Spring Cleaning in California: The Fair Employment and Housing Council’s New Regulations

On April 1, 2016, the California Fair Employment and Housing Council’s (FEHC) new Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) regulations take effect. The overarching purpose of the new FEHC regulations is to harmonize the regulations with recent court decisions. However, employers should take note of some of the more significant changes the new regulations impose, including:  (a) expanding and clarifying the scope of employers covered under the FEHA; (b) requiring employers to develop specific, detailed anti-discrimination/anti-harassment policies and internal procedures; and (c) enlarging employers’ training and related recordkeeping obligations. Notably, the new regulations also clarify employers’ potential liability for claims regarding alleged failure to prevent unlawful harassment or discrimination, as well as the remedies available.

More Employers Are Covered

The FEHA only covers employers who regularly employ five or more persons.  See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(d). Under the prior regulations, to “regularly employ” five or more individuals meant that the employer employed five or more individuals in each working day in any 20 consecutive calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. The new regulations further clarify that, in determining whether an employer regularly employs five or more individuals, consideration must be given to out-of-state employees. Thus, under the new regulations, an employer who employs only three employees in California is still an “employer” for purposes of the FEHA if it employs two or more employees outside of California (see footnote 1). The new regulations further clarify that, in counting the number of employees, individuals on leaves of absence or suspensions are counted.

Expanded Anti-Harassment, Anti-Discrimination, And Anti-Retaliation Policy And Procedure Requirements

Under the FEHA, employers have an affirmative obligation to prevent unlawful harassment and/or discrimination. To that end, pursuant to California Government Code Section 12950(b), employers are (and have been) required to distribute the DFEH’s brochure (DFEH-185) on unlawful sexual harassment, or provide the information in a comparable writing. However, the FEHC’s new regulations mandate that, in addition to the preexisting obligation with respect to providing the DFEH’s brochure (or comparable information), employers must now promulgate their own anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies that satisfy a variety of detailed requirements.

Specifically, under the new regulations, employers’ anti-discrimination/anti-harassment policies must:

  • • Be in writing;
  • • List all current protected categories covered under the FEHA;
  • • Indicate that the FEHA prohibits coworkers and third parties, as well as supervisors and managers, with whom the employee comes into contact from engaging in conduct prohibited by the FEHA;
  • • Create a complaint process to ensure that complaints receive:
    • -An employer’s designation of confidentiality, to the extent possible;
    • -A timely response;
    • -Impartial and timely investigations by qualified personnel;
    • -Documentation and tracking for reasonable progress;
    • -Appropriate options for remedial actions and resolutions; and
    • -Timely closures.
  • •Provide a complaint mechanism that does not require an employee to complain directly to his or her immediate supervisor, including, but not limited to the following:
    • -Direct communication, either orally or in writing, with a designated company representative, such as a HR manager, EEO officer, or other supervisor;
    • -A complaint hotline;
    • -Access to an ombudsperson; and/or
    • -Identification of the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as additional avenues for employees to lodge complaints.
  • •Instruct supervisors to report any complaints of misconduct to a designated company representative, so that the company can try to resolve the claim internally (see footnote 2);
  • •Indicate that when an employer receives complaints, it will conduct a fair, timely, and thorough investigation that provides all parties appropriate due process and reaches reasonable conclusions based on the evidence collected;
  • •State that confidentiality will be kept by the employer to the extent possible, but not indicate that the investigation will be completely confidential;
  • •Indicate that if, at the end of the investigation, misconduct is found, appropriate remedial actions will be taken; and
  • •Make clear that employees shall not be exposed to retaliation as a result of lodging a complaint or participating in any workplace investigation.

Under the new FEHC regulations, employers must disseminate their policies by one or more of the following methods:

  1. Providing printed copies of the policies to all employees with an acknowledgment for employees to sign and return;
  2. Sending the policies via email with an acknowledgment return form;
  3. Posting current versions of the policies on a company intranet with a tracking system to ensure that all employees have read and acknowledged receipt of the policies;
  4. Discussing the policies upon hire and/or during new employee orientation/training; and/or
  5. “Any other way that ensures employees receive and understand the policies.”

In addition to providing the policies in English, any employer whose workforce contains 10 percent or more of persons who speak a language other than English must translate their policies into any language(s) spoken by 10 percent or more of their workforce.

Updated Training And Related Recordkeeping Requirements

Pursuant to section 12950.1 of the California Government Code, employers with 50 or more employees have been and are required to provide supervisory employees with a minimum of two hours of sexual harassment training. Pursuant to the new FEHC regulations, in addition to satisfying the existing statutory requirements, the mandatory training must also:

  • •Instruct supervisory employees of their obligation to report potential sexual harassment, discrimination, and/or retaliation of which they become aware;
  • •Provide an overview of the remedies available for sexual harassment victims in civil actions, as well as potential employer/individual exposure and liability; and
  • •Cover “abusive conduct,” as used in Government Code section 12950.1 (see footnote 3), in a “meaningful manner,” including by:  (a) providing a definition of abusive conduct; (b) explaining the negative effects of abusive conduct on the victim and others in the workplace; (c) specifically discussing the elements of abusive conduct; (d) providing examples of abusive conduct; and (e) emphasizing that, unless the conduct is especially severe or egregious, a single act shall not constitute abusive conduct.

In addition to the above updated training requirements, the new FEHC regulations require employers to maintain training-related records for at least two years. Records to be maintained include, but are not limited to:  (a) the names of the participants; (b) the dates of the trainings; (c) sign-in sheets; (d) copies of all certificates of attendance or completion; (e) information regarding the type of training; (f) copies of all written or recorded materials comprising the trainings; and (g) the name of the training provider.

Clarifying Liability For Failure To Prevent Unlawful Discrimination Or Harassment

Recent case law confirmed that California employers cannot be held liable in a civil action for a stand-alone claim for failure to take reasonable steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment or discrimination if there is no underlying unlawful harassment or discrimination. The new FEHC regulations codify that authority and take it further in several respects:

  • •First, the regulations clarify that, in undertaking the individualized assessment of whether an employer failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent unlawful discrimination or harassment, consideration should be given to a variety of factors, including, but not limited to:  (a) the size of the employer’s workforce; (b) the employer’s budget; (c) the nature of the employer’s business; and (d) the facts of each particular case.
  • •Second, the regulations provide that the DFEH may independently seek non-monetary preventative remedies for an employer’s failure to take all reasonable measures to properly prevent harassment or discrimination even if there is no underlying liability for discrimination, harassment, or retaliation.

Take Aways

California employers (and any out-of-state employers with at least five employees total and one employee in California) should promptly review and revise their anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies. In conjunction with that effort, employers should ensure that their procedures with respect to disseminating policies and handling employee complaints satisfy the new requirements. Employers with 50 or more employees should ensure that their sexual harassment trainings encompass the additional topics and should begin retaining all records relating to such trainings for at least two years. For assistance with ensuring compliance, employers should seek advice from qualified California employment counsel.

______________________________

  1. While such out-of-state employees are counted in determining whether an employer falls under the FEHA’s ambit, the new FEHC regulations clarify that out-of-state employees “are not themselves covered by the protections of the … FEHA if the wrongful conduct did not occur in California and …was not ratified by decision makers or participants located in California.”
  2. For employers with 50 or more employees, mandatory sexual harassment training must also instruct supervisors to report any complaints of misconduct to a designated company representative.
  3. See California AB 2053, effective January 1, 2015.

Employers Should Not Rely on Employer Handbooks to Create Enforceable Arbitration Agreements

In a recent published opinion, the New Jersey Appellate Division held that an arbitration clause in an employee handbook was unenforceable because the handbook also contained standard disclaimer language stating that the handbook did not create an employment contract. The Court’s decision, in Morgan v. Raymours Furniture Co., Slip Op. A-2830-14T2, 2015 WL 9646045 (N.J. App. Div. Jan. 7, 2016), makes clear that arbitration agreements should ideally be separate, stand-alone documents, not provisions in employee handbooks.

On three occasions during the course of his employment with defendant Raymours Furniture Company (“Raymours”), plaintiff Grant Morgan acknowledged receipt of an employee handbook. The handbook included a mandatory arbitration clause and a waiver of the employee’s right to sue in court. According to Morgan, after he complained about age discrimination in the workplace, Raymours presented him with a separate, stand-alone arbitration agreement and told him to sign the agreement or Raymours would terminate his employment. Morgan refused to sign and Raymours fired him.

Morgan filed a lawsuit against Raymours (and two individual Raymours managers) asserting age discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, wrongful termination and other causes of action. The defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial judge denied the motion, and the defendants appealed.

In reviewing the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division considered the disclaimer contained in the employee handbook, which stated:

“Nothing in this Handbook or any other Company practice or communication or document, including benefit plan descriptions, creates a promise of continued employment, [an] employment contract, term or obligation of any kind.”

The Court also considered the text of the electronic form on which Morgan had acknowledged receipt of the employee handbook, which stated that the employee received the handbook and:

“understand[s] that the rules, regulations, procedures and benefits contained therein are not promissory or contractual in nature and are subject to change by the company.”

The Court recognized that Raymours included these disclaimers because of New Jersey Supreme Court precedent in Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 309, modified, 101 N.J. 10 (1985), holding that they may be necessary to defeat a claim that the handbook created implied contractual rights and duties. Nonetheless, the Morgan Court explained that “it is simply inequitable for an employer to assert that, during its dealings with its employee, its written rules and regulations were not contractual and then argue, through reference to the same materials, that the employee contracted away a particular right.” Moreover, the Court explained, for an arbitration clause to be enforceable, the employee must “clearly and unambiguously” agree to a waiver of his or her right to sue.

In light of the disclaimers, the Court concluded that Morgan had not clearly and unambiguously agreed to waive his right to sue. The Court reasoned that by “inserting such a waiver provision in a company handbook, which, at the time, the employer insisted was not ‘promissory or contractual,’ an employer cannot expect – and a court, in good conscience, will not conclude – that the employee clearly and unambiguously agreed to waive the valued right to sue.” The Court further reasoned that merely obtaining Morgan’s acknowledgment that he received the handbook did not constitute his agreement not to sue. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision denying the motion to compel arbitration.

One’s immediate reaction to the Morgan decision may be that it leaves employers with two untenable options. They can either: (1) issue handbooks with enforceable arbitration provisions that may inadvertently create contractual rights for employees; or (2) issue handbooks with unenforceable arbitration provisions that will not inadvertently create contractual rights for employees. However, employers also have a third, better option. An employer wishing to implement a mandatory arbitration program should require employees to sign a separate, stand-alone agreement in which the employee clearly and unambiguously agrees to arbitration. Meanwhile, employers should continue to include Woolley disclaimers in their handbooks. Overall, while arbitration programs offer many benefits, it is critical that employers exercise great care to ensure that they are enforceable.

Don’t Labor Under New Laws — What Employers Need to Know About 2016 California Labor Laws

*Originally published by CalCPA in the January/February 2016 issue of California CPA — the original article can be found here.

Many California employers feel over-regulated—and under-appreciated. Yet, surprisingly, proposed new regulation of employers has declined. In 2015, 224 bills introduced in the California Legislature mention “employer,” compared to 574 in 2014. Most of those bills did not pass, and of the ones that did, most were not signed into law by Gov. Brown. One veto blocked a bill (AB 465) that would have made pre-dispute arbitration agreements made as a condition of employment—the kind that are in widespread use across the state—unlawful. Another veto rejected a bill (AB 676) reintroduced this year that would have penalized employers for limiting job prospects of, or discriminating against, applicants who are not currently employed.

Key elements of some of the bills that became law affecting private employers, effective Jan. 1, 2016, unless otherwise mentioned and organized by bill number, follow.

Minimum Wage Boost

As of Jan. 1, the state minimum wage for non-exempt workers will increase to $10 per hour, up from $9. This change also impacts classification of most exempt workers. In addition to strict “duties tests” for administrative, executive and professional wage and hour exemptions, a salary of at least twice the state minimum wage must be paid to meet the “salary basis test.” That increases the annualized exempt salary requirement to $41,600, up from $37,440. Also affected is the retail inside-sales exemption, which requires employees be paid at least 1.5 times the state minimum wage, and at least half of their other earnings be from commissions.

An increasing number of municipalities have increased the minimum wage for companies who employ workers in their jurisdiction. As of July 1, minimum wage at Los Angeles employers with 26 or more employees will increase to $10.50 per hour, and will increase annually up to $15 per hour by July 1, 2021. Minimum wage for employees in San Francisco increased to $12.25 from $11.05 per hour May 1, 2015, and will incrementally increase to $15 per hour by July 1, 2018. Many other cities, including Berkley, Oakland and San Diego have either enacted or have pending minimum wage laws. In addition, living wage laws may require higher minimum wages be paid as a condition of contracting with local, state or federal agencies. Employers should monitor each of the requirements to assure compliance.

Penalties for Pre-offer E-Verify Use

Employers may hire only individuals who have the right to work in the United States—either U.S. citizens or foreign citizens with authorization issued by the federal government. E-Verify, administered by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Social Security Administration (SSA), is an internet-based system that allows employers to determine the eligibility of their employees to work in the United States.

AB 622 continues a California law trend to prevent employment discrimination of immigrants. The new law prohibits employers from using E-Verify to check the employment authorization status of employees or applicants who have not received an offer of employment. Post-offer use of E-Verify remains lawful, as does use required by federal law (such as certain federal contractors) or as a condition of receiving federal funds. In addition to other remedies that may be available, the new law establishes a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 for each unlawful use of the E-Verify system.

AB 622 also mandates employers provide to the affected worker—as soon as practicable—any DHS or SSA notification containing information specific to the worker’s E-Verify case or any nonconfirmation notice, indicating that the E-Verify data entered does not match federal records.

More Labor Commissioner Enforcement Powers

AB 970 expands the Labor Commissioner’s power to enforce local laws regarding overtime and minimum wage, and to issue citations and penalties for violations, except when the local entity has already issued a citation for the same violation.

Labor Code Sec. 2802 requires employers to indemnify for expenses or losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the discharge of the employee’s duties or as a result of obeying the employer’s directions. In addition to a private right of action by the employee to recover these expenditures, AB 970 authorizes the Labor Commissioner to issue citations and penalties against employers who violate Sec. 2802.

Employment Discrimination Clarified

AB 987 clarifies that it is an unlawful employment practice under the Fair Employment and Housing Act for an employer to retaliate or otherwise discriminate against an employee for “requesting” an accommodation for a disability or religious belief or observance, regardless of whether the request was granted.

Employers Can Cure Some Violations to Avoid PAGA

California’s Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) permits an employee to sue to recover civil penalties for certain alleged Labor Code violations that could otherwise be pursued by the Labor and Workforce Development Agency on behalf of the employee and other current or former employees. Employee-side litigants have used the act to leverage penalties on a workforce-wide basis for technical Labor Code violations, even where the employee has not been damaged.

As of Oct. 2, 2015, AB 1506 allows employers the opportunity to correct itemized wage statements (i.e., paystubs) to include missing inclusive dates of the pay period and the name and address of the legal employer, to avoid a PAGA action over those defects. The employer may cure the alleged violation within 33 calendar days of the postmark date of the PAGA notice it receives. The bill requires only a showing that the employer has provided fully compliant paystubs to each aggrieved employee to establish cure.

Whistleblowers’ Family Members Protected

Labor Code secs. 98.6, 1102.5 and 6310 generally prohibit an employer from discharging or taking other adverse action against any employee or applicant who has complained about unlawful discrimination, retaliation or any adverse action; engaged in whistleblowing activity; or complained about unsafe working conditions.

AB 1509 provides that an employer, or a person acting on behalf of the employer, shall not retaliate
against an employee because the employee is a family member of a person who has, or is perceived to have, engaged in any acts protected by these provisions. The term “employer” or “person acting on their behalf ” includes “client employers” (i.e., a business entity that obtains or is provided workers to perform labor within its usual course of business from a labor contractor) or a “controlling employer” (i.e., an employer listed in Labor Code Section 6400(b) regarding multiemployer worksites).

Piece-Rate Worker Pay Requirements

AB 1513, which adds new Labor Code Sec. 226.2 and repeals others, applies to employees who are
compensated on a piece-rate basis for any work performed during a pay period. This new law requires that employees be compensated for rest and recovery periods and “other nonproductive time” separate from any piece-rate compensation as follows:

Rest and recovery periods must be compensated at a regular hourly rate that is no less than the higher of: (i) an “average hourly rate” determined by dividing the total compensation for the workweek, exclusive of compensation for rest and recovery periods and any premium compensation for overtime, by the total hours worked during the workweek; or (ii) the “applicable minimum wage,” defined by the bill as “the highest of the federal, state or local minimum wage applicable to the employment.”

Certain employers, who comply with the applicable minimum wage requirement, have until April 30 to program their payroll systems to perform and record the calculation required under the average hourly rate requirement and comply with the itemized wage statement requirements (see below), so long as such employers pay piece-rate employees retroactively for all rest and recovery periods at or above the applicable minimum wage from Jan. 1–April 30, inclusive, and pay the difference between the amounts paid and the amounts that would be owed under the average hourly rate requirement, together with interest.

Other nonproductive time is that which is under the employer’s control, exclusive of rest and recovery periods, and not directly related to the activity being compensated on a piece-rate basis. That time must be compensated at an hourly rate that is no less than the applicable minimum wage. The amount of other nonproductive time may be determined either through actual records or the employer’s reasonable estimates, whether for a group of employees or for a particular employee, of other nonproductive time worked during the pay period.

Finally, in addition to the list of items required by Labor Code Sec. 226 for itemized wage statements, Sec. 226.2 requires that the statements include the:

  • Total hours of compensable rest and recovery periods;
  • Rate of compensation; and
  • Gross wages paid for those periods during the pay period.

Employers who do not pay an hourly rate for all hours worked in addition to piece-rate wages must also list on the itemized statements the total hours of other nonproductive time, rate of compensation for that time and gross wages paid for that time during the pay period.

Hospital Meal Period Waivers

For non-exempt employees, Labor Code Sec. 512 requires two meal periods for work periods of more than 10 hours. However, employees are allowed to waive their second meal period if the total hours worked in their shift are no more than 12. Effective Oct. 5, 2015, SB 327 made statutory the longstanding rule under Sec. 11(D) of Wage Order 5 that health care industry employees who work shifts in excess of eight total hours in a workday are permitted to waive their second meal period. The bill effectively sets aside a contrary appellate court decision.

Equal Pay Act for Substantially Similar Work

SB 358, known as the California Fair Pay Act (CFPA), subjects employers to one of the strictest and most aggressive equal pay laws in the country.

Under the CFPA, an employer is prohibited from paying employees of the opposite sex lower wage
rates for “substantially similar work, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort and responsibility, and performed under similar working conditions.”

Previously, the equal pay statute was more limited. It prohibited employers from paying employees of the opposite sex in the same establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility, and performed under similar working conditions. The standard permits employees to bring an unequal pay claim based on wage rates in any of their employer’s facilities and in other job categories as long as the work is substantially similar.

The employer’s defense burden has increased under the CFPA. An employer must establish that the entire wage differential is based on the reasonable application of one or more of the following:

  • A seniority system;
  • A merit system;
  • A system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or
  • A bona fide factor other than sex—such as education, training or experience.

The last factor will apply if the employer shows that the factor is not the result of a sex-based differential in compensation, is related to the position and is consistent with business necessity. An employee can defeat this defense by proving that an alternative business practice exists that would serve the same business purpose without producing the wage differential.

Seeking to decrease pay secrecy, the CFPA further prohibits employers from enacting rules, policies or otherwise engaging in conduct that prohibits employees from disclosing their own wages, discussing the wages of others, asking about other employees’ wages or aiding and encouraging employees to exercise rights under the CFPA. Yet, no one, including an employer, is obligated to disclose employees’ wages.

Finally, the CFPA prohibits discharge, discrimination and retaliation of employees for asserting rights under the act. The statute, as amended by the CFPA, permits a civil action seeking reinstatement, lost wages and interest, an equal amount as liquidated damages, lost benefits, other equitable relief and attorneys fees recovery. Finally, the CFPA requires that employers maintain records of employees’ “wages and rates of pay, job classifications, and other terms and conditions of employment” for a three-year period.

Wage Garnishment Restrictions

SB 501 amends, repeals and adds Sec. 706.050 of the Code of Civil Procedure, relating to wage garnishment. The new law reduces the prohibited amount of an individual judgment debtor’s weekly disposable earnings subject to levy under an earnings withholding order from exceeding the lesser of 25 percent of the individual’s weekly disposable earnings or 50 percent of the amount by which the individual’s disposable earnings for the week exceed 40 times the state minimum hourly wage, or applicable local minimum hourly wage, if higher, in effect at the time the earnings are payable.

Employee Time Off

California’s Kin Care Law allows employees to use half of their accrued sick leave to care for a “family member” (as defined). The Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families Act (Paid Sick Leave Act) SB 579, which went into effect July 1, requires certain mandatory accrual of paid sick days. The bill effectively trues-up the two statutes by defining “sick leave” as leave provided for use by the employee during an absence from employment for purposes permitted by the Paid Sick Leave Act; prohibiting an employer from denying an employee the right to use sick leave; and taking specific discriminatory action against an employee for using, or attempting to exercise the right to use, sick leave for these purposes.

In other words, employees may use paid sick leave for their own health condition or preventative care, a family member’s health condition or preventative care, and if the employee is a victim of domestic assault, sexual violence and stalking. Further, “family member” now includes a child, regardless of age or dependency (including adopted, foster, step or legal ward), parent (biological, adoptive, foster, step, in-law or registered domestic partner’s parent), spouse, registered domestic partner, grandparent, grandchild or siblings.

The Family School Partnership Act applies only to employers with 25 or more employees and permits an employee—defined as a parent, guardian or grandparent having custody of a child in school (grades 1–12) or child day care facility—unpaid leave of up to 40 hours each year (and no more than eight hours in a calendar month) to participate in school activities, subject to specified conditions. SB 579 amends this act by changing its scope from “child day care facility” to “child care provider” and adding leave rights for stepparents or foster parents, or one who stands in loco parentis to a child. The new law also allows employees to take unpaid time off to enroll or reenroll their children in a school or with a licensed child care provider.

Even More Labor Commissioner Enforcement Powers

SB 588 provides the California Labor Commissioner with additional powers to enforce judgments against employers arising from the employers’ nonpayment of wages. The new law, among other things, authorizes the Labor Commissioner to use any of the existing remedies available to a judgment creditor and to act as a levying officer when enforcing a judgment pursuant to a writ of execution; and issue a notice of levy if the levy is for a deposit, credits, money or property in the possession or under the control of a bank or savings and loan association or for an account receivable or other general intangible owed to the judgment debtor by an account debtor.

If an employer fails to pay a judgment for unpaid wages within 30 days of it becoming “final” (i.e., exhaustion of appeals), the employer must stop doing business in California unless it posts bond up to $150,000 (depending on the unsatisfied portion of the judgment). And the Labor Commissioner can issue a “stop order” to suspend all business operations to enforce this new provision.

What’s Next?
Employers should consider how these new laws impact their workplaces, and then review and update their personnel practices and policies with the advice of experienced attorneys or human resource professionals.

U.S. Supreme Court Continues To Reaffirm Concepcion, But Dodges Iskanian Again

On December 14, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed its previous ruling that any state law that treats arbitration agreements less favorably than other types of agreements is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.  Specifically, in a decision handed down in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, No. 14-462, reaffirmed its decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011), that the Federal FAA, which embodies the federal policy favoring arbitration, preempts all special state law rules that uniquely burden arbitration agreements.  Although the Imburgia decision was a consumer class action, the Court’s approach indirectly confirms its continued support for the enforceability of employment arbitration agreements, including those with class action waivers.  While Imburgia suggests that class action waivers are here to stay, the Court’s simultaneous decision to deny review to a case challenging the California Supreme Court’s ruling in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles LLC, 59 Cal.4th 348 (2014), suggests that the Court may exercise some restraint when it comes to state-specific workarounds, at least for the time being.

Imburgia

DIRECTV and its customers entered into service contracts that included binding arbitration agreements with class action waivers.  The agreements specified, however, that the entire arbitration provision would be unenforceable if the “law of your state” made class arbitration waivers unenforceable.  At the same time, the agreements declared that they were governed by the FAA.

Plaintiffs Amy Imburgia and Kathy Griener (“Plaintiffs”) sued DIRECTV in California state court seeking damages, but DIRECTV moved to compel arbitration.  The state trial court denied DIRECTV’s request and it appealed.  The California Court of Appeal decided that the enforceability of the arbitration provision turned on the meaning and import of the language the “law of your state” in the agreements.  It reasoned that even though Concepcion held that the FAA preempted the California Supreme Court’s decision in Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.4th 148 (2005), which invalidated class arbitration waivers, the parties had expressly incorporated the law of the State of California – not federal law.  Relying on two provisions of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), which invalidated any waiver of the right to bring class actions, the Court of Appeal found that the more specific language concerning the “law of your state” controlled over the more general language indicating that the agreements were governed by the FAA, and held that the arbitration provision was, thus, unenforceable.  The California Supreme Court denied discretionary review and DIRECTV appealed.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and reaffirmed Concepcion’s central holding that arbitration-specific state law defenses to enforcement are preempted by the FAA.  The majority noted that the contract language was not ambiguous and presumably only meant to incorporate valid state law.  Thus, because Discover Bank was no longer valid, that case’s holding was not incorporated.  The majority also noted that the Court of Appeals’ approach was different than in any other context – i.e., it would not have incorporated invalid state law in deciding the enforceability of any other type of contract.  The majority further explained that the Court of Appeals’ decision was rooted in the (erroneous) notion that an invalid state law remained in effect even after it had been authoritatively invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court, as was the case here.

Wahid

In 2014, in Iskanian, the California Supreme Court held a state law that prohibits waiver of the right to bring non-class representative actions pursuant to California’s Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”), California Labor Code §§ 2698 et seq., was not preempted by the FAA.  The U.S. Supreme Court denied review of Iskanian and, in January 2015, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied Iskanian’s holding in federal court.

Earlier this year, CarMax Auto Superstores California LLC (“CarMax”) petitioned for certiorari in CarMax Auto Superstores California LLC v. Wahid, effectively asking the U.S. Supreme Court to review Iskanian’s holding, arguing that it was at-odds with Concepcion and its progeny.  However, despite its favorable ruling in Imburgia the same day, the U.S. Supreme Court denied CarMax’s petition for certiorari.

Takeaways

Although Imburgia’s holding reconfirms that employers can rely on arbitration agreements with class action waivers so long as the current Roberts court majority exists, the Court’s refusal to hear a challenge to Iskanian suggests that some level of interference with arbitration agreements will be permitted.  California employers will have to wait until the Ninth Circuit or California Supreme Court again tee up the issue to determine how cases like Iskanian can be reconciled with Imburgia and Concepcion, if at all.  Meanwhile, this uncertainty will permit California plaintiffs’ lawyers continued opportunities to engage in costly, large-scale representative actions.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Finally Kills Hope That Magic Words Can Substitute for Valuable Consideration in Exchange for Post-Offer Restrictive Covenants

To most practitioners, Pennsylvania law governing the consideration required for an employment agreement containing a restrictive covenant (e.g., a non-competition clause or non-solicitation clause) has been simple: (1) if the restrictive covenant is entered at the inception of the employment, the consideration to support the covenant is the award of the position itself; (2) if the restrictive covenant is entered during employment (i.e., post-offer), it is enforceable only if the employee receives new and valuable consideration—that is, some corresponding benefit or a favorable change in employment status. To avoid the need to provide a current employee additional consideration, some employers added magic language to their restrictive covenants, based on a statute from 1927, which arguably made a restrictive covenant enforceable without new consideration.

Specifically, the Uniform Written Obligations Act (“UWOA”) states that a written promise “shall not be invalid or unenforceable for lack of consideration, if the writing also contains an additional express statement, in any form of language, that the signer intends to be legally bound.” Thus, according to the terms of the statute, using the magic language, “the parties intend to be legally bound” erased any deficiencies in the consideration actually exchanged. Therefore, despite a significant line of authority requiring valuable consideration for post-offer restrictive covenants, an employer looking to enforce a post-offer covenant that lacked additional consideration could hold out hope of nevertheless enforcing the covenant.

Earlier this week, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court extinguished any flicker of hope with its decision in Socko v. Mid-Atlantic Sys. of CPA, Inc., No. 142 MAP 2014 (Pa. Nov. 18, 2015). There, the employer, Mid-Atlantic, was seeking to enforce a restrictive covenant against a former salesperson, David Socko. When Mr. Socko began his second stint of employment with Mid-Atlantic (he had resigned but was rehired four months later), Mr. Socko signed a new employment agreement containing a two-year noncompetition covenant. While still employed, Mr. Socko signed another, more restrictive, covenant not to compete. That agreement also expressly stated that the parties intended to be “legally bound,” but Mr. Socko apparently did not receive anything of value in return for his signature.

When Mid-Atlantic sought to enforce the agreement signed by Mr. Socko during his employment, Mr. Socko argued that the non-competition clause was unenforceable, as it was not supported by consideration. Mid-Atlantic, citing the parties’ pledge in the agreement to be “legally bound,” contended that the UWOA did not allow Mr. Socko to challenge the validity of the terms of the agreement on the basis of a lack of consideration. Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed. The Court concluded that the UWOA does not save a post-offer restrictive covenant that otherwise lacks consideration. In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited Pennsylvania’s historical disfavor of covenants in restraint of trade and the fact that Pennsylvania courts have, for years, mandated strict compliance with the basic contractual requirement of consideration in the context of post-offer restrictive covenants.

For employers, this case serves as a reminder that they must provide new consideration in exchange for a post-offer restrictive covenant. To avoid this situation altogether, employers should consider whether they should insist, at the time of hiring, on having employees (especially those employees who will be in contact with customers or will have access to sensitive information) enter post-employment restrictive covenants. Agreements entered at the time of hiring are rarely subject to challenge for lack of consideration. Otherwise, employers will need to give up something of value in order to create a binding restrictive covenant. Continued at-will employment—which is sufficient consideration under most states’ laws—is not sufficient under Pennsylvania law. Rather, employers will need to offer more, and Pennsylvania courts have found that the following suffice as new consideration in exchange for a post-offer restrictive covenant: a promotion, a change from part-time to full-time employment, or a beneficial change to a compensation package of bonuses, insurance benefits, and severance benefits. Other valuable promises may also suffice depending on the circumstances.

Beware of the Literal and Hypothetical When Considering Work Rules

National Labor Relations Board activity in the area of work rules, among other areas, has become the new normal. Employers have come to expect that the Board will find a work rule unlawful if the rule, taken literally, could hypothetically interfere with an employee’s right to engaged in “concerted activities” – legal speak for two or more employees raising issues about the terms or conditions of their employment. Now, the Board is also finding success on appeal.

Most recently, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals decided Hyundai America Shipping Agency, Inc. v. NLRB, a case in which Hyundai appealed the Board’s finding that certain work rules in its handbook violated the National Labor Relations Act because they had a tendency to interfere with its employees’ right to engaged in concerted activities. Those work rules included: (1) a prohibition on employees discussing matters under investigation by the company, (2) a limit on the disclosure of information from Hyundai’s electronic communication and information systems, (3) a prohibition on performing non-work activities during “working hours,” and (4) a provision urging employees to make complaints to their immediate supervisor or human resources employees rather than to fellow employees. The Court affirmed the Board’s decision as to the first three rules, holding that:

A rule prohibiting, as a blanket matter, the discussion of matters under investigation is problematic because it limits an employee’s right to discuss his or her own employment;

A rule prohibiting the disclosure of information on the employer’s electronic systems except to authorized persons is problematic because it could prevent an employee from sharing non-confidential information, including information about the terms or conditions of his or her employment; and

A rule prohibiting an employee from performing non-company work during “working hours” is unlawful because the term working hours – unlike “working time” – could be read to prohibit employees from communicating during breaks.

Interestingly, the Court reversed the Board as to the fourth rule, finding that a rule “urging” employees with a complaint to speak with supervisors or HR rather than co-workers is permissible because it merely urges employees to so act, rather than acting as a prohibition.

So what does this mean for employers? First, the Board’s assault on employer work rules will continue, given that this is an area of frequent disconnect between the Board’s interpretation of the law and common employer practice. Second, employers need to read their rules literally and consider hypothetical scenarios, even when the rule is proper and sensible in 95 percent or more of such scenarios.

For example, an employer can limit employee communications during an investigation, but not all such discussions on a per se basis. The employer should evaluate the issue on a case-by-case basis and consider whether it has a legitimate business justification requiring confidentiality (such as when there is a basis to believe that a disclosure will put evidence at risk or otherwise compromise the investigation). Likewise, an employer may very well expect (legitimately) that its employees will not disclose internal company information, but the rule memorializing that expectation should be limited to confidential information and exclude information about one’s own terms and conditions of employment, so as not to chill the activities of employees who want to talk about their own employment terms. Lastly, it makes all the sense in the world for employers to expect that their employees will perform only work activities while working. But the proper terminology should be used to ensure that employees are not restricted during breaks.

It is noteworthy that, in finding the rule about disclosing information on the employer’s electronic systems improper, the Hyundai Court acknowledged that a “reasonable reader” might understand the rule to be limited to confidential information, which would make it permissible. Unfortunately, “reasonableness” is not the standard; what is possible is. Accordingly, employers would be wise to review their rules carefully and literally to make sure that they are using the most precise language possible to describe the prohibited conduct and that the prohibitions cannot be interpreted – even in a strained way – to limit protected conduct.

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