Laborsphere

Possible Amendment to New Jersey’s Anti-Discrimination Law Would Likely Mean More Claims, Greater Liability Risks and Larger Damages Awards

Earlier this week, the New Jersey General Assembly passed a bill that would amend the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”) to address specifically pay differentials among employees of different sexes who perform “substantially similar” work. The amendment, which the state Senate passed last month, will now be delivered to the Governor for consideration.

As the NJLAD exists now, an employee can bring a pay-related claim only by alleging that the differential amounts to sex discrimination and satisfying a comparatively higher standard. If the bill is signed into law, New Jersey would follow in the footsteps of other states like New York and California, which have recently updated their discrimination laws to provide a separate cause of action specifically for unequal pay.

The bill, if enacted into law, would severely limit the circumstances under which an employer can pay male and female employees different amounts for “substantially similar” work. An employer would be permitted to do so if it can demonstrate that it is utilizing a seniority (pay based on tenure) or merit (pay based on achieving certain goals) system. Alternatively, the employer would need to demonstrate that each of the following factors exists:

• The differential is based on one or more legitimate, bona fide factors other than sex, such as training, education or experience, or the quantity or quality of production;

• The factor or factors do not perpetuate a sex-based differential in compensation;

• Each of the factors is applied reasonably;

• One or more of the factors account for the entire wage differential; and

• The factors are job-related with respect to the position in question and based on a legitimate business necessity, and there are no alternative business practices that would serve the same business purpose without producing the wage differential.

If enacted, the New Jersey bill would also significantly increase potential employer exposure, in that the recovery period would be extended to pick up the entire time period when the pay differential existed.

With the passing of this bill by both houses, and with laws specifically targeting gender-based pay differences on the rise generally, employers would be wise to look at their employees’ titles and job descriptions to identify “substantially similar” positions and any pay differentials among the employees in those positions. Where such differences exist, employers will want to explore the reason for those differences and whether changes need to be made. If an employer has an established seniority or merit-based system on which it intends to rely, it is important that the system be set forth in detail and made available to all employees, so that there is no question as to its existence and applicability later.

In FLSA Settlements, the Permissible Scope of Releases and Confidentiality Provisions May Be Broader Than You Think

Courts and the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) often refuse to approve Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) settlements: (1) in which the employee’s release of claims is not narrowly limited to wage claims; or (2) that seek to restrict public disclosure of the settlement terms. Because FLSA settlements are arguably only enforceable if approved by a court or the DOL, these conditions sometimes impede the ability of parties to resolve FLSA disputes. A recent court decision may offer a solution. In Lola v. Skadden, Arps, Meagher, Slate & Flom LLP, 2016 BL 29709 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2016), the Honorable Richard J. Sullivan, U.S.D.J., allowed the parties more leeway in resolving FLSA claims, adopting an approach likely to facilitate settlements.

Case Background

Plaintiff David Lola, an attorney, worked for a staffing agency that placed him at the law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, where he performed document review work for 15 months. He later filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the staffing agency and the law firm (as joint employers), alleging that they had misclassified him as exempt under the FLSA and failed to pay him overtime when he worked more than 40 hours a week. He filed the lawsuit on behalf of himself and as a putative collective action on behalf of other, “similarly-situated,” contract attorneys.

The parties ultimately negotiated a settlement agreement and submitted it to the Court for approval. The agreement provided that Lola and two other individuals who opted into the lawsuit (and plaintiffs’ attorneys) would receive a total of $75,000 in exchange for, among other things, dismissing the lawsuit, releasing claims against the defendants and limiting disclosure of the terms of the settlement.

Judge Sullivan approved the settlement, issuing a written decision to address the release of claims and confidentiality provisions of the parties’ agreement.

Release of Claims

Under the settlement, the plaintiffs agreed to waive both FLSA and non-FLSA claims against the defendants. Judge Sullivan observed that some courts “have refused to approve [FLSA] settlements with broad releases of claims, concluding that they conflict with the FLSA’s remedial purposes.” However, Judge Sullivan explained, “there is nothing inherently unfair about a release of claims in an FLSA settlement.” The Court concluded that the release of claims in this case “was the fair result of a balanced negotiation, in which Plaintiffs were represented by able counsel.” In reaching this conclusion, the Court highlighted these facts: (1) the release was mutual; (2) plaintiffs were not aware of any “actual, existing, or meritorious claims” that they were waiving; and (3) plaintiffs were not waiving any future claims. Under these circumstances, the Court determined that plaintiffs “could reasonably conclude that the provisions releasing claims were an acceptable compromise.”

Non-Disclosure of Settlement Terms

Judge Sullivan also observed that several courts have “rejected FLSA settlements containing confidentiality provisions that restrict plaintiffs’ ability to talk about the settlement.” The Court acknowledged that, “in certain cases, confidentiality provisions may excessively restrict plaintiffs’ ability to discuss settlements” and, therefore, undermine the purposes of the FLSA and the public interest in assuring that employees receive fair wages. According to the Court, however, the FLSA “imposes no per se bar on confidentiality provisions in settlements.” Instead, “the fairness of restrictions on the parties’ ability to disclose details of a settlement depends on the particular circumstances of any given case.” Under the circumstances in this case, the Court ruled that the restrictions were fair. Here, the agreement stated that plaintiffs and their counsel: “will not contact the media or utilize any social media regarding this Settlement or its terms” and, if contacted, they will respond, “no comment” or “[t]he matter has been resolved.”

Judge Sullivan reasoned that, in the absence of the non-disclosure provision, “Plaintiffs would be free to decline commenting on the case in response to any future inquiries by the press or otherwise” and, therefore, “it is difficult to see why they should be barred from adopting such a posture in advance of settling the matter.” The Court explained that, “since no one can force Plaintiffs to opine on the case in the future anyway, it is by no means irrational or improper for Plaintiffs to compromise words for dollars as part of a global, arms-length settlement” (emphasis in original). Given that a plaintiff is “allowed to accept less than the maximum potential recovery on the basis of litigation risk,” the Court explained that a plaintiff should also be permitted “to make nonmonetary concessions, such as minor restrictions on his right to comment on the case.” Again, the Court stressed, “this provision is the result of fair bargaining between well-represented parties and embodies a reasonable compromise that does not conflict with the FLSA’s purpose of protecting against employer abuses.” Notably, the settlement agreement was publicly-filed, so anyone interested in discovering its terms was free to do so. The parties simply limited the ability of plaintiffs to disclose them.

Conclusion

Employers sometimes litigate FLSA cases that they would rather settle, because they are concerned that a settlement will not ensure finality. Employers worry that a narrow release will not bar the plaintiff from filing another lawsuit after collecting the settlement payment or that the plaintiff may publicize the settlement, thereby encouraging copycat lawsuits. Judge Sullivan’s decision in Lola offers a potential solution for employers. Under the right circumstances, a settlement agreement can include a broad release of claims and the parties can agree to limit disclosure of the settlement terms.

In Wiest v. Tyco Electronics Corp., the Third Circuit Further Clarifies a Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Burden for a Retaliation Claim under SOX

Wiest v. Tyco Electronics Corp., a case that has been closely watched by Sarbanes-Oxley (“SOX”) practitioners, may have finally come to a close after nearly six years of litigation. In its decision (click here to view), the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s granting of summary judgment for Tyco, and provided additional clarification on what a plaintiff must do to make out a prima facie retaliation claim under SOX.

Tyco asserted that it fired Plaintiff Jeffrey Wiest in 2008 for inappropriate sexual relations with two female co-workers and sexual harassment. He then brought suit under SOX, alleging that Tyco terminated him for raising concerns to his managers about excessive corporate expenditures.

The case has twice been on appeal to the Third Circuit. In 2010, Tyco successfully moved to dismiss Wiest’s complaint on the basis that his complaints did not amount to “protected activity” under SOX. Upon appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded, adopting the worker-friendly standard that an employee engages in “protected activity” where he has a “reasonable belief” that the employer has violated or may violate the law or SEC rules (rejecting the standard, announced and later abandoned by the DOL’s Administrative Review Board, that the complaint must “definitively and specifically” relate to an existing violation of a particular anti-fraud law).

After remand, Tyco was eventually granted summary judgment on the basis that Wiest’s complaints were not a “contributing factor” in his termination. Wiest again appealed to the Third Circuit, which affirmed, and in the process adopted the standard of several other Circuits that a “contributing factor” was “any factor, which alone or in combination with other factors, tends to affect in any way the outcome of the decision.”

The “contributing factor” standard is a relatively low bar, specifically when compared to the causation standard for retaliation claims under some other statutes. Under Title VII, for example, an employee must establish that his protected activity was a “but-for” cause of the adverse action. See Univ. of Texas Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2521 (2013) (“Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.”). Nonetheless, the Third Circuit had no trouble finding that Wiest was unable to meet his burden, noting that there was a ten-month gap between Wiest’s alleged protected activity and the adverse action; that he received praise and commendations in the interim; that the persons who initiated the investigations into Wiest’s inappropriate behavior had no knowledge of his protected activity; and that other persons in the accounting department who were involved (or more involved) in the same activity as Wiest did not receive any negative treatment.

Further, the Court also held that, even if Wiest were able to establish a prima facie case, his claim would have failed regardless. An employer may still rely on the defense that it would have taken the adverse action in the absence of protected activity, and the Court held that “Tyco has demonstrated that it would have taken the same actions with respect to Wiest in the absence of Wiest’s accounting activity given the thorough, and thoroughly documented, investigation [into his inappropriate activity] conducted by its human resources director.”

The Wiest decision is useful guidance for employers defending against SOX retaliation claims, as it outlines potential arguments (concerning the temporal relationship between the protected activity and adverse action, intervening events, and the thoroughness of internal investigations) that may be used to defeat an inference of causation or to establish the affirmative defense that the adverse action would have occurred regardless.

EEOC and DOL Propose Increased Reporting Requirements for EEO-1 Reports

On the seventh anniversary of the federal Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), in partnership with the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (“OFCCP”), announced a proposed rule to collect data from employers that will be used to identify discriminatory pay practices. Under the proposed rule, companies with 100 or more employees, both private employers and federal contractors, would be required to report wages from W-2 earnings and total hours worked for all employees by sex, race, and ethnicity within a 12-month period. It is projected that these new proposed requirements will affect over 63 million employees.

This proposed rule is now in the comment period until April 1, 2016. The EEOC also plans to conduct a public hearing regarding the new rule at some point. If things progress as expected, this rule becomes effective for the September 30, 2017 reporting period.

While the EEOC highlights that the proposed rule also is a benefit to employers because it assists employers “in evaluating their pay practices to prevent pay discrimination” and to avoid enforcement actions, there are legitimate concerns regarding how such data will be interpreted and used by government agencies. Some concerns include the strong likelihood of this data producing false positives and the ability to keep this information confidential.

Pay Data

Currently, the EEO-1 form collects data regarding the number of employees, along with their sex, race and ethnicity, in 10 specifically designated job categories. Under the proposed rule, an employer also would be required to report the number of employees by their sex, race, and ethnicity, within 12 specified pay bands in each of the 10 job categories. These pay bands track the 12 pay bands used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the Occupation Employment Statistics survey. The specific pay bands are:

• $19,239 and under;
• $19,240 – $24,439;
• $24,440 – $30,679;
• $30,680 – $38,999;
• $39,000 – $49,919;
• $49,920 – $62,919;
• $62,920 – $80,079;
• $80,080 – $101,919;
• $101,920 – $128,959;
• $128,960 – $163,799;
• $163,800 – $207,999; and
• $208,000 and over.

The proposed new section of the EEO-1 form is available on the EEOC’s website (click here).

The pay data will be taken from employees’ total W-2 earnings for a 12-month period looking back from a pay period between July 1st and September 30th. The EEOC believes the benefit to using W-2 earnings is that it includes total earnings, including wages, salaries, and other compensation such as commissions, tips, taxable fringe benefits, overtime pay, shift differentials and bonuses. Also, the EEOC insists that using W-2s places the least amount of burden on an employer because this information is already gathered and most human resources information systems allow for calculations for any 12-month period, not just the calendar year.

A concern for employers is that there is no way to indicate on the EEO-1 form neutral factors, such as experience, education, or performance that might account for or explain any pay differentials. Accordingly, it is anticipated that this data may produce many false positives which will force employers to exert additional time and resources to defend their pay practices.

Total Number of Hours Worked

Under the proposed rule, an employer would also have to record the total number of hours worked by employees, broken down by sex, race, and ethnicity, in each pay band. The EEOC states that the reason for providing the number of hours worked is to take into account part-time or partial-year employees. Specifically, data on number of hours worked “will allow analysis of pay differences while considering aggregate variations in hours.”

As the rule is currently drafted, it is unclear how this information will achieve that purpose when it does not take into account factors which could skew results such as overtime hours, or other supplemental earnings like bonuses or commissions, which may be less due to part-time work. Another issue not addressed by the EEOC is how hours for salaried employees would be calculated. In fact, the EEOC acknowledges that it is not certain how to report hours worked for salaried employees and is requesting employer input on that issue.

Data Analysis

The EEOC states that it plans to use the pay data to: (1) assess complaints of discrimination; (2) focus agency investigations; and (3) identify existing pay disparities that may warrant further examination. The agency claims the information from the pay bands will be used to “compute within-job-category variation, across-job-category variation, and overall variation” to discern potential discrimination. The EEOC plans to develop statistical tools for staff to use on their computers so that they can conduct this type of analysis. The EEOC will also publish aggregate data so that employers can conduct their own analysis of their pay practices

Yet, the EEOC has not identified what statistical methodology it plans to use. Thus, it is not possible to assess whether the EEOC’s statistical analysis would hold up under judicial scrutiny or would be rejected by the courts.

Confidentiality Concerns

The EEOC does not guarantee that the pay data will be kept confidential and not subject to FOIA requests through both the EEOC and the DOL. Specifically, the EEOC states that Title VII forbids it from making public the EEO-1 data before a Title VII proceeding is instituted. As for OFCCP, it promises to keep the EEO-1 data confidential “to the maximum extent permitted by law, in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act Exemption 4 and the Trade Secret Act.”

The EEOC attempts to counter any confidentiality concerns by claiming that since the data is provided in the aggregate and not on based on individual employees, there is no confidentiality issue. Aside from the fact that it’s really more of a privacy issue, that response underplays the importance that the compensation data could provide to competitors and ignores the free discovery that it would provide to the plaintiff’s bar by allowing access to this pay data.

Next Steps

Given the complexity of defending discriminatory pay claims, in preparation of the enactment of this new rule employers should conduct pay equity analysis to assess any issues prior to submitting any pay data. Additionally, companies affected by the proposed rule may wish to consider submitting comments.

Who’s The Boss? The Department of Labor’s Effort to Expand Joint Employer Liability Under the FLSA

On January 20, 2016, the U.S. Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) Wage and Hour Division issued an Administrator’s Interpretation (“Interpretation”) significantly expanding the definition of a “joint employer” under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. The DOL’s new approach, which relies in part on regulations promulgated under the Migrant and Seasonal Worker Protection Act (“MSPA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801, shifts the focus of the analysis toward “economic realities.” If followed, the DOL’s approach potentially expands liability for wage and hour violations such as overtime pay to entities that do not directly employ workers, but that have contracted with third parties for labor.

In the introductory paragraphs of the Interpretation, the DOL implies its motive in promulgating the new standard is to protect a larger number of workers and to address purported efforts by employers to shield themselves from wage and hour liability using multi-tiered workforce structures. Although the Interpretation is not binding on courts, it may be cited as persuasive authority in litigation, and could significantly expand the number of companies subject to joint employer liability under the FLSA.

Two Types of Potential Joint Employer Arrangements

The Interpretation focuses on two types of potential joint employer relationships: (a) horizontal joint employment; and (b) vertical joint employment.

Horizontal joint employment “exists where the [putative] employee has employment relationships with two or more employers and the employers are sufficiently associated or related with respect to the employee such that they jointly employ the employee.” In the case of horizontal joint employment, there is typically an undisputed employer-employee relationship between each potential joint employer, individually, and the employee in question. For example, a horizontal joint employment scenario may exist for a waitress who works for two different restaurants that are owned by the same entity.

Vertical joint employment “exists where the employee has an employment relationship with one employer . . . and the economic realities show that he or she is economically dependent on, and thus employed by, another entity involved in the work.” In this type of potential joint employment arrangement, the putative joint employer is usually the (indirect) beneficiary of the employee’s work, contracted through an intermediary. However, unlike in the context of horizontal joint employment, the putative joint employer in a vertical joint employment inquiry would not have an admitted employment relationship with the putative employee. One example of this type of potential joint employment is a nurse placed at a hospital by a staffing agency.

Factors to Consider When Determining Whether Horizontal Joint Employment Exists

Relying largely on regulations and case law developed under the FLSA, the Interpretation identifies a number of non-exhaustive facts that should be considered in determining whether a horizontal joint employment relationship exists. They include:

Who owns the potential joint employers (e., does one company own part or all of the other or do they have any common owners);
Do the potential joint employers have any overlapping officers, directors, executives, or managers;
Do the potential joint employers share control over operations, including hiring, firing, payroll, advertising, and/or overhead costs;
Are the potential joint employers’ operations inter-mingled;
Does one potential joint employer supervise the work of the other;
Do the potential joint employers share supervisory authority for the employee;
Do the potential joint employers treat the employees as a pool of employees available to both of them;
Do the potential joint employers share clients or customers; and
Are there any agreements between the potential joint employers.

The Interpretation states that the above factors need not all be present for a horizontal joint employment relationship to exist. However, if the employers are “acting entirely independently of each other and are completely disassociated” with respect to an employee, no horizontal joint employment relationship will exist. The central focus is the relationship between the two potential joint employers.

Vertical Joint Employment: A Major Departure

Before the Interpretation, various federal circuit courts had developed their own multifaceted tests for determining whether two employers could be liable as joint employers pursuant to the FLSA. Though the standards varied, a majority shared a common focus on the degree of putative employers’ control over the putative employees.

While the Interpretation continues to focus on control in the context of horizontal joint employment relationships, the DOL departed from that focus with respect to vertical joint employers. Under the new formulation, determining whether a vertical joint employment relationship exists is a two-part process. First, consideration must be given to whether the “intermediary employer” (either an individual or an incorporated entity) is an employee of the putative joint employer (e.g., is a farm labor contractor actually an employee of the grower, and not an independent contractor?). If so, “all of the intermediary employer’s employees are employees of the potential joint employer too, and there is no need to conduct a vertical joint employer analysis.”

If the intermediary employer is not an employee of the putative joint employer, focus shifts to the “economic realities” analysis. Control cannot be the predominant consideration – as it had been in the past. Rather, the “core question” is “whether the [putative] employee is economically dependent on the potential joint employer who, via an arrangement with the intermediary employer, is benefitting from the work” (emphasis added).

In determining whether there is the requisite degree of economic dependence, the Interpretation recites seven factors that developed under the MSPA – a law governing agricultural workers – based on regulations implemented almost 20 years ago:

Whether and to what extent the work performed by the putative employee is controlled or supervised (directly or indirectly) by the putative joint employer beyond a reasonable degree of contract performance oversight.
Whether the putative joint employer controls the employment conditions, including whether the putative joint employer has the authority to hire or fire the employee, modify employment conditions, or determine the rate or method of pay.
The degree of permanency and duration of the relationship, taking into consideration the industry in which the relationship exists.
The extent to which the putative employee’s work for the putative joint employer is repetitive and rote, is relatively unskilled, and/or requires little or no training.
Whether the work performed by the putative employee is an integral part of the putative employer’s business.
Whether the work is performed on the putative joint employer’s premises. (It is immaterial whether the putative joint employer leases as opposed to owns the premises where the work is performed, so long as the putative employer controls the premises.)
Whether and to what extent the putative joint employer performs administrative functions for the employee, such as handling payroll, providing workers’ compensation insurance, providing necessary facilities and safety equipment, housing, or transportation, or providing tools and materials required for the work.

The Interpretation notes that some previous judicial standards focused only or primarily on factors relevant to the putative employer’s level of control (e.g., ability to hire and fire, supervision of the work, determining method and rate of pay). But the Interpretation takes the position that a limited, control-dominated analysis is inconsistent with “the breadth of employment under the FLSA.”

The result of the DOL’s broad, economic-driven approach may be that many companies that have contracted with third-party staffing providers will find themselves swept within the ambit of the FLSA if the Interpretation’s seven-factor analysis is applied. For example, the analysis above may result in a finding of a joint employment relationship where two entities are entirely economically dependent, but share little or no control over the putative employees. Note that the DOL’s new standard departs from many of the state common law formulations of the joint employer relationship, which may be more lenient for employers. On the other hand, some states, like California, have already expanded the scope of joint employer liability through the use of statutes imposing liability on customers of labor contractors. See, e.g., Cal. Lab. Code § 2810.3.

Takeaways

The Interpretation is not binding on courts, but may, nonetheless, be regarded (and cited) as persuasive authority, and will certainly guide the DOL’s own approach to potential joint employment enforcement under the FLSA. Although the Interpretation arguably does not alter the analysis for potential horizontal joint employment, it significantly changes the analysis for potential vertical joint employment. Accordingly, companies using third-party labor providers should carefully examine their risk of potential vertical joint employment liability, with an eye on the seven factors above. Unlike in the past, the focus should be on the level of economic dependence, as opposed to just control.

In addition to exploring restructuring of relationships with third-party labor providers, companies may wish to consider adding terms to contracts with labor providers entitling the companies to guarantees of wage and hour compliance, and providing the companies the right to audit labor providers’ compliance with wage and hour law. To further mitigate risk under the DOL’s new standard, companies may consider including indemnification provisions in agreements with third-party labor providers.

Employers Should Not Rely on Employer Handbooks to Create Enforceable Arbitration Agreements

In a recent published opinion, the New Jersey Appellate Division held that an arbitration clause in an employee handbook was unenforceable because the handbook also contained standard disclaimer language stating that the handbook did not create an employment contract. The Court’s decision, in Morgan v. Raymours Furniture Co., Slip Op. A-2830-14T2, 2015 WL 9646045 (N.J. App. Div. Jan. 7, 2016), makes clear that arbitration agreements should ideally be separate, stand-alone documents, not provisions in employee handbooks.

On three occasions during the course of his employment with defendant Raymours Furniture Company (“Raymours”), plaintiff Grant Morgan acknowledged receipt of an employee handbook. The handbook included a mandatory arbitration clause and a waiver of the employee’s right to sue in court. According to Morgan, after he complained about age discrimination in the workplace, Raymours presented him with a separate, stand-alone arbitration agreement and told him to sign the agreement or Raymours would terminate his employment. Morgan refused to sign and Raymours fired him.

Morgan filed a lawsuit against Raymours (and two individual Raymours managers) asserting age discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, wrongful termination and other causes of action. The defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial judge denied the motion, and the defendants appealed.

In reviewing the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division considered the disclaimer contained in the employee handbook, which stated:

“Nothing in this Handbook or any other Company practice or communication or document, including benefit plan descriptions, creates a promise of continued employment, [an] employment contract, term or obligation of any kind.”

The Court also considered the text of the electronic form on which Morgan had acknowledged receipt of the employee handbook, which stated that the employee received the handbook and:

“understand[s] that the rules, regulations, procedures and benefits contained therein are not promissory or contractual in nature and are subject to change by the company.”

The Court recognized that Raymours included these disclaimers because of New Jersey Supreme Court precedent in Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 309, modified, 101 N.J. 10 (1985), holding that they may be necessary to defeat a claim that the handbook created implied contractual rights and duties. Nonetheless, the Morgan Court explained that “it is simply inequitable for an employer to assert that, during its dealings with its employee, its written rules and regulations were not contractual and then argue, through reference to the same materials, that the employee contracted away a particular right.” Moreover, the Court explained, for an arbitration clause to be enforceable, the employee must “clearly and unambiguously” agree to a waiver of his or her right to sue.

In light of the disclaimers, the Court concluded that Morgan had not clearly and unambiguously agreed to waive his right to sue. The Court reasoned that by “inserting such a waiver provision in a company handbook, which, at the time, the employer insisted was not ‘promissory or contractual,’ an employer cannot expect – and a court, in good conscience, will not conclude – that the employee clearly and unambiguously agreed to waive the valued right to sue.” The Court further reasoned that merely obtaining Morgan’s acknowledgment that he received the handbook did not constitute his agreement not to sue. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision denying the motion to compel arbitration.

One’s immediate reaction to the Morgan decision may be that it leaves employers with two untenable options. They can either: (1) issue handbooks with enforceable arbitration provisions that may inadvertently create contractual rights for employees; or (2) issue handbooks with unenforceable arbitration provisions that will not inadvertently create contractual rights for employees. However, employers also have a third, better option. An employer wishing to implement a mandatory arbitration program should require employees to sign a separate, stand-alone agreement in which the employee clearly and unambiguously agrees to arbitration. Meanwhile, employers should continue to include Woolley disclaimers in their handbooks. Overall, while arbitration programs offer many benefits, it is critical that employers exercise great care to ensure that they are enforceable.