Former Executive’s Race to California Hits a Roadblock in New York

By: David J. Woolf

Like many things in life, there is a perceived formula for success in non-compete cases:  If you are the former employee or his or her new or would-be new employer, conventional wisdom dictates that you identify the restrictions early and consider filing a preemptive declaratory judgment action in a state that is hostile to such agreements (provided the facts permit).  California is the most well-known example, but there are others.  The plan works best if the former employee lives in California (or similarly hostile state) or has other significant connections by virtue of his past or intended future employment.  But now, a New York appellate court has thrown conventional wisdom a curve.

Michael Cusack and Peter Arkley were former Aon executives.  They left Aon on June 13, 2011 to pursue lucrative opportunities with a competitor, Alliant Insurance Services.  The same day, 38 other Aon employees also left, and 22 more followed shortly thereafter.  Aon’s clients came too, with over $20 million in client revenue allegedly flowing from Aon to Alliant.

Arkley and Cusak, along with Alliant, following the familiar formula, filed for a declaratory judgment to invalidate their restrictive covenant agreements in California federal court on the same day they resigned.  Arkley’s chances of success in California seemed particularly good because, although his employment agreement was governed by Illinois law, he both lived and worked in California, and he planned to continue to do so with Alliant.

Aon responded by filing suits in Illinois and New York state courts, and found success in New York in particular.  The New York trial judge, undeterred by the action in California and Arkley’s California connections, enjoined him soliciting business from, and entering into any business relationship with, any of Aon’s clients whom he either procured or whose accounts he worked on in the 24 months prior to his departure.  She also enjoined him from soliciting any Aon employees to work for Alliant.

In January, a New York appellate court affirmed.  The court rejected Arkley’s calls to defer to the first-filed California action, calling it “a preemptive measure undertaken to gain a tactical advantage so as to negate the force and effect of the restrictive covenants, which the parties had freely agreed upon.”  The New York court seized upon the fact that the parties’ agreement had selected Illinois law to govern and held that Illinois law provided for enforcement.

Although the outcome was arguably an unusual one insofar as a New York court entered an injunction against someone who lived and worked in California and intended to do so in his new employment, so too were the facts involved, on many levels.  First, the conduct at issue was particularly egregious in that it involved, among other things, former employees allegedly taking the equivalent of hundreds of thousands of printed pages of documents, including highly-sensitive documents; a coordinated departure strategy that included filing a declaratory judgment action in California within an hour of the key executives’ resignations; a mass exodus of both employees and clients; and alleged violations of an earlier-issued temporary restraining order.  Second, the executives involved were high-level employees, who received seven-figure compensation from Aon, at least in part in consideration of the very restrictions they sought to avoid.  Third, the restrictive covenants at issue were not blanket non-competes, but rather restricted the executives from disclosing confidential information, from calling on the customers that they serviced for Aon, and from soliciting other Aon employees for employment.  In different circumstances, involving lower-level employees, who are alleged to have engaged in less egregious conduct and/or who are subject to broader restrictive covenants, the former employer may not fare as well.

Still, the takeaways are unmistakable.  First, choice of law is critical, and an employer loses a tactical advantage when it fails to select a state law that, if not favorable to it, at least gives it a fair shot.  Second, living and working in California is not the end all be all, and racing into a California court does not guarantee the former employee and his new employer freedom from the employee’s post-separation obligations.  Solid facts and a solid agreement, presented in a jurisdiction that follows a more traditional approach to restrictive covenants, can still result in success for the former employer.

FTC Approves Settlement of Noncompetition Case Against Renown Health Voiding Ten Physicians’ Noncompetition Agreements

By: Mark E. Furlane

On November 30, 2012, the Federal Trade Commission voted 5-0 to approve the settlement of a complaint it filed against Renown Health on August 3, 2012.  A settlement was promptly reached between the FTC and Renown Health avoiding the unwinding of two acquisitions made by Renown Health of two independent local cardiology groups.

The complaint alleged that Renown Health’s acquisition of competitor cardiology groups in Reno, Nevada, Sierra Nevada Cardiology Associates, Inc. (“NCA”) and Reno Heart Physicians, Inc. (“RHP”), and the employment of the 32 physicians employed by these entities, “is likely to lead to anticompetitive effects including increased prices and reduced non-price competition.”  The acquisitions resulted in Renown Health employing approximately 97% of the cardiologists serving private patients in the Reno area.  The FTC complaint focused on the fact that all of the employed physicians were subject to employment agreements containing noncompetition and non-solicitation provisions prohibiting them from practicing medicine or soliciting former patients for two years in the Reno area after termination of their employment.  As a result of the noncompetition and non-solicitation agreements, competition for cardiology services would have to come from without, which the complaint alleged to be unlikely because of certain barriers to market entry.  The State of Nevada, through its attorney general, worked with the FTC in investigating and resolving the matter.  The Nevada AG filed a similar complaint and entered into an agreement with Renown Health similar to the FTC consent decree.

The parties reached a settlement this fall through an agreed consent decree that would avoid having to unravel the mergers.  The FTC has now approved the consent decree under which Renown Health released up to ten cardiologists previously employed by NCA or RHP from their noncompetition and non-solicitation restrictions.

This result signals a cautionary note for those hospitals and health care systems with an overly large market share in a geographical market who seek to further expand their employed physicians in a given practice area.  In this case, the 88% market share for the cardiologists was a daunting statistic for Renown Health to overcome.  Going forward, this is just one more potential road block that health care providers must consider before acquiring additional physician practices and increasing its employed physician roles.

 

California Rejects Enforcement of Restrictive Covenant in Employment Agreement

By: Elena S. Min

A California Court of Appeal recently rejected a covenant not to compete included in an employment agreement, although it was related to a transaction for the sale of goodwill of a business – one of the well-recognized exceptions to the general rule in California that limits restrictive covenants.

In Fillpoint, LLC v. Maas, No. G045057 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2012), Michael Maas, a shareholder in Crave Entertainment Group, Inc., sold his shares in the company when it was acquired by Handleman Company.  That transaction was executed through a stock purchase agreement which contained a three year covenant not to compete.  A month later, Maas entered into an employment agreement, which contained a one year covenant not to compete that became effective as of the date of the termination of his employment with Crave.  Three years after the sales transaction, Maas resigned from Crave and began working for a competing company.  Handleman’s successor, Fillpoint, LLC, sued Maas for breaching his employment agreement (as well as his new employer for interference with contract).

Fillmore argued that the restrictive covenant in Maas’ employment agreement was enforceable because it fell within the sale of goodwill exception contained in California Business and Professional Code section 16600.  The Court of Appeal rejected that argument and found that, although the stock purchase agreement and employment agreement constitute a single transaction and each agreement referenced the other, only the purchase agreement was focused on protecting the acquired goodwill.  In contrast, the Court of Appeal stated that the covenant contained in the employment agreement impermissibly targeted an employee’s fundamental right to pursue his or her profession and was therefore unenforceable.

This recent decision reaffirms the limited scope of the exceptions to the general rule in California that covenants not to compete are unenforceable.  Therefore, employers must be mindful when drafting such covenants to ensure that they fall squarely within one or more of the recognized exceptions.

Georgia’s Pro-Employee Restrictive Covenant Law Is Back (If Only Briefly)

By: David J. Woolf

Just when it seemed safe for companies with employees in Georgia to try to enforce their restrictive covenant agreements, the Eleventh Circuit has brought back to life – if only for one last hurrah – the old Georgia law that made non-competition and other restrictive covenant agreements virtually impossible to enforce.  The Court did so in Becham, et al. v. Synthes USA, et al., No. 11-14495, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11225 (11th Cir. June 4, 2012), by holding that Georgia’s first attempt to re-write the State’s non-competition law was unconstitutional and that the second attempt did not apply to the agreement at issue.

The backdrop, well known to those who practice in Georgia, is a frustrating one for employers who have attempted to enforce restrictive covenant agreements.  For years, Georgia statutory and constitutional law disfavored non-competition and other restrictive covenants and, through a very narrow view of what is reasonable and a refusal to reform overly broad agreements, made them nearly impossible to enforce.  This changed beginning in 2009 when the Georgia legislature approved a law allowing the enforcement of previously unenforceable covenants, by, among other things, creating presumptively reasonable time periods for restrictions, removing the requirement of an expiration date for certain confidentiality covenants, and, perhaps most importantly, giving Georgia courts the ability to reform overly broad agreements.  The law was subject to a constitutional amendment permitting the change, which occurred on November 2, 2010 through Georgia’s citizens’ ratification of the amendment.

The confusion then began.  The new law went into effect on November 3, 2010, the day after the constitutional amendment was ratified.  The constitutional amendment, however, did not take effect until January 1, 2011.  Fortunately, the Georgia General Assembly recognized the gap and passed a second law that repealed the first law and authorized a second, virtually identical law effective May 11, 2011.  Problem solved, right?

Not so fast.  Unfortunately for Synthes, the restrictive covenants at issue were reaffirmed on December 1, 2010, after the effective date of the first law, but before the effective date of the second law.  The Eleventh Circuit thus focused on the first law and held that, because the law was implemented before the constitutional amendment went into effect, it “was unconstitutional and void the moment it went into effect.”  The Court then went back to “old” Georgia law, and like so many agreements before it, found Mr. Becham’s restrictive covenant agreement unenforceable.

Although the result was an unfortunate one for Synthes, the impact can be managed going forward by making note of the critical May 11, 2011 date.  Restrictive covenant agreements entered into on or after May 11, 2011 will be subject to the second new law, and hence subject to more favorable court review.  Agreements entered into prior to that date, even if after the November 2, 2010 constitutional amendment, will be judged under “old,” pro-employee Georgia law.  Employers of Georgia employees will therefore want to make sure that their restrictive covenant agreements are effective on or after May 11, 2011 and, where they are not, arrange for the execution of new agreements.