William R. Horwitz, Author at Laborsphere

Bill Horwitz Article Published in New York Law Journal

An article by Florham Park counsel Bill Horwitz titled, “Second Circuit Adopts New Standard Involving Harassment by Non-Employees,” was published in the New York Law Journal.

Bill discussed the case of Summa v. Hofstra University, in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the question of whether an employer is liable when non-employees harass its personnel and adopted a standard for answering it.

The case involved claims of sexual harassment and retaliation by a former part-time manager of Hofstra University’s football team, a graduate student named Lauren Summa. Bill says the decision, however, has implications “beyond the world of college sports and applies to harassing conduct by vendors, customers and other third parties.”

The Second Circuit held that Summa could not pursue her sexual harassment claims against the university because it promptly responded to her complaints about football players’ conduct and took appropriate remedial action. The court, however, allowed her retaliation claim to continue because Summa provided sufficient proof that her complaints about the football team influenced the university’s decision to ultimately terminate her employment.

Bill says the decision “serves as a reminder to employers that: (1) ensuring that employees do not engage in inappropriate conduct will not necessarily shield an employer from civil liability for harassment; and (2) preventing retaliation against an employee who complains about harassment may be as important as preventing harassment in the first place.”

Second Circuit Rejects Application of McDonnell Douglas to New York City Human Rights Law – But Grants Summary Judgment Under More Lenient Analysis

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently affirmed a district court’s summary judgment dismissal of a lawsuit that an attorney filed against her former employer alleging race discrimination under federal, state and New York City law. In Simmons v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 1571 (2d Cir. 2013), the Court explained that the trial court had erroneously applied the McDonnell Douglas analysis to a New York City Human Rights Law claim, rather than only to the federal and state claims. Nonetheless, the Second Circuit concluded that the trial court properly dismissed all of the claims.

Plaintiff Tameka Simmons worked as an associate for defendant law firm, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP (“Akin Gump”), from 2007 to late 2009. In 2009, the firm was “experiencing significant economic difficulties.” For economic reasons, Akin Gump laid off forty-seven attorneys in March 2009. In April 2009, the firm announced deferred start dates for incoming associates. In June 2009, the firm converted a full-time associate to an hourly employee. At the end of 2009, the firm discharged Simmons.

Simmons filed a lawsuit against Akin Gump in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Her claims included race discrimination in violation of: (1) Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (2) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; (3) the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296; and (4) the New York City Human Rights Law, NYC Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq. After discovery, Akin Gump filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, dismissing the lawsuit in its entirety. Simmons appealed.

The Second Circuit analyzed the federal and state claims under the “burden-sifting framework” of the McDonnell Douglas case. In so doing, the Court considered whether Simmons could establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing: (1) that she was a member of a protected class; (2) that her job performance was satisfactory; (3) that she experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) “circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination” based on her membership in the protected class.

The Court concluded that Simmons could not establish the fourth prong of the analysis, because no evidence gave “rise to a reasonable inference of discrimination due to her race.” According to the Court, the evidence demonstrated that Akin Gump terminated her employment solely for economic reasons.

In any event, the Court explained, even if Simmons had been able to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, she could not have satisfied the next step in the McDonnell Douglas analysis, which was demonstrating that the firm’s proffered reason for her termination was pretextual. To satisfy this burden, Simmons would have had to present “sufficient evidence to support a rational finding that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons proffered by [the firm] were false, and that more likely than not discrimination was the real reason for the employment action.” The Court acknowledged that Simmons provided “some evidence” – such as the “low percentage of African-American associates” in her department of the firm – but it was insufficient. According to the Court, “[n]o reasonable jury could have found, on this record, that Simmons was selected for the reduction-in-force at least in part because of her race.”

The Second Circuit then turned to Simmons’ claims under the New York City Human Rights Law. The Court explained that the New York City law “was intended to provide a remedy reaching beyond those provided by the counterpart federal civil rights laws.” Accordingly, under the City law, Akin Gump could only obtain summary judgment by “showing that, based on the evidence before the court and drawing all reasonable inferences in [favor of Simmons], no jury could find that [Akin Gump] treated Simmons ‘less well’ than other employees at least in part because of her race.”

The Second Circuit observed that the district court had erred in failing to apply this more lenient analysis. Nonetheless, even under this analysis, the Second Circuit concluded that Simmons could not maintain her claim. The Court concluded that “Simmons failed to raise a triable issue as to whether she was treated less well than other employees based in whole or in part on discrimination, and not because of the non-discriminatory reasons proffered by [Akin Gump].”

As the Simmons v. Akin Gump case makes clear, the analysis that courts apply to discrimination claims under the New York City Human Rights Law is more lenient than the analysis under federal and state anti-discrimination laws. Employers with New York City employees should be aware of the more liberal analysis, but understand that – even under this analysis – courts will dismiss claims as long as employers can provide adequate support for their decisions. The keys to this effort include maintaining clear policies and documenting reasons for employment decisions.

Extreme Weather, Natural Disasters and Personnel Issues

What happens when a business is temporarily closed due to extreme weather? What about overtime as employees try to catch up on work? These are questions that employers on the East coast find themselves asking in the wake of Hurricane Sandy. William Horwitz, counsel in the Florham Park office, has authored a client alert to answer these and other questions that employers are now faced with.

Read the full alert.

Seventh Circuit: ADA Gives Disabled Employees Priority For Vacant Positions

A recent Seventh Circuit decision may require employers to select minimally qualified employees over far more qualified employees when filling vacant positions. In EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 2012 WL 3871503 (7th Cir. 2012), the Court held last month that, absent undue hardship, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), requires an employer to transfer a disabled employee to a vacant position ahead of more qualified non-disabled employees.

This case involved guidelines that United Airlines issued in 2003 for accommodating “employees who, because of disability, can no longer do the essential functions of their current jobs even with reasonable accommodation.” Under the guidelines, these disabled employees were eligible for placement in a vacant position and even received priority over otherwise equally qualified co-workers, but did not receive an open position over a genuinely superior candidate. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) filed a lawsuit against United Airlines, which filed a Motion to Dismiss. The district court granted the motion, holding that a “competitive transfer policy does not violate the ADA.”

The EEOC appealed and the Seventh Circuit reversed. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that, according to its own precedent, employers were not required “to reassign a disabled employee to a job for which there is a better applicant, provided it’s the employer’s consistent and honest policy to hire the best applicant for the particular job in question.” The Court concluded, however, that this precedent conflicted with the Supreme Court’s more recent decision in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).

In Barnett, the Supreme Court considered whether a disabled cargo handler who could no longer perform his job was entitled to a mailroom position ahead of a more senior employee who was otherwise entitled to the job pursuant to a seniority system. The Barnett Court noted that “preferences will sometimes prove necessary to achieve the [ADA’s] basic equal opportunity goal” and articulated a “two-step, case-specific” analysis. First, the plaintiff/employee must show that an accommodation “seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases.” After the plaintiff/employee satisfies the first step, the burden shifts to the defendant/employer to “show special (typically case-specific) circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship in the particular circumstances.” The Barnett Court concluded that, although a transfer to the mailroom may have constituted a reasonable accommodation, violating the seniority system was unreasonable. According to the Seventh Circuit, however, the Barnett Court “was not creating a per se exception for seniority systems.”

Relying on Barnett, the Seventh Circuit remanded the United Airlines case and directed the district court to apply the Supreme Court’s analysis. The Seventh Circuit observed that the Tenth and the District of Columbia Circuits have previously reached similar results. The Court gave little weight to a contrary Eighth Circuit decision that relied on the Seventh Circuit’s now-overruled precedent.

Practical Advice for Employers

Employers should have policies and procedures in place to address transfer requests by employees whose disabilities prevent them from performing their jobs. Within the Seventh Circuit (Wisconsin, Illinois and Indiana), employers should plan to give these employees priority for open positions and must understand that the Seventh Circuit will rarely accept an “undue hardship” excuse for denying the transfer.

Even outside of the Seventh Circuit, employers should be mindful of the United Airlines decision. Not only have the Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits reached similar rulings, but the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the Supreme Court’s Barnett decision will likely influence the decisions of courts that have not yet addressed this issue. Moreover, the EEOC clearly takes the position that anything less than mandatory reassignment violates the ADA.

Third Circuit Addresses The Notice An Employee Must Give Of Unforeseeable FMLA Leave

On August 3, 2012, in Lichtenstein v. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed the issue of how much information an employee must provide when notifying an employer of unforeseeable leave under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. (“FMLA”). By way of background, the FMLA generally entitles eligible employees to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave during any twelve-month period to care for themselves or a family member with a “serious health condition,” such as a condition requiring inpatient hospital care or continuing medical treatment. An employee only qualifies for FMLA leave if he or she provides sufficient information to permit the employer to determine whether the FMLA applies. For unforeseeable leave, the regulations require an employee to provide this notice “as soon as practicable.”

In this case, plaintiff Jamie Lichtenstein, a psychiatric technician, telephoned her employer shortly before her shift was scheduled to begin and explained that she “was currently in the emergency room [because her] mother had been brought into the hospital via ambulance, and [Lichtenstein] would be unable to work that day.” A few days later, Lichtenstein provided further information about her mother’s condition and requested a leave of absence but, by that time, the employer had already decided to terminate Lichtenstein’s employment for unrelated conduct pre-dating the mother’s emergency room visit.

In a lawsuit against her employer, Lichtenstein asserted FMLA interference and retaliation claims, alleging that her absence had constituted protected leave and that her employer had impermissibly considered the absence in deciding to terminate her employment. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer, dismissing Lichtenstein’s FMLA claims. Among other things, the district court concluded that Lichtenstein’s notice was inadequate to trigger the FMLA’s protections, because it did not include enough information for the employer to conclude that her mother “necessarily” had a serious health condition. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, emphasizing that, “when the leave is unforeseeable, the employee’s obligation is to provide sufficient information for an employer to reasonably determine whether the FMLA may apply to the leave request” (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis in original).

The Third Circuit explained that, by notifying the employer that her mother had been taken to the emergency room by ambulance, Lichtenstein did not provide enough information for the employer to conclude that her mother necessarily had a “serious health condition,” but did provide enough information for the employer to reasonably determine that her mother may have a “serious health condition” and the FMLA may, therefore, apply. According to the Court, once the employee’s initial notice “reasonably apprises the employer that FMLA may apply, it is the employer’s burden to request additional information if necessary.”

The Lichtenstein case provides helpful guidance for employers. With regard to the FMLA, when receiving information from an employee suggesting that his or her absence may trigger the FMLA, the employer should follow up with the employee and request additional information. This case also acts as a reminder that, when discharging employees, an employer should be sure to document its legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons in order to minimize the risk that an unexpected development, such as unforeseeable leave, provides a basis for employees to allege that the decision was unlawful.

William Horwitz Authors Articles for New Jersey Law Journal and BNA’s Corporate Counsel Weekly

William Horwtiz, counsel in the Labor & Employment practice group, recently authored articles for both the New Jersey Law Journal and BNA’s Corporate Counsel Weekly.

William’s article for the New Jersey Law Journal titled, “Third Circuit Rides the Class-Action Arbitration Waive”, discusses the case of Quilloin v. Tenet HealthSystem Philadelphia, in which the Third Circuit, following the U.S. Supreme Court’s lead and its own precedent, endorsed the validity of class-action waivers in predispute employment arbitration agreements. Bill outlines the facts of the case and the court’s reasoning and says that the case offers helpful guidance for employers rolling out new arbitration agreements and employers with existing agreements. He also notes that Quilloin holds that class-action waivers are enforceable and employers should consider including them in arbitration agreements, adding that employers should also “include a provision requiring the parties to submit arbitrability issues to the arbitrator.”

William’s article for BNA’s Corporate Counsel Weekly, “In Case Involving Employer’s Poor Handling of Sexual Harassment Allegation, Second Circuit Resolves Two Novel Issues”, William discusses the case of Townsend v. Benjamin Enterprises, Inc., in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit resolved two issues of first impression. In outlining the facts of the case and the court’s observations, William notes that the most important takeaway from the decision may be the important guidance for employers of how not to address sexual harassment in the workplace.

To read the complete article, “Third Circuit Rides the Class-Action Arbitration Waive”, click here.

To read the complete article, “In Case Involving Employer’s Poor Handling of Sexual Harassment Allegation, Second Circuit Resolves Two Novel Issues”, click here.