Lawrence Del Rossi, Author at Laborsphere

What Employers Need to Know about the Government’s Recent Scrutiny of Non-Competes

For more than 400 years, private businesses have used non-compete agreements in one form or another to protect their legitimate business interests, such as long-standing customer relationships, investment in specialized training, or development of trade secrets. They are commonplace in many employment contracts in a variety of industries ranging from retail, insurance, healthcare, financial services, technology, engineering, and life sciences. Some state legislatures and courts have curtailed their use in certain industries or professions. California, for example, prohibits them unless limited exceptions apply. Cal. Bus. Code §16600. Most states prohibit them for legal professionals. Many courts can modify or “blue pencil” them if the restrictions are found to be broader than necessary to protect an employer’s legitimate business interests.

Historically, federal and state agencies have generally stayed out of the mix in terms of regulating or challenging private businesses’ use and enforcement of non-competes. However, a recent uptick in government enforcement activity suggests a new wave of challenges is on the horizon for employers.

Continue reading “What Employers Need to Know about the Government’s Recent Scrutiny of Non-Competes”

Courts in New Jersey Continue to Endorse “Awkward Theory” of Individual Liability in NJLAD Cases

Referred to by some courts as an “awkward theory” of liability, employers and supervisors should be aware that courts in New Jersey continue to recognize the viability of individual liability claims under the “aiding and abetting” provision of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. §10:5-12(e).

Personal Liability for Supervisors: Title VII vs. NJLAD

Unlike Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act, which does not provide for individual employee liability, New Jersey courts have held that in addition to “employers” being liable under NJLAD, supervisors can be personally liable for their illegal conduct under an “aiding and abetting” theory. The New Jersey Supreme Court recently clarified the expansive definition of “supervisor” for purposes of the NJLAD as an employee who is (1) authorized to undertake tangible employment decisions affecting the plaintiff, or (2) authorized by the employer to direct the plaintiff’s day-to-day work activities. Aguas v. New Jersey, 220 N.J. 494, 529 (2015).

To hold a supervisor liable as an “aider and abetter” under the NJLAD, a plaintiff must show that the individual (1) performed a wrongful act that caused an injury; (2) was generally aware of his or her role as part of an overall illegal activity at the time that he or she provided the assistance; and (3) knowingly and substantially assisted in the principal violation. Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 70, 83084 (2004). Aiding and abetting requires “active and purposeful conduct.” Cicchetti v. Morris County Sheriff’s Office, 194 N.J. 563, 595 (2008).

What Makes this Aiding and Abetting Theory so “Awkward”?

Courts applying New Jersey law have yet to follow a uniform rule in situations where the plaintiff alleges that a supervisor aided and abetted the “employer” in violating the NJLAD based on the supervisor’s own conduct (i.e., as the sole actor engaged in the wrongful conduct). In other words, what happens when the supervisor is the only person alleged to have engaged in the wrongful conduct? Two distinct lines of cases have developed in this area of the law – one finding supervisory employees can be personally liable for aiding and abetting their own/the employer’s wrongful conduct (e.g., Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 1999), and another refusing to impose individual liability (e.g., Newsome v. Admin. Office of the Courts of N.J., 103 F. Supp. 2d 807 (D.N.J. 2000). See Aiding and Abetting Your Own Conduct, New Jersey Law Journal, Volume 209 (July 16, 2012), Employment Counselor, Number 241 (Sept. 2010).

A string of recent decisions by New Jersey state and federal courts suggest that this “awkward” theory is here to stay. For example, in Yobe v. Renaissance Electric, Inc., 2016 WL 614425 (D.N.J. Feb. 16, 2016), the court denied a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s NJLAD disability retaliation claims against his former supervisor, who was the only person alleged to have engaged in the retaliatory conduct. The defendant argued that the plaintiff’s claim failed as a matter of law because a supervisor cannot “aid and abet” his own conduct. Citing to the Third Circuit’s “prediction” in Hurley that the New Jersey Supreme Court would hold a supervisor personally liable under NJLAD, and an unpublished, non-precedential decision by the New Jersey Appellate Division in Rowan v. Hartford Plaza Ltd., 2013 WL 1350095 (App. Div. April. 5, 2013), the court in Yobe concluded that “[w]hile it is concededly an ‘awkward theory’ to hold an individual liable for aiding and abetting his own conduct, it would thwart the NJLAD’s broad and remedial purpose, and make little sense, to construe it as permitting ‘individual liability for a supervisor who encourages or facilitates another employee’s harassing conduct, while precluding individual liability for the supervisor based on his or her own discriminatory or harassing conduct.’”

Impact on Employers and Individual Supervisors

In discrimination, hostile work environment and retaliation cases brought under the NJLAD, it is common for a plaintiff to name his or her former supervisor as an individual defendant, particularly if the supervisor is the person who made the decision to take an adverse employment action against the plaintiff. Naming the supervisor, particularly a high-level manager, might be viewed by the plaintiff as a tactical move to encourage an early settlement by driving a wedge between the employer’s interest in defending its business decision and the supervisor’s reputational or financial impact concerns. Absent a showing of fraudulent joinder, a plaintiff’s naming of his or her supervisor as a defendant might prevent the employer from removing the action to federal court based on complete diversity of citizenship. In addition, legal fees could increase if separate legal representation for the employer and the supervisor is required. These important issues should be considered and discussed with counsel at the outset of the case. Because the NJLAD does not provide for individual liability for aiding and abetting if the employer is not found liable, the best defense is a unified one between the employer and the individual supervisor.

Standards of Proof in Employment Wage and Hour Class Actions Remain a Hot Topic for U.S. Supreme Court

Last week the United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments in a donning and doffing class and collective action against Tyson Foods, Inc. (see full transcript of oral argument here) that has the potential to dramatically expand the certification of class and collective wage and hour “off-the-clock” actions.

The Fictional “Average Employee”

One of the primary issues in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146, is whether the plaintiffs’ use of statistical averages in a Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) case was appropriate to certify a federal Rule 23(b)(3) damages class and to prove liability and damages at trial. The plaintiffs relied on expert testimony to prove that a class of more than 3,000 workers at an Iowa pork processing plant were owed overtime wages for time spent donning and doffing personal protective equipment and walking to and from their workstations. At trial, the plaintiffs used statistical evidence of the average donning, doffing and walking times for employees, resulting in a jury verdict against Tyson Foods in excess of $5.8 million. They relied on individual time sheets and average times calculated by their expert from more than 700 videotape observations of employees putting on and taking off protective gear and walking to their workstations.

Relying on the Supreme Court’s recent employer-friendly class action decisions in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) and Comcast v. Behrend, 133 S.Ct. 1426 (2013), Tyson Foods appealed the verdict to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. It argued that the plaintiffs’ reliance on statistical evidence improperly “presume[s] that all class members are identical to a fictional ‘average’ employee,” which is contrary to the so-called “trial by formula” prohibition in Dukes and Behrend for determining classwide liability and damage.

A divided (2-1) panel of the Eighth Circuit disagreed with Tyson Foods’ positions. Based on a split in the circuits, the Supreme Court granted certification on (1) whether differences among individual class members may be ignored and a class action certified under Rule 23(b)(3), or a collective action certified under the FLSA, where liability and damages will be determined with statistical techniques that presume all class members are identical to the average observed in a sample; and (2) whether a class action may be certified or maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), or a collective action certified or maintained under the FLSA, when the class contains hundreds of members who were not injured and have no legal right to any damages.

Will Statistical Modeling Be Permitted to Show Classwide Violations Under the FLSA?

Some of the Justices, including the likely swing-vote, Justice Kennedy, appeared skeptical of Tyson Foods’ argument that the plaintiffs could not rely on statistical averages as the mechanism to demonstrate commonality and typicality among workers when there was evidence Tyson Foods did not keep accurate or adequate time records. Several Justices cited to the burden-shifting framework in off-the-clock cases established after Anderson v. Mount Clemens Pottery Co., 380 U.S. 680 (1946) (where the employer’s records are inaccurate or inadequate and the employee cannot offer convincing substitutes, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate the precise amount of work performed or to refute the inference to be drawn from the employee’s evidence). In addition, Justice Kennedy suggested that Tyson Foods might have waived arguments by not challenging the plaintiffs’ statistical experts at trial, by objecting to bifurcating the liability and damages phases of the trial, and by not seeking a special jury verdict for determination and apportionment of damages among class members.

On the other side, Justices Alito and Roberts questioned whether the use of averaging is appropriate when the job positions and equipment used by workers were undisputedly different among the workers included in the class, and where it was undisputed that some workers did not perform the activities in question and therefore suffered no injury. Justice Alito asked, “How can you separate the employees who were injured from the employees who were not injured” or “how much time the employees were entitled to” except in “a very slap-dash fashion?” The Chief Justice echoed this point, stating “once the jury rejects plaintiffs’ “average statistics, . . . there’s no way to tell whether everybody who’s going to get money was injured or not.”

Takeaways

The Tyson Foods case highlights the difficulties employers continue to face when determining whether their workers’ “preliminary” (time spent before the principal work begins) and “postliminary” activities (time spent after the principal work ends) are compensable in the first place under the FLSA. As Justice Alito asked at oral argument, “What do you think an employer should do about recordkeeping when the employer believes that certain activities need not be counted under the FLSA? . . . Is it supposed to keep two sets of records?” The answer, according to the DOJ’s attorney, is that “Mt. Clemens . . . make[s] clear that the employer is stuck with its mistake . . . .”

Tyson Foods also shows that despite the Court’s decisions in Dukes and Comcast, which many commentators predicted would be the death knell of employment class actions, courts continue to certify classes where the plaintiffs can muster enough evidence (including statistical “averages” through qualified experts) to overcome the presumption of individualized differences among class members. Further, while the lack of accurate time records is not an insurmountable obstacle to defeating an employee’s claim that he or she (or a group of workers) did not receive overtime for compensable time worked in excess of 40 hours, it could provide an opening under the Mt. Clemens standard for employees to take advantage of “relaxed” standards of proof (“just and reasonable inference”) to show wage violations under the FLSA, which ultimately could allow them to avoid early dismissal and get to a jury.

Is Social Media Eroding Nonsolicitation Agreements?

Are former employees in violation of non-solicitation agreements by using social media to contact their employer’s customers or co-workers? Florham Park Counsel, Lawrence Del Rossi, recently published an article in Law360 discussing the emerging trends regarding the role that social media plays in restrictive covenant case. He also provides practical guidance to employment law practitioners.

Read “Is Social Media Eroding Nonsolicitation Agreements?” here.

Daughter’s Facebook Post Leads to Costly Breach by Father of a Confidentiality Clause in His Settlement Agreement With Former Employer

A recent decision by a Florida appeals court, Gulliver Schools, Inc. v. Snay, stands as a stark reminder of the perils of trying to maintain confidentiality in the age of social media where news can travel faster than the speed of sound and inadvertent dissemination of information that is intended to be “confidential” can be difficult, if not impossible, to prevent.

Patrick Snay sued his former employer, Gulliver Schools, for age discrimination and retaliation under the Florida Civil Rights Act after his contract as the school’s headmaster was not renewed. The parties reached a settlement in the amount of $150,000 ($10,000 in back pay, $80,000 for non-wage damages, and $60,000 in attorney’s fees), and agreed that the “existence or terms” of the agreement were to be kept strictly confidential. The confidentiality provision prohibited Snay from “directly or indirectly” disclosing or discussing the case or the settlement with anyone except “his attorneys or other professional advisors or spouse.” It contained a clawback or liquidated damages provision allowing for the disgorgement of plaintiff’s portion of the settlement payments in the event of a breach.

Only four days after the parties had signed the settlement agreement, the school notified Snay that he had materially breached the agreement based on a Facebook posting of Snay’s college-age daughter, who boasted to approximately 1200 Facebook friends (many of whom were either current or past Gulliver students): “Mama and Papa Snay won the case against Gulliver. Gulliver is now officially paying for my vacation to Europe this summer. SUCK IT.”

Mr. Snay testified that he believed his daughter was retaliated against at Gulliver, that she was “very concerned about” the lawsuit, and that after the settlement was reached he and his wife decided to tell their daughter that the case had settled and that they were happy with the result. They apparently did not tell her that the settlement was confidential or that she should not disclose such information to anyone else. The trial court found that neither Snay’s comments to his daughter nor his daughter’s Facebook comment constituted a breach. The appeals court disagreed and reversed, ruling that Mr. Snay “violated the agreement by doing exactly what he had promised not to do,” and “[h]is daughter then did precisely what the confidentiality agreement was designed to prevent, advertising to the Gulliver community that Snay had been successful in his age discrimination and retaliation case against the school.”

Confidentiality clauses like the one in the Snay/Gulliver settlement agreement are common and should be enforced when they are clear, unambiguous and voluntarily and knowingly agreed to. From a drafting standpoint, if it was important for Mr. Snay to have disclosed certain information about the settlement to his daughter (as he had claimed at his deposition), then the confidentiality provision could have included “immediate family” as permissible recipients of confidential information and have subjected those family members to the same confidentiality obligations as Mr. and Mrs. Snay.

In addition, attorneys should take heed of this opinion in light of their ethical and legal obligations to protect client confidences. The duty to protect privileged and confidential client information extends to current clients (RPC 1.6), former clients (RPC 1.9), and prospective clients (RPC 1.18). Zealous representation and confidentiality are at the foundation of the attorney-client relationship, but if an attorney’s spouse, family member, or co-worker, inadvertently or otherwise posts on social media client or case information that is confidential (e.g., “mom just settled big toxic tort case, off to Mexico for much needed family vacation!”), such disclosure could be disastrous.

Blowing The Wrong Whistle – Close Scrutiny Of Code Of Ethics Dooms Nurse’s Lawsuit Under New Jersey’s Whistleblower Statute

New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA) is remedial legislation designed to protect employees who “blow the whistle” on illegal or unethical activity committed by their employers or co-workers. To be sure, CEPA is a powerful anti-retaliation statute, providing an array of significant remedies to an aggrieved party. However, as the saying goes, with great power comes great responsibility. A recent decision by the Appellate Division, Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc. (decided March 22, 2013), highlights the important gatekeeping functions of trial courts in CEPA cases. Click here for a copy of Hitesman. http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a0140-11.pdf.

Not every employee who “blows a whistle” is a “whistleblower” subject to the protections of CEPA. An employee who lacks an objectively reasonable belief that his or her employer’s conduct violated a law or public policy or constituted improper quality of patient care cannot, as a matter of law, sustain a viable claim under CEPA. The Supreme Court in Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451 (2003) provided the legal framework for trial courts to use to separate the proverbial wheat from the chaff in most CEPA cases. First, the trial court must identify a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to a law or a clear mandate of public policy, that the plaintiff believed was violated by the employer’s conduct. Next, the court must determine whether there is a “substantial nexus between the complained-of conduct and [the] law or public policy identified by the court or the plaintiff.” If the trial court so finds, the jury then must determine whether the plaintiff “actually held a belief and, if so, whether that belief was objectively reasonable.”

In Hitesman, the plaintiff, a nurse who worked at a long-term nursing home facility, disclosed to government regulators “practices of Defendant that he reasonably believed constituted improper quality of patient care and violations of his professional code of ethics.” He sued under CEPA after he was fired for admittedly violating the defendant’s confidentiality policy (improper disclosure of patient information). The trial court allowed the plaintiff’s CEPA claim to proceed to a jury trial, and the jury found in the plaintiff’s favor on liability. However, on appeal the Appellate Division reversed the jury’s verdict.

Applying the analytical framework in Dzwonar for determining whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case under CEPA, the court in Hitesman found that the plaintiff had failed to proffer facts that would support an objectively reasonable belief that a violation of law or clear mandate of public policy by his employer had occurred. The Appellate Division concluded that the plaintiff’s reliance on the American Nursing Association’s Code of Ethics (“Code”), his employer’s Employee Handbook and a Statement of Residents’ Rights, was misplaced because none of these documents constituted a source of law or public policy closely related to the conduct about which the plaintiff claimed he had blown the whistle. While the section of the Code relied upon by the plaintiff provided guidance as to whether he had acted in compliance with the Code in expressing his concerns, nothing in the Code established any standards regarding patient care. As a result, the court held that the plaintiff’s belief that his employer had acted in violation of the Code was not objectively reasonable as a matter of law.

The court in Hitesman also concluded that “generalized statements” in the employer’s Employee Handbook about a commitment to “the best quality of health care” and requirements that its employees comply with all applicable statutes, regulations and ethical standards were “far too vague” to provide a “high degree of public certitude in respect of acceptable versus unacceptable conduct.” Thus, an employee’s reliance on generalized statements that the employer and its employees will comply with the law will not support a CEPA claim.

All too often, plaintiffs in CEPA cases cite a litany of broad and generalized legislative, ethical rule or code of conduct statements to challenge management decisions. Do not let a plaintiff get away with the “throw everything at the wall to see what sticks” approach in CEPA cases. Hitesman and Dzwonar require trial courts to engage in a rigorous analysis to determine whether the plaintiff had, as a matter of law, an objectively reasonable belief that the complained-of conduct violated a law or public policy. Because CEPA does not shield a complainer who simply disagrees with an employer’s course of lawful conduct, close scrutiny of the complained-of conduct by the trial court is essential. As the court in Hitesman explained, it is “not enough for an employee to rest upon a sincerely held – and perhaps even correct – belief that the employer has failed to follow the most appropriate course of action, even when patient safety is involved.” Instead, the employee must have an objectively reasonable belief that a violation of relevant legal authority occurred.