Audits/Due Diligence - Page 20 of 24

OFCCP’s New Rules Target Veterans and Individuals with Disabilities

Familiar with this? It’s time to update your affirmative action plans. For the women and minorities plan, you gather your applicant data, prepare spreadsheets and update your written materials to reflect new goals and changes in your recruiting sources. For the veterans and individuals with disabilities plan, you update a bit and you’re done. Starting early next year, however, the rules will change making updates more onerous for employers. On August 27, 2013, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs announced final rules for federal contractors regarding hiring and employment of disabled individuals and protected veterans and imposing new data retention and affirmative action obligations on contractors. The rules are expected to be published in the Federal Register shortly and will become effective 180 days later.

The key changes include:

Benchmarks. Contractors must establish benchmarks, using one of two methods approved by the OFCCP, to measure progress in hiring veterans. Likewise, contractors must strive to hire individuals with disabilities to comprise at least seven percent of employees in each job group. The OFCCP says these are meant to be aspirational, and are not designed to be quotas.
Data Analysis and Retention. Contractors must document and update annually several quantitative comparisons for the number of veterans who apply for jobs and the number of veterans that they hire. Likewise, for individuals with disabilities, contractors are required to conduct analyses of disabled applicants and those hired. Such data must be retained for three years.
Invitation to Self-Identify. Contractors must invite applicants to self-identify as protected veterans and as an individual with a disability at both the pre-offer and post-offer phases of the application process, using language to be provided by the OFCCP. This particular requirement worries employers who know that the less demographic information they have about applicants, the better – especially when the application is denied. Contractors must also invite their employees to self-identify as individuals with a disability every five years, using language to be provided by the OFCCP.

Additional information, including with respect new requirements such as incorporating the equal opportunity clause into contracts, job listings, and records access, can be found here (http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/vevraa.htm) and here (http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/section503.htm).

Contractors with an Affirmative Action Plan already in place on the effective date of the regulations will have additional time, until they create their next plans, to bring their plan into compliance. However, whether they have a current Affirmative Action Plan or not, federal contractors should begin looking at these new rules now and take steps to ensure they are in compliance.

Significant Illinois and Massachusetts Non-Compete Rulings

Two recent cases should give employers pause as to whether their restrictive covenants with their at-will employees are enforceable. On May 28, 2013, a United States District Court in Massachusetts held that under Massachusetts law, a confidentiality agreement signed by an at-will employee was unenforceable where the employee’s title, duties, remuneration and other terms of employment had materially changed since signing the agreement. Then, on June 24, 2013, an Illinois Appellate Court held that unless an at-will employee is employed for at least two years, restrictive covenants the employee signed at the beginning of employment are unenforceable for lack of adequate consideration. Moreover, the Illinois court held it was irrelevant whether the employee quits or is terminated before two years of employment. While the rulings rely on the applicable state law, they address important points that may have broader application than only in Massachusetts and Illinois.

In Smartsource Computer & Audio Visual Rentals v. Robert March et al, D. Mass. (May 28, 2013), Smartsource filed an action to enforce its noncompete agreements with its former employee, March. March was hired by Smartsource in 2006 as a Senior Account Executive, and signed an offer letter with a simple confidentiality agreement/restriction. In 2007, March was promoted to Branch Sales Manager, in 2008 to Regional Sales Manager, in 2010 to Regional General Manager, and again in 2012 to Regional Sales Manager. With each change his job responsibilities and compensation changed. Citing to Massachusetts law, the court denied the requested injunctive relief to Smartsource. Although stopping short of a definitive ruling on the merits, the court noted that “it may well be under [Massachusetts case authority], March’s 2006 confidentiality agreement has been abrogated, and he is not bound by any restrictive covenants.” March and the Massachusetts cases cited therein suggests that when material changes to an employment relationship are contemplated, the employer should consider revisiting the existing restrictive covenant agreement and consider whether a new agreement is advisable.

More recently, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District (Cook County) in Eric D. Fiefield et al v. Premier Dealer Services, Inc., (Ill. App. Ct., 1st Dist. June 24, 2013), answered the question as yet definitively unanswered in Illinois: What additional employment period after the signing of a restrictive covenant agreement is sufficient consideration to make the agreement enforceable against an at-will employee? The Court answered at least two years, even where the employee signs the restrictive covenant at the outset of employment. Fiefield had worked for the predecessor company that was acquired by Premier. Fiefield was then hired by Premier in late October 2009, and as a condition of employment Fiefield was required to and did sign an employment agreement containing a two-year restrictive covenant. Fiefield signed the agreement on October 30, 2009 and started work on November 1, 2009. On February 12, 2010, Fifield resigned to go to work for a competitor. Fiefield and his new employer then filed suit against Premier seeking a declaratory judgment that the restrictive covenant agreement was unenforceable. The circuit court ruled the agreement was not enforceable because it lacked consideration. Premier appealed and the Appellate Court affirmed, agreeing that there was inadequate consideration. The court held that regardless of whether Fiefield had signed the agreement before he started work or after he started work, “Illinois courts have repeatedly held there must be at least two years or more of continuous employment to constitute adequate consideration in support of a restrictive covenant…This rule is maintained even if the employee resigns on his own instead of being terminated.”

The Premier decision will surely send employers in Illinois scrambling to reconsider the validity of their at-will employee restrictive covenant agreements in Illinois. However, help may be on the way as Premier has filed a petition for leave to appeal the decision to the Illinois Supreme Court. Granting review is within the Court’s discretion, and the Illinois Chamber of Commerce and other employer groups are backing Premier’s bid. Even if the case is not reviewed or reversed, however, there are a number of possible solutions to the Premier consideration problem. These include offering employees consideration for the non-compete in addition to simply offering at-will employment (such as a “bonus” payment or possibly elaborating on the consideration offered to include, for example, training, access to customers and valuable confidential information and trade secrets) or offering employees some form of term employment contract.

If you have at-will employees with restrictive covenants less than two years old, and you view confidentiality and restrictive covenant agreements important to your business, or if your agreements with your employees significantly predate their current job positions, compensation and other conditions, these cases should sound the alarm to review your competitive advantage protections.

NLRB Rules That Policy Requiring Employees to Individually Arbitrate Employment Disputes Violates the National Labor Relations Act

On June 3, 2013 an National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reached a decision in which it found that MasTec Services’ Company’s policy that required employees to individually arbitrate employment disputes violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). In so holding, the ALJ radically expanded the NLRB’s previous decision in D. R. Horton, Inc. (1/3/12). As D.R. Horton itself has been rejected by almost all federal courts which have considered it, the MasTec decision is bound to create a firestorm of criticism.

In D.R. Horton, the NLRB ruled that requiring employees to sign a blanket waiver of rights to pursue their employment claims through class actions violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. The specific agreement at issue in D.R. Horton (1) contained a mandatory arbitration provision, and (2) required employees to bring all employment-related claims to an arbitrator on an individual basis, as opposed to as a potential class action. The D.R. Horton decision generated significant criticism, and many commentators noted that it appeared to conflict with U.S. Supreme Court precedent, specifically AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). Concepcion held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state laws that prohibit contracts from disallowing class-wide arbitration, and that companies can enforce contract provisions that require customers to arbitrate their disputes individually. Concepcion, which involved a consumer contract, was thought to make it much harder for individuals – not only consumers, but also employees who had signed arbitration agreements – to file class action lawsuits.

Although D.R. Horton initially caused great concern among employers, as it seemed to eliminate the possibility of preventing class suits through mandatory arbitration agreements, this concern has been tempered by the fact that an overwhelming number of federal courts that have considered the issue have refused to follow the decision, including the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. See e.g., Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013); Delock v. Securitas Security Servs. USA, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 2d 784 (E.D. Ark. 2012); Morvant v P F Chang’s China Bistro Inc., 2012 WL 1604851 (N.D. Cal. 2012); De Oliveira v. Citicorp North America, Inc. (M.D. Fla. 2012); Tenet Healthsystem Philadelphia, Inc. v. Rooney (E.D. Pa. 2012); Lavoice v. UBS Wealth Management Americas (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdales, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2012); Sanders v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., 843 F Supp. 2d 1033, (N.D. Cal. 2012); Palmer v. Convergys Corp., 2012 WL 425256 (M.D. Ga. 2012).

MasTec is sure to be controversial because, despite the courts’ hostile reaction to D.R. Horton, MasTec expands its holding. The arbitration provision at issue in MasTech was less restrictive than that in D.R. Horton, in that it (1) permitted the employee to opt out within 30 days, and (2) explicitly authorized employees to bring claims to administrative agencies. Nonetheless, even with these safeguards in place, the ALJ found the provision to violate Section 8(a)(1). The ALJ gave three independent reasons for reaching this conclusion. First, given that the NLRA grants employees the right to engage in protected concerted activities without interference, an employer may not require its employees to affirmatively act (through the opt-out) in order to obtain or maintain those rights. Second, employees who opt out still would be unable to engage in and cooperate in concerted activities with those who did not opt out, disadvantaging them in their attempts at concerted action. Third, some employees may be reluctant to exercise the opt-out option for fear of angering their employers. Under the reasoning of the Mas Tec opinion, it would be virtually impossible for any employer to include a class action waiver in arbitration agreements with individual employees.

D.R. Horton itself is currently on appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Should the NLRB and Federal Court decisions continue to diverge, the stage may be set for a reversal of D.R. Horton (or perhaps a Supreme Court decision). We will continue to monitor D.R. Horton and its progeny, given the case’s broad implications for employers potentially subject to employee class actions.

NLRB Issues Guidance on Lawful Confidentiality Language

On July 30, 2012, the NLRB (“Board”) issued a decision in Banner Health System dba Estrella Medical Center, 358 NLRB No. 93 holding, among other things, that the employer violated Section 8(a)(1) (which prohibits employers from interfering, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights), by restricting employees from discussing any complaint that was then the subject of an ongoing internal investigation.

To minimize the impact of such a confidentiality mandate on employees’ Section 7 rights, the Board found that an employer must make an individualized determination in each case that its “legitimate business justification” outweighed the employee’s rights to protected concerted activity in discussing workplace issues. In Banner Health, the employer did not carry its burden to show a legitimate business justification because it failed to make a particularized showing that:

Witnesses were in need of protection;
Evidence was in danger of being destroyed;
Testimony was in danger of being fabricated; or
A cover-up must be prevented.

The Board concluded that the employer’s one-size-fits-all rule, prohibiting employees from engaging in any discussion of ongoing internal investigations, clearly failed to meet these requirements.

More recently, the NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel clarified the limits of how such policies could be drafted without running afoul of Section 7 in an advice memorandum released on April 24, 2013 (dated January 29, 2013). The Region had submitted Verso Paper, Case 30-CA-089350 (January 29, 2013) to the Office of the General Counsel for advice regarding the confidentiality rule at issue and whether it unlawfully interfered with employees’ Section 7 rights. Specifically, the Verso Code of Conduct contained this provision prohibiting employees from discussing ongoing internal investigations:

Verso has a compelling interest in protecting the integrity of its investigations. In every investigation, Verso has a strong desire to protect witnesses from harassment, intimidation and retaliation, to keep evidence from being destroyed, to ensure that testimony is not fabricated, and to prevent a cover-up. To assist Verso in achieving these objectives, we must maintain the investigation and our role in it in strict confidence. If we do not maintain such confidentiality, we may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including immediate termination.

Reiterating that employees have a Section 7 right to discuss disciplinary investigations of their co-workers, the General Counsel’s Office found that the Verso Paper provision did not allow for a case-by-case analysis of whether or not the employer’s business justification for the restriction outweighed the employees’ Section 7 rights as required by Banner Health. According to the General Counsel’s Office, the employer may establish this by presenting facts specific to a given investigation that give rise to a legitimate and substantial business justification for imposing confidentiality restrictions.

However, in footnote 7 of its advice, the General Counsel’s Office, after noting that the first two sentences of the Verso Paper rule lawfully set forth the employer’s interest in protecting the integrity of its investigations, surprisingly put forward a modified version of the remainder of the Verso Paper provision that it said would pass muster under Banner Health:

Verso may decide in some circumstances that in order to achieve these objectives, we must maintain the investigation and our role in it in strict confidence. If Verso reasonably imposes such a requirement and we do not maintain such confidentiality, we may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including immediate termination.

Although this guidance is not binding, combining this language above with the first two sentences of the Verso Paper provision could certainly strengthen an employer’s argument that its intent was not to violate an employee’s Section 7 rights, but rather, to lawfully put employees on notice that if the employer “reasonably” imposes a confidentiality requirement, they must abide by it or face discipline. However, employers must remain mindful that using a provision like this suggested does not obviate the need for the employer to engage in the particularized case-by-case determination of its substantial and legitimate business need that would permit it to impose confidentiality restrictions on the investigation.

WARN Act Liability And Private Equity Firms

Last month’s decision out of the Delaware District Court in Woolery, et al. v. Matlin Patterson Global Advisers, LLC, et al. was an eye opener for private equity firms and other entities owning a controlling stake in a faltering business. Breaking from the norm, the Court refused to dismiss private equity firm MatlinPatterson Global Advisers, LLC (“MatlinPatterson”) and affiliated entities from a class action WARN Act suit alleging that the 400-plus employees of Premium Protein Products, LLC (“Premium”), a Nebraska-based meat processer and MatlinPatterson portfolio company, hadn’t received the statutorily-mandated 60 days advance notice of layoffs.

According to the plaintiffs, Premium’s performance began to decline in 2008 and, upon the downturn, the defendants became more and more involved in Premium’s day-to-day operations, including by making business strategy decisions (e.g., to enter the kosher food market), terminating Premium’s existing President, and installing a new company President. Things got bad enough that, in June 2009, the defendants decided to “furlough” all of Premium’s employees with virtually no notice and close the plant. The defendants then, in November 2009, converted the furlough to layoffs, and Premium filed for bankruptcy. According to the plaintiffs, Premium’s head of HR raised WARN Act concerns back in June, when the decision to close the plant and furlough the employees was made, and the defendants ignored the issue.

With Premium in bankruptcy, the plaintiffs, unsurprisingly, turned to MatlinPatterson and the other defendants as the targets of their WARN Act claim, asserting that they and Premium were a “single employer.” The Court then applied the Department of Labor’s five-factor balancing test, namely (1) whether the entities share common ownership, (2) whether the entities share common directors or officers, (3) the existence of de facto exercise of control by the parent over the subsidiary, (4) the existence of a unity of personnel policies emanating from a common source, and (5) the dependency of operations between the two entities. This test often favors private equity firms, and on balance it did so in Woolery too, with the Court finding that the plaintiffs had made no showing as to three of the five factors. The Court nevertheless refused to grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the complaint alleged that the defendants had exercised de facto control over Premium and then essentially giving that factor determinative weight.

No one should be surprised by the decision given the plaintiffs’ allegations, which had to be accepted as true at the motion to dismiss stage. They presented an ugly picture of a private equity firm dictating the most critical decisions (to close plant, layoff employees) and then attempting to duck the WARN Act’s dictates. The decision is nevertheless a cautionary tale for private equity firms and at first blush it presents a catch 22: (a) do nothing and watch your investment sink or (b) get involved and risk WARN Act liability.

So what is a private equity firm, lender or majority investor to do? Obviously, the best scenario is to build in the required 60-day notice period or, if applicable, utilize WARN Act exceptions, including the “faltering company” and “unforeseen business circumstances” exceptions. Even where that’s not possible, private equity firms and other controlling investors need not take a completely hands off approach. They would, however, be best-served (at least for WARN Act purposes) to do the following:

Provide only customary board-level oversight and allow the employer’s officers and management team to run the employer’s day-to-day operations
Although Board oversight and input can occur, continue to work through the management team on major decisions, including layoffs and potential facility closures
Avoid placing private equity firm or lender employees or representatives on the employer’s management team
Have the employer’s management team execute employment contracts with the employer, not the private equity firm or lender, and have the contracts, for the most part, create obligations only to the employer
Allow the employer to maintain its own personnel policies and practices, as well as HR oversight and function

What the courts are primarily concerned with in these cases are (a) a high degree of integration between the private equity firm or lender and the actual employer, particularly as to day-to-day operations, and (b) who the decision-maker was with regard to the employment practice giving rise to the litigation (typically the layoff or plant closure decision). Private equity firms and lenders that have refrained from this level of integration have had, and should continue to have, success in avoiding WARN Act liability and returning the focus of the WARN Act discussion to the actual employer.

Beware of ICE!

The Department of Homeland Security has issued new and revised I-9 Forms that employers must begin using on May 7 for all new hires. Failure to properly complete and retain the new forms can result in substantial fines and penalties. With immigration being a hot issue in Washington, we should expect that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) will be vigilant in conducting audits to enforce the I-9 requirements. Beware of ICE!

ICE will continue to focus its resources on the criminal prosecution of employers that knowingly hire illegal workers. Audits of employers for compliance with I-9 requirements is the principal tool for ICE to identify and prosecute violators. Unfortunately, those audits often result not in prosecution for hiring illegals, but in the imposition of substantial fines for paperwork and retention mistakes even where such mistakes have nothing to do with the employment of illegal aliens. Under the matrix used for calculating fines, ICE punishes employers based on the percentage of Forms handled improperly, which means that an employer could be fined more than $1,000 per Form if it makes the same mistake in completing or maintaining the Forms for each new hire, even if there are no illegal employees and the mistakes are merely inadvertent or negligent errors.

Employers need to become familiar with the new two-page Form and its accompanying Instructions. As a general rule, each new hire must fill out and sign Page 1, Section 1 of the Form no later than the first day of employment, but in no event prior to the employee’s acceptance of a job offer. Section 1 includes a new request for the employee’s telephone number and email address, but employers should know, if asked, that the Instructions indicate that providing such information is optional (although it does not say so on the Form). After completing Section 1, the employee will have three days to provide the employer with the required documents (Passport, Driver’s License, Social Security Card, Alien Registration, etc.) to prove identity and authorization to work in the U.S. Employers may not demand or request that the employee produce a specific form of documentation from the List of Acceptable Documents included with the I-9 Form. Once the proper documents have been produced, the employer must review them to determine that they are current, original and reasonably authentic, and carefully fill out, sign and certify Section 2 of the Form confirming that it has in fact reviewed the documents provided. The Certification in Section 2 is critical, as it is not sufficient for the employer to simply attach copies of the documents to the Form.

While employers are not required to retain a copy of the documents, keeping a copy with the completed Form is recommended for all new hires, not just for foreign born employees, because it is illegal to discriminate based on an individual’s place of birth. The I-9 Forms must be retained for the longer of three years from the date of hire or one year following termination, and should be kept in a folder separate from the employee’s personal file, which can easily be produced in the event of an audit. Employers are subject to substantial fines if the Forms are not properly completed, signed and retained in conformance with the rules.

We recommend that employers audit their I-9 procedures to verify they are currently in compliance with Immigration requirements and to ensure that their HR staff is familiar with the new Form. We also suggest that employers review their existing policies, or create an I-9 Compliance Policy, to ensure that the proper procedure is followed for each new hire. Beware of ICE!