse action and is unable to provide the applicant/employee with specific reasons as to why the adverse action was taken. The employer must also provide the applicant/employee with notice of his/her rights to obtain a free copy of the consumer report within sixty days and to dispute the accuracy or completeness of any information contained in the report.

Further, while the FTC no longer will have primary statutory authority to issue interpretive guidance under the FCRA, the agency on July 20, 2011 issued a Staff Report entitled “Forty Years of Experience with the Fair Credit Reporting Act: An FTC Staff Report and Summary of Interpretations” which compiles and updates the agency’s prior guidance under the FCRA and provides a section-by-section summary of the agency’s interpretations of the Act. The FTC also has withdrawn its 1990 Commentary on the FCRA, which the agency admits had become obsolete as a result of statutory amendments expanding the FCRA in the intervening years. A copy of the FTC’s new Staff Report can be found on the FTC’s website at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/07/110720fcrareport.pdf. The copy of the new Summary of Rights form which employers are required to use effective January 1, 2013 can be downloaded from the CFPB’s website at http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/graphics/pdfs/er21dell.019.pdf.

Seventh Circuit Expands § 1981 Coverage to Include Individual Liability for Retaliation Under “Cat’s Paw” Theory

The Seventh Circuit has held that an employee with an unlawful retaliatory motive may be individually liable under § 1981 for causing an employer to retaliate against a co-worker. Section § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in contractual relations and has been held applicable to employment matters.

In Smith v. Bray, the Seventh Circuit tackled this issue of first impression by looking to recent Supreme Court precedent endorsing the “cat’s paw” theory of employer liability under Title VII and the holdings of five circuits that the “cat’s paw” theory supports individual liability under § 1983, which provides redress for individuals whose federally protected rights have been violated. As such, the Court held that “recognizing cat’s paw liability under § 1981 is consistent with our parallel approaches to these [non-discrimination] statutes.”

The “cat’s paw” theory, which was recognized by the Supreme Court in Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011), says that an employer may be liable for discrimination under Title VII where an adverse employment decision is based on a biased or improperly motivated recommendation by a subordinate or supervisor. “Cat’s paw” liability may be established where a plaintiff can show that an employee with a discriminatory purpose or bias provided information that may have affected an adverse action. The theory comes from a French fable wherein a monkey (the biased employee) convinces a cat (the employer) to pull chestnuts from a hot fire. The cat’s paw is then burned and the monkey enjoys the fruits of the cat’s labor. In holding that the “cat’s paw” theory can support individual liability under § 1981, the court inquired, “Why should the ‘hapless cat’ (or at least the employer) get burned but not the malicious ‘monkey’?”

This decision is noteworthy not just because it endorses individual liability under § 1981, but also because it provides an arrow in a plaintiff’s quiver which is not available under Title VII as most circuits have held that an individual cannot be liable under Title VII. As far as race discrimination is concerned, however, Smith v. Bray opens the door for suits against supervisors and co-workers under a “cat’s paw” theory.

New Jersey’s Highest Court Rejects “Absolute Liability” Standard for Employee Assault of Patient

The New Jersey Supreme Court in Davis v. Devereux Foundation, 209 N.J. 269 (2012), recently rejected an attempt to impose absolute liability against a residential health care facility for a criminal assault committed by an employee against a resident patient. The Court determined that the facility should be held to the traditional reasonable duty of care towards its patients. Further, the traditional “scope of employment” analysis should be applied to determine whether the employer could be held liable for the tortious conduct of its employee.

In Davis, a resident counselor employed by Devereux, a residential institution for the developmentally disabled, engaged in a pre-meditated act of aggression when she assaulted a residential patient by pouring boiling water on him. The counselor was arrested and imprisoned for criminal assault, and the patient’s guardians obtained a default judgment against her for assault in the ensuing civil action.

The family also brought a civil action against the health care facility. Reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the facility, the Appellate Division remanded for trial and imposed an absolute liability standard on the employer under the common law “non-delegable duty” analysis, which imposes a duty on the master to protect those entrusted to its care in an in loco parentis relationship, such as a school or health care facility, and subjects the master to liability for the acts of its employees whenever they fail to meet their duty of care. Under that common law approach, the non-delegable duty imposed on the employer cannot be satisfied by any level of care taken by the employer in hiring or supervision of its staff, but is based solely on the level of care taken by the employee.

The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated summary judgment in favor of the health care facility. The Court observed that the “non-delegable duty” would unfairly impose absolute liability on the employer regardless of the level of care engaged in by the employer. “Once an employee has committed a tortious act, the duty would effectively impose absolute liability upon residential institutions” even if the employer had acted reasonably in screening applicants and supervising its employees.

The Court instead determined that traditional principles of the duty of reasonable care should be followed with respect to the actions of employees of facilities responsible for in loco parentis care. The Court observed that such facilities are expected to take reasonable measures to assure that their staff members are not endangering the safety of the patients entrusted to their care, and that liability for the tortious acts of their employees would be determined under traditional “scope of employment” principles. Finding in this case that Devereux acted reasonably in screening individuals prior to hiring, and in supervising the relationship of its employees with the residential patients, the Court determined that the facility had met its duty of care to its patients. The Court further determined that the counselor had acted far outside the scope of her employment in pouring boiling water on the patient where she acted out of personal anger and frustration, and not in any way to further the interests of her employer.